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This research focuses on the development of the jurisprudence of the infant colony 
of Van Diemen’s Land now known as Tasmania, with particular interest on the law 
of defamation.  
 
During the first thirty years of this British penal colony its population was subject to 
changes. There were the soldiery, who provided the basis of government headed by 
a Lieutenant Governor, the indigenous people, the convicts, and gradually an influx 
of settlers who came enthused by governmental promises of grants of land. In 
addition to these free settlers there were a selection of convicts who, under a process 
of something akin to manumission under Roman Law, became upon completion of 
their sentence, eligible for freedom and possibly a grant of land.  
 
There developed a spirit of competition amongst the settlers, each wanted to become 
more successful than the others. The favourite means of distinguishing oneself was 
the uttering or publication of damaging words against a person who was perceived 
to be a rival. Various defamation actions between 1805 and 1835 are discussed, 
providing a fascinating insight into the emergence of a Rule of Law, however 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE AIMS AND PARAMETERS OF THE PROJECT 
 
1. The Aim of the project 
This study aims to identify the principles revealed in selected cases in colonial Van 
Diemen’s Land in the areas of defamation during the years 1805 to 1835. 
 
This study is set in Van Diemen’s Land. Van Diemen’s Land is the name formerly given 
to the island state of Australia which is now known as Tasmania.  According to James 
Boyce (2008)
1 the name Tasmania was used as early as 1820 in a guide for settlers 
written by Charles Jeffreys. Boyce 
2 further explains that the name Tasmania gradually 
usurped the name Van Diemen’s Land as colonists endeavoured to avoid the convict 




Figure (l): Map of Van Diemen‘s Land constructed for Lieutenant Governor Arthur, circa 1826
3 
                                                 
1 James Boyce, Van Diemen’s Land, (Melbourne, Victoria: Black Inc., 2008), 158 
2 ibid  
3 Map of Van Diemen’s Land, circa 1826, original in National Archives Office, Kew, Great Britain 2 
 
Van Diemen’s Land was discovered by Abel Jansen Tasman in 1642. He named it Van 
Diemen’s Land after the governor of Java, by whom he had been sent out with two small 
vessels to ascertain the extent of the great south land, New Holland.
4 Van Diemen’s 




The selected Van Diemen’s Land cases are investigated in accordance with the 
methodology explained in detail in Chapter Two of this thesis, to identify the power and 
powerlessness dichotomy and the values espoused. Through the identification of the 
power and powerlessness dichotomy and values upheld in decisions, the study aims to 
examine the extent to which the Rule of Law was followed in the selected slander, libel 
and criminal libel cases during the period 1805 to 1835. Being based upon selected cases, 
the study does not purport to be a complete nor continuous examination of defamation in 
Van Diemen’s Land between the years 1805 – 1835. 
 
The doctrine of the Rule of Law is based upon the tenet that all men are equal before the 
law, whether they be officials or not (except the Queen).
6 It follows that the acts of 
officials in carrying out the behests of the executive government are cognisable by the 
ordinary courts and judged by the ordinary law. Essentially this means that there is an 
absence of arbitrary power, with offenders only being punished for a breach of the 
ordinary law, and in the ordinary courts.  The Rule of Law also upholds fundamental 
                                                 
4 William Brackley Wildey, Australasia and the Oceanic Region, (Melbourne: George Robertson, 
MDCCCXXVl), 315 
5 ibid 
6 P. G. Osborn, A Concise Law Dictionary,  (5
th edn.)  (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1964), 285 3 
 
rights of the citizen, such rights being the freedoms  of speech and  of meeting and 
association. These freedoms, according to the Rule of Law, are rooted in the ordinary 
law, and not upon any special constitutional guarantees.
7 
 
While the year 1803 was the year the English established their settlement on the island, 
the absence of defamation case reports prior to 1805 is the reason for the discussion of 
cases beginning in 1805.  The study ends with cases in the year 1835 because in that year 
the Chief Justice ceased sitting on the colony’s  Executive Council.
8  In 1835 it was 
considered improper for the head of the judiciary to exercise executive functions.
9  
 
Thus in 1835 the blurring of the judiciary with the exercise of executive function came to 
an end. This was of immense importance for the Rule of Law which, at that point, ceased 
to be fettered by the interdependence and intimacy of the official function and 
relationship of the Lieutenant Governor Arthur and the Chief Justice Pedder. The year 
1835 was also important from an economic and sociological perspective. Roberts 
(1935)
10 notes that Van Diemen’s Land in 1835 was at the beginning of a serious sixty 
year economic depression, noting that it was heavily overstocked with one million sheep, 
                                                 
7 ibid  
8 W. A. Townsley, The Struggle for Self-Government in Tasmania 1842 – 1856, (Hobart: Government 
Printer, 1951),  27,  relies on The Van Diemen’s Land Executive Council Minutes of 17/5/1839 which  
reveal that due to an administrative error by the clerks in the Colonial Secretary’s Office, Chief Justice  
Pedder was reappointed to the Executive Council and resumed his seat on 17 May 1839. The Minutes 
further reveal that in consequence of a memo from Lieutenant Governor Franklin to Goderich of 18/5/1839, 
the error was subsequently rectified. Correspondence from Russell to Franklin dated 15/10/1839 reveals 
that His Honour’s role was replaced on the Executive Council by the Chief Police Magistrate. 
9 ibid, 6 and 26 and Gooderick to Arthur 13/3/1835 
10 Stephen H. Roberts,  The Squatting Age in Australia 1835 – 1847,  (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1935),  6-7 4 
 
had a Caucasian population nearing forty thousand  people, as many bond as free, 
extraordinarily unscientific agriculture, and an unceasing flood of convicts.   
 
Through deliberation and reflection upon the selected comment of those who decided 
cases, counsel, parties, and the decisions themselves, the researcher retrieves specific 
material which  discloses  the power and powerlessness dichotomy and values.  This 
material provides the basis for identifying the extent to which the Rule of Law  was 
observed. 
    
The intention of this project is not to legitimate particular decisions, methods or 
comment: rather, the intention is to determine the extent to which the Rule of Law was 
followed. 
 
2. Definitions of key terms  
 
Key terms used in the discussion of cases include the terms defamation, principle, value 
and law. 
 
Defamation is used as a generic umbrella term for the species of slander, libel and 
criminal libel. Each of these terms is further defined according to common law and 
English statute later in this chapter.  
 5 
 
The adoption of the essentially descriptive term ‘principle’ derives primarily from the 
work of Alex Castles (1982)
11 who, in considering  the introduction and role of unacted 
English law into Australia, defines unenacted English law as “a set of principles.”   
In this study the term ‘principle’ is defined as the determining concept for the 
establishment of a basic norm of right and wrong.  
 
The term ‘value’ is used when discussing the comments and decisions of cases. ‘Value’ is 
defined as the foundation of a principle that determines the concept of a basic norm of 
right and wrong.  For the purposes of the study, ‘value’ and ‘principle’ are considered to 
be consistent, thus, ‘principle’ is used concurrently with ‘value.’  
 
In each case discussed, an attempt is made to identify the underlying value or principle 
that is upheld. It may well be that the principles which are identified are the ethics or 
values espoused by decision-makers, counsel or parties and may derive from English 
common law,  statute and/or the specific context of Van Diemen’s Land. 
 
The principles identified as determining the application of the law of slander, libel and 
criminal libel are taken to be indices of the extent to which the Rule of Law applied to 
defamation cases in Van Diemen’s Land during the years 1805 to 1835. They may also 
comprise the jurisprudence in this area of the law at that time and for the selected cases. 
The term ‘jurisprudence’ in this study is the term used to designate the total cohort of 
principles which define each of the three species of defamation: slander, libel and 
criminal libel. 
                                                 
11 Alex Castles,  An Australian Legal History, (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1982), 495 6 
 
 
3. English law receivable when the English community began in Van Diemen’s Land 
 
No directives were given by England on the substantive law to be applied in Van 
Diemen’s Land
12. Thus, in reality English Common Law receivable at the time the 
English established their community  on the island continued until modified by   
Australian Statute not English Statute.
13  
 
Common law principles could be received subsequently if their character was such that 
they were capable of being received
14. Consequently, in regard to the law of defamation 
in the period 1805 - 1835, principles from subsequent English case law could be adopted 
in Van Diemen’s Land.  
 
4. Principles of English common law 
 
Brix (2006)
15 defines English common law as the incremental development of the law by 
judges through deciding particular cases, with each decision being shown to be consistent 
with earlier decisions by a higher or co-equal court. 
 
When the English arrived in Van Diemen’s Land they brought with them an unshakeable 
belief probably prevailing from Calvin’s Case (1608)
16 that that the laws of a conquered, 
                                                 
12 ibid, 499 
13 ibid,  502 
14 ibid, 505 
15 Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context, (4
th edn.), (London: Thomson Sweet and Maxwell, 
2006), 146 7 
 
non-Christian country, as they perceived Van Diemen’s Land to be,  would immediately 
cease. In reality, however, the laws of the indigenous people in Van Diemen’s Land did 
not immediately cease. Thus, the indigenous people continued to endeavour to live by 
their rules while the English settlers endeavoured to impose English law. The resulting 
mix of the law of English community with that of the indigenous people can be seen as 
producing legal pluralism.  
 
5. Legal pluralism and folk law 
 
The most serious issue identified by Alison Dundes Reuteln and Alan Dundes (1995)
17 
concerning legal pluralism is that of individuals caught between the competing demands 
of two or more legal systems. In Van Diemen’s Land the result was continuing conflict 
between the indigenous people and the English community. 
 
During the administration of Lieutenant Governor Davey 1813 - 1817, the operation of a 
single system of law in the colony of Van Diemen’s Land was promulgated through the 
publication of a Poster.
18  This Poster reveals the English perspective that  one law – 
English law – was to prevail in the colony, and the indigenous people would be treated in 
the same way as the non-indigenous people. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 7 CX0 Rep  2a, 2 St. T 559, 77 English Reports, 377 
17 Alison Dundes Reuteln and Alan Dundes, ‘Folk Law in Conflict,’ Folk Law: Essays in the Theory and 
Practice of  Lex Non Scripta: Vol ll,  (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995),  751-752 
18 The original of Governor Davey’s Proclamation to the Aborigines, 1815, is said to be in the metropolitan 
Art Gallery, New York  8 
 
 
Figure (ll): Lieutenant Governor Davey’s Proclamation to the Aborigines, 1815
19 
 
6. Definitions of law 
 
The promulgation of the Lieutenant Governor Davey’s poster could be seen as fulfilling 
Lon Fuller’s (1964)
20 definition of law as the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to 
the governance of rules. In Van Diemen’s Land law became what the people on whom 
power was conferred to determine disputes would do. This is similar to the notion of the 
                                                 
19 Lieutenant Governor Davey’s Poster, 1815, National Archives, Kew, England 
20 Lon Luvois Fuller, The Morality of Law, 1964,  96 relied upon by in Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory 
and Context, (4
th ed.), (London: Thomson Sweet and Maxwell, 2006), 80-81 9 
 
court’s function held by Oliver Wendell Holmes (1879).
21 Such a notion can be said to 
acknowledge the unpredictability of court and administrative decisions. This tension of 
unpredictability and arbitrariness is apparent in the definition of the law offered by Karl 
N. Llewellyn (1930)
22 with his statement that law is what officials do in disputes:  
 
“The doing of something about disputes, this doing of it reasonably is the business 
of law. And the people who have the doing in charge, whether they be judges or 
sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers, are officials of the law. What these officials 
do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.”  
 
In Van Diemen’s Land between 1805 and 1835, law can be seen as what officials did 
about disputes. Until 1824, when the Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court was 
established, decisions involving disputes were made by officials and administrators from 
professions other than the law. By investigating the power and powerless parameters in 
each case as revealed in comment and the decisions, this study seeks to determine the 
extent of the subsistence of the Rule of Law in the selected cases.   
      
7. Historical jurisprudence 
 
The philosophical foundation of this study accords with historical jurisprudence in that it 
accepts that a community evolves or changes.
23 Thus, the principles identified in the 
                                                 
21 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law,’ 10 Harvard Law Review 1879, 457, 461, ibid,  5 
22 Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study’, Oceana, New York, 1930, 3,  ibid  
23 Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context, (4
th edn),  (London: Thomson Sweet and Maxwell, 
2006), 256 10 
 
cases probably reflect aspects of the community at a particular time in its development.  
This study, however, differs from a strictly historical jurisprudential investigation in that 
it challenges the idea that a community’s stages of development are predictable.  For 
example, in Van Diemen’s Land there were unusual features, the effect of which in 
combination could not be foretold, such as: 
 
•  it was a geographically isolated island,  
•  the English community consisted mainly of male convicts,  
•  there were increasing numbers of non-convicts, often having entrepreneurial 
intentions,  
•  the small indigenous community had a value system, legal regime and language 
unknown to the English, and importantly,  
•  the raison d’être for the English community was to find a place to syphon off the 
very worst offenders against the English law.  
 
Thus, in colonial Van Diemen’s Land, the years 1805-1835 were years of unpredictable 
development. They resulted in:  
 
•  movement between individuals and groups,  
•  competition between individuals, and  
•  the rise of business and commerce,  
 
in an unknown ethnographic environment.  11 
 
 
8. Administrative response to context 
 
This unknown context which confronted the English colonial administrators in Van 
Diemen’s Land required them to respond and adapt with the overall aim of controlling or 
governing. They knew the necessity of demonstrating to the English government that 
they could profitably run the colony.  It is fair to say that the entire English community in 
Van Diemen’s Land was under the psychological imperative to show those ‘at home’ in 
England that they could succeed because of their own skills. Thus the proving of 
independence and wealth maximisation were priorities.  
 
9. Roots of Van Diemen’s Land  jurisprudence 
 
Van Diemen’s Land defamation jurisprudence can be seen to have emerged from the 
seeds of English Law. These seeds were planted when the first consignment of convicts, 
free English and administrative personnel arrived in the island to establish their 
community. The seeds of English law were no different from the seeds of vegetables such 
as green peas, corn, potatoes and other plants brought from England. They were thrown 
onto the soil of the previously untilled soil. Sometimes they were pushed down deep into 
the earth, sometimes they were drilled into furrows, sometimes they were stamped on 
with feet held in shackles or the prongs of a rake held horizontally. Some of the seeds 
grew rapidly to be eaten by the native animals; others were strangled by the wilderness 
but persisted and eventually lived, different from the parent seed; yet others survived, 12 
 
grew strong roots and became as if they had always been there, the same as the parent 
plant they had never known. So much for the analogy of the seeds of a foreign law 
planted in another land.  
 
In the absence of legislation and other directives to the contrary, it can be inferred that 
English law – statute and common - was introduced in Van Diemen’s Land from the time 
of the landing ceremony conducted by Lieutenant Governor Collins on his arrival from 
England.  
 
This  body of English  law  continued in the colonies of New South Wales and Van 
Diemen’s Land up until 1828. It was then that the Australian Courts Act (Imp.)1828
24 
was enacted, with section 24 directing that it shall be the duty of the Supreme courts to 
adjudge and decide as to the application of any such English laws and statutes in the 
colonies. It can thus be inferred that from 1828 it was up to the local colonial Supreme 
courts to determine whether the English statutes continued in the colonies.  
 
10.Relevant English statute law 
 
The relevant English Statute law for defamation goes back centuries. For example in the 
seventeenth century legislation was passed giving committees the power to eject 
schoolmasters found to be conducting a personal scandalous life or were ill affected to 
                                                 
24 9 Geo. lV, Imp., c. 83 13 
 
the Parliament.
25 The parameters  of  scandalous offences was further widened in 1643 in 
an Ordinance for the Regulating of Printing to Suppress the Great Late Abuses and 
Frequent Disorders in Printing many False, Forged, Scandalous, Seditious, Libellous 




The Libel Act (1792),
27 known as Fox’s Libel Act, had a specific role in defamation law, 
being an Act to remove Doubts respecting the Functions of Juries in Cases of Libel
28. 
Defamation law was further formalised in the Criminal Libel Act of 1819,
29 an Act for the 
more effectual Prevention and punishment of Blasphemous and Seditious Libels.  
 
Importantly, for the purposes of this particular project, this latter  Act  enunciates the 
difference between libel and slander.  
 
Firstly, the Criminal Libel Act of 1819
30defines defamation as the exposure of a person 
“…to hatred, ridicule or contempt which causes him to be shunned or avoided or which 
has a tendency to injure him in his office, profession or trade.” Secondly the Act states 
that an action for libel is grounded if such exposure is published in a form to which some 
                                                 
25 Thomas E. Tomlins (ed.), Statutes at Large of England and Great Britain, Vol. 1, (1643-4, Jan. 22), 
(London: George Eyre and Andrews Strahan, MDCCCXl),  i. 371 - 372 
26 ibid, 370 - 372 
27 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 
28 C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait (eds.),  Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660, Vol. 1, (Florida: 
William W. Gaunt and Dons, Inc.,1972),  401-402 
29 60 Geo. 3 and 1 Geo 4 c. 8, in Complete Statutes of England, Vol. X, T. Willes Chitty (ed.), (England: 
Butterworths, 1929), 399-400 
30 ibid 14 
 
degree of permanence attaches, while an action for slander is grounded if the exposure is 
in a transitory for such as an oral statement.  
 
The Criminal Libel Act of 1819
31 also provides essential details for bringing defamation 
proceedings. For example, the time set for bringing an action for slander is within two 
years and for libel within six years. Distinctions between the two actions are drawn. For 
example, libel may be prosecuted by criminal proceedings, while slander cannot. Another 
distinction made in the Act is that for slander, damage must be proved before an action 
can succeed, while for libel only  proof of publication is required. The specific 
requirement relating to a criminal prosecution for libel is expressed, for example, that 
there can only be criminal prosecution for libel if the defamation is likely to cause a 
breach of the peace.  
 
Thus the relevant English legislation applying to defamation law in Van Diemen’s Land 
between 1805 and 1835 was The Libel Act (1792),
32 known as Fox’s Libel Act, which 
was of specific importance in the role respecting the function of juries in cases of libel
33 
and the Criminal Libel Act  of 1819,
34  which expounds  the English law applying  to 




                                                 
31 ibid 
32 32 Geo. 3, Imp., c. 60 
33 C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait  (eds.) op. cit.  401-402 
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11. English common law 
 
English common law combined with English statutes to provide the legacy for the Van 
Diemen’s Land actions in defamation. Some of the early English cases providing seminal 
principles include: 
 






Thorley v Lord Kerry
38,  
R v John Wilkes Esq.
39,  
R v Bear 
40, 
Dominus Rex versus Bear
41, 
The King v Alme and Nott, also called R v Orme and Nott
42, 
Cropp v Tilney 
43, 
Dr Edwards v Dr Wooton (1608)
44, 
The Queen v Drake
45,  and  
John Lamb’s case
46. 
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Essentially, following the case of Lord Townsend v Hughes,
47 the rule laid down by the 
court was that words should not be construed either in a rigid or mild sense; but 
according to their genuine and natural meaning and agreeable to the common 
understanding of all men. This tenet was followed in Gardener v Atwater,
48 and the rule 
became entrenched that words were to be understood in their usual and obvious sense. 
Thus for defamation cases, the meaning of the words was determined by the meaning 
which prevailed in the context.  
 
This principle is important for the present study because in the penal colony of Van 
Diemen’s Land, where society comprised free people, serving convicts, free convicts or 
emancipists, administrators and indigenous people, it can be expected, that words took on 
meanings and innuendos with specific relevance to the place. It is not surprising, then, 
that cases for alleged defamatory words resulted in protracted argument and discursive 
advocacy in the Court of Van Diemen’s Land. 
 
In the case of Duval v Price
49, an action on the case for slander to correct a judgment of 
error in the Court of the Exchequer, the offending words spoken were “He is disaffected 
to the Government”. The court held that these words were general and uncertain and 
reversed the judgement of first instance. 
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The principle therefore, was established that to make words actionable they must either 
tend to be scandalous and discredit the party, or if true, bring damage to the party of 
whom they are spoken.  The  possibility for endless litigation was introduced by the 
additional premise from this case that a man is actionable only for his own words, and not 
for those expounded or described in a manner other than the speaker intended.  
 
While the potential for escalation in the number of slander actions was introduced by the 
premise of the ‘speaker’s intention’  in Duval v Price,
50 a similar potential for burgeoning 
was instituted in libel cases with the case of Cropp v Tilney (1693).
51 In this case the 
court opened a virtual flood-gate for libel actions when it held that inference imputing ill 
opinion is libel. The facts of the case are that Mr Tilney wrote a letter, stating that Mr 
Cropp, who was standing for parliament, had said: 
“There is a war with France of which I can see no end, unless the young 
gentleman on the other side of the water (innuendo Prince of Wales) be restored”. 
The court found for the plaintiff, on the basis that it is sufficient to ground a case of libel 
if the writing induces an ill opinion of the plaintiff, or if it makes him contemptible and 
ridiculous.  
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In John Lamb’s case
52 the court held that to be convicted of a libel in the Star Chamber 
the party ought to be either a contriver of the libel, or a procurer of the contriving of it, or 
a malicious publisher of it, knowing it to be libel. This requirement for the maker or 
publisher to know that the writing is libellous before the charge can be grounded, can be 
seen as akin to the Rule of Law’s keystone guarantee of the absence of arbitrary power.   
 
Further protection from arbitrary prosecution is found in the case of Dr Edwards v Dr 
Wootton,
53 the facts are that Dr Wootton wrote a letter containing infamous, malicious, 
scandalous and obscene comments about Dr Edwards, in a letter to the said Dr Edwards. 
After sealing the letter, Dr Wootton directed his friend to deliver the letter to Dr Edwards. 
However, the friend opened the letter and read it. The court held that no action on the 
case lies against person who sends a libel in a letter sealed and directed to the party 
libelled, without any other publication. From this case comes the principle that to 
establish libel the publication must be by the person libelling to someone other than the 
person libelled. An important refinement of libel came in The King v Alme and Nott, also 
called R v Orme and Nott
54 where the court defined a libel as writing to mankind in 
general with particulars about a specific individual.  
 
The  parameters of libel were further expanded in the case of Thorley v Lord Kerry 
(1812)
55  which  established that a written  defamatory comment about a  person’s 
dereliction of duty is libel. This case also established the principle that an action can be 
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maintained for written words which it could not if they were merely spoken. Thus, it 
implicitly determines that defamatory written words are more serious than defamatory 
spoken words. Implicitly it can be seen as an indication that the written word, because of 
its capacity for permanence, has the capacity to do more harm to a reputation than the 
transient spoken word. The principle established in Thorley v Lord Kerry (1812)
56 is of 
particular interest to the discussion of the Rule of Law in Van Diemen’s Land defamation 
cases, where the plaintiffs were frequently officials and administrators complaining of 
defamatory comments made of them while undertaking their official duties.  
 
The species of criminal libel was developed in the case of R v John Wilkes Esq. (1770)
57 
In this case Sir Fletcher Norton, H.  M.  Solicitor General, exhibited an Information 
against Mr Wilkes for having published an obscene and impious libel, entitled An Essay 
on Woman. This matter first came before the court in 1764 and repeatedly came before 
the court with various minor amendments to the Information. Mr Wilkes pleaded not 
guilty. Mr Wilkes subsequently printed and published The North Briton and for this he 
was charged with printing and publishing a seditious and scandalous libel. 
 
During the life of the charge against him, Mr Wilkes travelled to France. He voluntarily 
returned to England just before a parliamentary election, at which he was duly elected to 
parliament.  
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The writ of Capias was issued against him and he was convicted on Informations for 
Misdemeanours. He did not appear and at the fifth  non-appearance Mr Wilkes was 
designated an outlaw. Subsequently, on 21 April 1768, Mr Wilkes voluntarily appeared. 
He published an article in newspapers stating that he had been tried upon altered facts. In 
Mr Wilkes’ view both judgments were rendered void because the alteration of facts was 
unconstitutional and illegal. Mr Wilkes also argued that there were errors of law and 
provided specific details. In the light of these errors, Mr Wilkes duly sought a Writ of 
Error, relying on precedent to amend the judgments or convictions.  
 
Mr Wilkes’ argument, however, did not convince the Attorney General, who responded 
that there could be no Writ of Error and no Fiat when the party was not in custody. Mr 
Wilkes was not an outlaw for non-appearance but for conviction. This legal argument 
was contrived to ensure Mr Wilkes was not let off the hook, so to speak. The impropriety 
levelled against Mr Wilkes was that he, as defendant, came to court and was not brought.  
 
On Monday 16 of May 1768 judgment was given for the Plaintiff, being the Crown. Mr 
Wilkes was given a severe sentence. He was fined five hundred pounds, imprisoned for 
ten months with a further fine of five hundred pounds and a further twelve months’ 
imprisonment. As well he was required to give security for seven years and one thousand 
pounds’ surety, and to remain in custody until the fines were paid. Amazingly, however, 
within fifteen days of being sentenced, Mr Wilkes was freed.  
 21 
 
This case is of particular interest because it draws attention to the Rule of Law. The early 
release of Mr Wilkes suggests arbitrariness in the way that court-determined sentences 
were fulfilled by some convicted offenders. In R v John Wilkes Esq. (1770)
58 the offender 
was relieved of the custodial component of his sentence and there is no indication of 
whether the fines were paid. The fact that Mr Wilkes was an elected member of the 
English parliament can be used to infer that people in more influential positions in society 
may have received preferential treatment, rather than equal treatment before the law. The 
study of defamation cases in Van Diemen’s Land during the years 1805-1835 is 
undertaken with the aim of identifying if there were comparable examples of failures of 
the Rule of Law in the colony.    
 
The case of  R v Bear
59  was an Indictment against Mr Bear for making, writing, 
composing and collecting several libels. A verdict was given for the accused, because a 
transcript of the libel was tendered as evidence, instead of the actual libel itself. The court 
found that the transcript could only import an identity in sense, but not the words. This 
case established the rule that a transcript is not sufficient evidence of a libel and the libel 
itself must be tendered in court. This case has particular relevance for the consideration 
of Van Diemen’s Land cases. If the person holding the original libellous writing held a 
position of executive power, the writer of the libel could be outside of the court’s reach 
simply by the holder of the writing refusing to produce it. Thus, the Rule of Law, which 
claims all are equal before the law, could be circumvented. 
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The case of  Dominus Rex versus Bear
60  was an Indictment for libel following the 
defendant’s previous acquittal on the same facts. The matter returned to court with the 
Attorney General seeking a new trial. The court, however, relied on ancient precedent to 
hold there would not be a new trial in the absence of the verdict being shown to have 
been obtained by fraud or malpractice, for example, stealing a witness. A new trial is 
never granted just because the verdict is against the evidence. In Van Diemen’s Land this 
principle may have been used to avoid nuisance and potentially serial litigants.   
The court standardised the parameters of libel in The  Queen  v Drake,
61  where  the 
Information for the libel differed in one word from the libel itself, despite the fact that 
there were several scandalous words and the mistake did not alter the sense. The 
defendant pleaded not guilty. The court gave judgment for the defendant, establishing the 
principle that the Information must exactly match what was written. 
Thus, these English cases provide some of the essential principles comprising  the 
foundation of the law of defamation which the English brought to Van Diemen’s Land. 
 
12. Summation of defamation principles from English cases 
 
Starting with the interpretation of words in defamation case  of  Lord Townsend v 
Hughes,
62 the court held that words must be given their general and natural meaning 
while in Gardener v Atwater
63the English court held that words must be interpreted in 
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their usual and obvious sense. For words to be actionable in slander, the court in Duval v 
Price
64held that they must be certain, specific and scandalous and discredit the party of 
whom they are spoken.  
 
Libel was defined by the court in The King v Alme and Nott, also called R v Orme and 
Nott
65as a writing to mankind in general with defamatory particulars about a specific 
individual. In Cropp v Tilney,
66 the court established the principle that inference imputing 
ill opinion is libel. In Thorley v Lord Kerry
67 the court held that a written defamatory 
comment about a person’s dereliction of duty is libel. In The Queen v Drake
68 the court 
held that the words on the Information for a libel must be exactly the same as the libel 
itself. In R v Bear 
69 the court laid down the principle that in a libel case the exact libel, as 
distinct from a copy of the libel, must be presented to the court. In Dr Edwards v Dr 
Wooton
70 the court held that to establish libel the publication must be by the person 
libelling to someone other than the person libelled. In John Lamb’s case
71 the court held 
that knowledge that a writing was libellous was essential by either its maker or publisher. 
In the libel case of Dominus Rex versus Bear
72the court held that a new trial would not be 
granted just because a verdict was against the evidence. 
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R v John Wilkes Esq.
73is a fascinating betrayal of the essential principle of the Rule of 
Law that all are equal before the law. As such it is of relevance to this study which sets 
out to identify the extent to which the Rule of Law was followed in defamation cases in 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY  
 
 
1. The research topic 
 
The research topic is a discussion of defamation jurisprudence in Van Diemen’s Land 
from 1805 to 1835, with specific emphasis on the adherence to or neglect of the Rule of 
Law in selected cases. As such, the discussion of colonial cases from the courts in Van 
Diemen’s Land can be seen as an exercise in ethnography, in that it is a process that 
discovers and describes a people and their culture.
74 The people and culture investigated 
in the present project comprise the non-convict English community in Van Diemen’s 
Land, between the years 1805 and 1835.
75 
 
The phenomena of Van Diemen’s Land defamation cases are unique because they 
emerged from within the context of a penal colony. Thus it follows that the methodology 
developed to consider these cases must have aspects unique to these phenomena.
76 The 
methodology  developed  and used in this study  is qualitative and shares with all 
qualitative methodology the resistance to standardization due to the novel situation of 
research. 
Amanda Potter (2009)
77 posits the notion of a reception theory for ethnographers where 
there is a researcher centric approach, that is, the researcher responds to the experience 
and that response is the reception. This particular project adopts Potter’s proposition and 
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attempts to develop a method to investigate Van Diemen’s Land defamation cases from a 
researcher centric approach. 
 
In this study of selected colonial defamation cases from 1805 to 1835, the researcher’s 
‘relationality’
78 or engagement and response, is a site straddling three time zones, these 
being:  
•  selected early English common law cases and their precedents,  
•  English legislation which was planted and transferred to Van Diemen’s Land, and  
•  the twenty-first century interpretation of the Australian common law context.  
 
Raffles (2002)
79 points out that places are made by the combination of humans with non-
human phenomena, such as physical labour, narrative, imagination, memory, political 
economy, animals, plants and the  the agentive bio-physicality of tides. To these 
characteristics it is appropriate for this study, to include attributes specific to the context 
of Van Diemen’s Land, these being: 
•  its geographically remote island setting,  
•  England’s use of it as a prison to remove offenders from England,
80 and  
•  the perceived indicia of power in colonial Van Diemen’s Land as the ownership 
of land, literacy, merchant entrepreneurship and the holding of administrative 
positions. 
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These characteristics in combination contribute an intimacy particular to the island state 
of 19
th century Van Diemen’s Land. It is in this particular context that cases in the genre 
of defamation emerged.  
 
2. The underlying premise of the research    
 
The premise underlying the research is that the context of the British penal colony of Van 
Diemen’s Land between 1805 and 1835 encouraged vigorous competition between the 
various elements of society -  soldiers, convicts, free settlers, administrators, 
professionals, aboriginals and merchants. This competition fostered a desire to destroy 
competitors through defamation. Those who had sufficient self-confidence, education and 
money took legal action against their detractors in libel and slander suites.  
 
This premise provides the foundation for investigation of the cases. The study aims to 
identify the extent to which the Rule of Law is either evident or absent in the cases. Thus, 
as in grounded theory,
81 the data of the reports of cases is used to disclose a response to 
the aim of the investigation.  
 
It is submitted that paramount power in  the penal colony between 1805 and 1835 
devolved on the administrators. Personnel with power deriving from holding any type of 
official office in the colony, such as the Lieutenant-Governor, the Justices of the Peace, 
the Magistrates, the Field Police, the Judges, the Government Surveyor, were the rulers 
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of the colony at the time. The Rule of Law, which insists that all people are equal before 
the law and are free from arbitrary power, was under severe stress as administrators 
struggled to retain control and supremacy in the colony. Thus, the selected cases are read 
in order to determine the extent to which administrative power prevailed over the Rule of 
Law.   
 
3. The case investigation tool 
 
The case investigation tool for this study  is developed from several models used by 
various researchers. For example, the works of M. A. Franklin (1980)
82 and Bezanson, 
Cranberg and Soloski (1987)
83 are highly relevant for this particular study because these 
researchers have examined defamation and libel litigation. In both of these studies, the 
analysis tools consist of identifiers these being:  
 
•  the case name, 
•  place and date of hearing, 
•  the parties, 
•  the arbiter of fact, 
•  counsel, if any, 
•  the hurt or damage basing the complaint and 
•  the decision of the court. 
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Each identifier is applied to each case, generating data. In this way quantitative data is 
collected for the entire study. The data is then collated under various headings reflective 
of the study’s aim. From this accumulation of data, hypotheses are constructed.  
 
The methodology developed by Christopher Enright  (2008),
84  although its specific 
example is for trespass to land
85 as distinct from defamation cases, provides valuable 
insight into developing a foundation for the micro analysis of Van Diemen’s Land 
colonial defamation case law.
86 Enright examines the structure of a law by segmenting it 
into its elements and consequences. Finally, he demonstrates linkage of the elements with 
consequences to constitute a breach of the law. Enright’s
87discussion of trespass to land 
is undertaken in three discrete stages, for example: 
  
•  elements defining the crime which must be met, 
•  particular facts of each case which reveal whether the crime is established, and 
•  consequences attendant upon the facts being found to exist in a specific case 
 
If such a methodology had been adopted for the examination of colonial Van Diemen’s 
Land defamation cases, it would have necessitated separating the elements
88 of the tort of 
defamation into subdivisions or sub-elements. Thus it was considered inappropriate. 
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A methodology model of considerable use is that developed in the study by Andrew 
Kenyon (2004)
89comparing qualified privilege in defamation law in England and 
Australia with specific focus upon the media. The method Kenyon adopts to investigate 
this privilege in action is one hour, semi-structured, audio-taped and hand-written 
interviews with fifty practitioners in England, New South Wales and Victoria, those 
practitioners being judges, barristers, solicitors and in-house lawyers.
90 Reliance for the 
use of interviews was placed upon the edict of Clive Searle (1997)
91that interviews can 
encompass activities across a wide range of times and locations. To achieve reliability, 
Kenyon uses recognised legal categories in transcription and coding of the interviews, 
while to attain validity he maintains the realistic representation of social phenomena.
92 
 
The present Van Diemen’s Land project strives to maintain reliability by using 
recognised legal categories to select and discuss the cases, that is, the categories of 
slander, libel and criminal libel. Validity is maintained by the use of primary and 
secondary sources, to complement and further elucidate case report content.  
 
Kenyon acknowledges the limited legal scope of his project,
93 in that it is set within a 
twenty-year period and discusses just fifty cases. The present Van Diemen’s Land project 
also shares the weakness acknowledged by Kenyon in that it quotes a selection of cases 
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without indicating how representative they are and without providing contrary 
responses.
94 Nevertheless, despite such weaknesses, Andrew Kenyon and Timothy 
Majoribanks received a Discovery Project
95 grant from the Australian Research Council 
to undertake a comparative study of defamation law in context. This can be taken as 
recognition of the intrinsic value of qualitative methodology based upon a small selection 
of subjects.   
 
In a subsequent paper based upon this Australian Research Council Discovery Project, 
Kenyon and Majoribanks (2005)
96 expound upon the method they used. They state that 
the method fell into three stages. In the first stage, they analysed relevant legal and 
sociological resources, for example, case law, legislation, law reform reports and legal 
scholarship, which resulted in their identification of themes and issues to pursue.
97 In 
stage two they undertook fieldwork investigation, involving interviews and 
observations.




Much the same stages were used in the present Van Diemen’s Land study. Stage one 
consisted of researching and reading various materials including cases, legislation, 
historical writings about the period of 1805 to 1835 in Van Diemen’s Land and England, 
which identified the major issue of the power and powerlessness paradigm. In stage two, 
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cases were searched for under the categories of libel, slander and criminal libel. Cases 
identified as being sufficiently clearly written were selected for discussion. In stage three, 
the cases were investigated and discussed.  
 
Thus, these four methodologies – Franklin’s (1980),
100 Bezanson, Cranberg and Soloski’s 
(1987),
101 Enright’s (2008)
102 and Kenyon’s (2004)
103were of considerable value in the 
development of a  procedure for the investigation  of  selected  Van Diemen’s Land 
defamation cases. 
 
4. Sources of data 
 
Both primary and secondary materials are used in the research.  
 
Primary sources used include: 
 
•  the reports of slander, libel, and criminal libel appearing in Van Diemen’s Land 
newspapers up to 1835, and  
•  accessible documents relating to relevant Van Diemen’s Land legal proceedings 
held in the Archives Office of Tasmania, State Records Office of New South 
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Wales, Mitchell Library of New South Wales, La Trobe Library Victoria, Allport 
Museum, Hobart and National Archives, Kew, England. 
 
Secondary sources used include: 
 
•  various historical commentaries and texts, and 
•  visual texts such as paintings and drawings. 
 
Bibliographic details of the sources relied upon are provided in the Bibliography of this 
thesis.  
 
5. The selection of cases to generate data 
 
The three determinants for selecting the cases to be included in the study were:  
 
•  availability of the entire case report,  
•  comprehensibility of the language of the report, and  
•  relevance of the case content to the genre of defamation law.  
 





6. The procedure 
 
A systematic and interdisciplinary procedure is developed and implemented, following 
Olaf Helmer  (1971),
104  in order to provide focus for an otherwise diffuse and 
unmanageable task. As a result, both qualitative and quantitative data are generated and 
discussed in the investigation of the selected cases. 
 
Firstly, each selected case is identified as belonging to a particular year and allocated to 
one of the particular categories - slander, libel and criminal libel – acknowledged in legal 
principles as being of the corpus of defamation. 
 
Each case is then located within one of five categories, these categories being: 
  
•  Bench of Magistrates’ cases,  
•  Lieutenant Governor’s Court cases, 
•  New South Wales Supreme Court civil jurisdiction case heard in Van Diemen’s 
Land in 1819,   
•  Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court cases 1820’s, and  
•  Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court cases 1830 to 1835. 
 
Objective data for each case is then recorded, providing the foundation to base numerical 
conclusions drawn from the cases selected for the study. For example, within a particular 
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jurisdiction, such as the Lieutenant Governor’s Court, it is possible from the objective 
data of the total number of cases discussed for slander, to calculate the number of 
decisions made for the plaintiff as distinct for the defendant. This quantitative data is 
arranged in charts to visually illustrate the findings for each of the five categories of cases 
identified above.  
 
Secondly, the power and powerless polarities are interpreted in each case from comments 
by counsel, parties, judge and magistrates. In particular, the plaintiff and defendant are 
identified as either having power or being powerless.  This qualitative data is arranged in 
charts to visually illustrate the findings for each of the cases. Importantly, the 
identification of the power and powerless polarities is the foundation for ascertaining the 
extent to which the Rule of Law was followed or ignored in defamation decisions.  
 
Thirdly, the language of each case report is used to identify the principles and values 
espoused. These are summarized,  with examples of the language grounding the 
identification, and located in a figure for each case. In this figure, the value identified as 
predominant is classified as either a negative value, being one which was discouraged, or 
a  positive  value, being one which was encouraged.  These data are the basis for an 
interpretation of the prevailing values which materialized into the colony’s jurisprudence.  
 
The conclusions and inferences drawn from the qualitative data are discussed in detail 
with the aim of generating a cultural text
105  to base a foundation for comment upon the 
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extent to which the Rule of Law was ignored or observed in  selected defamation cases in 
the colony of Van Diemen’s Land between the years 1805 - 1835.  
 
7. Weaknesses of the methodology 
Clearly, the methodology devised for this research project is a quasi-experimental model. 
Some of its weaknesses are addressed in the discussion of Kenyon’s (2004)
106 model, 
above. Being a quasi-experimental model, the methodology meets the definition of a new 
method described by Anoma Armstrong and Evelyn Ogren  (1986)
107  in that it is an 
attempt to draw causal inferences from the selected cases. Its problems are: 
 
•  the absence of a control group for comparison, 
•  the possibility of alternative interpretations of the data,  
•  the possibility that the selected cases may not be representative, and  
•  the subjectivity of the researcher.  
 
These weaknesses are typical of those levelled at qualitative methodology, and identified 
by Lyn Richards  (1993)
108  as analysis that generates soft  data, being vague, 
impressionable, disconnected and not rigorously sampled. Nevertheless, it is argued that 
the area of defamation jurisprudence in colonial Van Diemen’s Land could not be 
interpreted without vivid, contexted accounts.
109  This justification accords with that of 
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Larry W.  Isaac’s  (1997),
110  who  identified  the existence of three core discursive 
elements in historical sociology, these being time, causality and narrative, with social 
processes being dependent on local time and place. Hence, it is submitted that while the 
fingerprints of the researcher on the data in the present study can be seen, their visibility 
is justified. 
 
A further criticism could be that this research relies solely on the cases as reported in the 
newspapers and a few other surviving case remnants.  Thus the conclusions may be seen 
as: 
 
•  presumptive to make claims that the sample represents the whole, and  
•  that the selection is unrepresentative of the total body of cases.  
 
Be that as it may, Metin M. Cosgel (2004)
111 in a study of Ottoman tax registers, justifies 
the use of representative sampling rather than whole set examination, on the basis that it 
can facilitate comprehensive large-scale studies at a fraction of the cost.  Cosgel
112 
identifies the advantage of sampling as providing the benefit of making general claims 
about the subject matter based on the presumption that the sample represents the whole. 
Cosgel’s taxpaying subjects had large quantities of information, similar to the defamation 
cases in the present study.  
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Problems regarding the accuracy of representativeness of samples were encountered by 
Rebecca Kippen (2005)
113 when calculating nineteenth century maternal deaths  in Van 
Diemen’s Land. Even though a maternal death may have been recorded, the actual cause 
may have been hidden under a non-maternal cause.
114 This was due to the damage likely 
to be caused to a general practitioner’s reputation and practice if it became known in the 
community that a woman under his care had died from maternal causes. Such a death 
would have been interpreted by the local community as indicative of insufficient care, 
skill or management by the practitioner.
115 The researcher places reliance on the content 
of the report, but in law, so in medicine and as Kippen finds, at times, historical facts are 
probably hidden from researchers, either  by editorial bias and or efforts to protect the 
subjects of a report.
116 Consequently, while it is acknowledged that problems exist in 
using a sample to make deductions, it is submitted that it is apposite in the present study 
which seeks to identify an understanding of the development of the jurisprudence of 
defamation from 1805 to 1835 in Van Diemen’s Land. This is because there are very few 
records of cases available and those which are available are usually in newspaper form. 
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A further possible criticism of this method is that of the intrusion of the researcher’s 
subjectivity and reality construction. It is a fact that the reality construction in this  study 
can not reveal the Van Diemen’s Land colonial world from the inside,
117 because the 
inside world of 1805 to 1835 is no longer available to a researcher two hundred years on.  
 
Every place has temporal and place bases, identified by Doreen Massey (1994)
118 as the 
uniqueness of place. Massey
119 develops a notion of place as specific moments which are 
intersecting, spatialised, social relations, some of which are contained within the place 
and  others of which stretch beyond it. Thus a particular locality is tied into wider 
relations and processes, implicating  other places. These  particular time and place 
moments are identified by Ann C. Stoler  (2001)
120  as cultural boundaries. The local 
knowledge of time and specific location is not available to the outsider. Thus, for the 
researcher in the twenty-first  century investigating legal cases from colonial Van 
Diemen’s Land, the localised research site is nineteenth  Van Diemen’s Land. The 
research, however, is intersected with the components of the twenty-first  century 
researcher’s network. Consequently, the researcher’s individuality, context and time are 
the actual determinants of the reality constructed in the research. Thus, subjectivity is 
unavoidable. 
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There is nothing new in the proposition that the researcher’s subjectivity influences the 
reality of the research subject. Numerous theorists acknowledge a researcher’s 
subjectivity. For example, Max Weber (1864 –  1920) emphasised the intentional 
subjectivity of the researcher during the research process. He identified the research 
process as the selection and abstraction of information; thus, reality is liable to distortion 
from the mere fact of selection. George Herbert Mead (1863 – 1931) saw the inevitability 
of subjective research in his notion  that the  individual is inseparable from myriad 
influences of society. The grounded theory methodology of Barney Glaser and Anselm 
Strauss (1967),
121  which aims to have research data mould the researcher’s explanation 
of social action, can be seen as an attempt to minimise subjectivity. 
 
Reports of Van Diemen’s Land law cases were published only in newspapers in the years 
1805 to 1835. Very few actual court documents survive for inexplicable and unknown 
reasons.
122 The accounts of cases written by nineteenth century newspaper journalists are, 
therefore, valuable primary research material.  However, that primary material is the 
product of construction by a reporter. Ultimately, the report was written for publication in 
a commercial enterprise in a penal colony.  Thus, as far as possible, reports of cases in 
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8. Newspaper reports of Van Diemen’s Land court cases as primary sources 
 
The colonial newspapers in Van Diemen’s Land were not well-regarded by the judiciary 
of the day, for example Puisne Judge His Honour Algernon Montagu (1835)
123referred to 
the press in colonial Van Diemen’s Land as being licentious and degraded.  
 
Within the confines of the infant island colony, according to John West (1852)
124 there 
was a paucity of topics to write about. E. Morris Miller (1952)
125the foremost researcher 
of Van Diemen’s Land  colonial newspapers, concurred with this and  asserted that reader 
entertainment assumed priority in the reportage of  court proceedings. The instigation of 
home-delivery of newspapers
126 adds fuel to the hypothesis that their paramount value 
was entertainment. Possibly this is the reason why the newspaper reports of cases 
frequently describe the behaviour of counsel and parties as if the court room were a 
theatre of entertainment. 
 
Some of the newspapers held the belief that the press greatly influenced the current of 
society.
127 Such a belief gave rise to the colonial press giving itself a role of determining 
the colony’s thinking rather than merely reporting current thinking. For example, in 
March 1833 the Hobart Town Chronicle stated that it reported court proceedings for the 
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sake of instruction and example.
128 The colonial newspapers did have power, not only in 
the colony but also in England and other parts of the English-speaking world. Such power 
included the ability to influence the reputation of colonists through detailed transcripts of 




A nineteenth century description of the newspapers published in Hobart Town at that 
time is provided by Henry Widowson (1829).
130 Widowson
131 identifies the Government 
Gazette  edited  at that time by Dr Ross as being scarcely more than the organ for 
advertisements, notices of convicts and all official affairs, published on Saturdays. He 
also mentions the Tasmanian Gazette which was published on Thursdays but states his 
preference, without providing a reason, for Andrew Bent’s Colonial Times published 
each Friday.
132 Thus, it is clear that the public had a choice of newspapers and that each 
newspaper had specific characteristics. 
 
The early nineteenth century Van Diemen’s Land court reporters were men, thus it is a 
masculine perception of the cases that survive. It may be that the reporters wrote from a 
perspective of affective sociality, a phenomenon identified by Hugh Raffles (2002).
133 
This was an intimate lived experience of everyday life, undertaken in relationship with 
contemporaries and the physical environment of the place. The significance of this notion 
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to the present study is that the reporters knew and understood the values and mores of 
Van Diemen’s Land, the place in which the cases occurred. They also knew what the 
readers wanted to read in the newspapers.  
 
An interesting example of one of the Van Diemen’s Land colonial court reporters is 
Thomas Richards. He worked for a time as a medical practitioner in Hobart before 
joining the Surveyor’s Department, a position which he left in 1837.
134 He then began his 
work as court reporter for the Colonial Times and The Courier. Along with his court 
reporting, Thomas Richards conducted a correspondence service for poor people, 
assisting them to write memorials and petitions.
135 Thomas Richards’ court reports were 
not always well-received. One of the critics who complained about Thomas Richards’ 
court reporting was Edward MacDowell, who published his criticism in the Colonial 
Times  in June and September of 1841.
136  Despite this criticism, Thomas Richards 
continued as a court reporter some years. Eventually, however, his career seemed to go 
full circle with his return to the practice of medicine in 1852.
137 
 
Whether Thomas Richards was typical of nineteenth century Van Diemen’s Land court 
reporters
138 is unclear. However, this cameo unmistakably emphasizes that such men 
possessed valuable literacy skills.  
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9. The use of visual texts  
  
Visual texts, comprising early nineteenth century paintings and drawings are used in this 
study of defamation cases in Van Diemen’s Land between 1805 and 1835, in order to 
enhance understanding of the context of the cases.  
 
R. Foote Whyte (1949)
139 contends that careful study of the content of paintings and 
drawings from the perspective of content, arrangement of subjects and space, provides 
valuable comment upon the society from which it emanated. Annsi Perakyla’s(1989)
140 
study built on this notion and revealed that spatial arrangements in visual texts 
differentiate groups of people. Thus, various visual materials are used in this study to 
widen the perspective on the context and people of Van Diemen’s Land. For example, 
The Sketchbook of George Tobin
141 provides details of the encounter between European 
explorers and Van  Diemen’s  Land  indigenous people  and the Van  Diemen’s  Land 
physical environment in Adventure Bay in 1792.  
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Figure (lll): Sketch of the Adventure Bay landing, 1792, from George Tobin’s Sketch Book
142 
 
The  sketch reveals disturbance in  the unsettled flight of the native birds. The two 
European men in the landing party are together, the men in the row boat landing party are 
together and the Aborigines are together. Nevertheless, each group is separate from the 
other and in a different part of the painting. This demarcation in sectors of Van Diemen’s 
Land society is further revealed in the paintings and sketches of other colonial artists, 
with soldiers, free settlers and convicts being depicted in separate areas.  
 
Thirty or so years later, the segregation of Hobart Town society into separate groups is 
portrayed in the following drawing by an unknown artist of 1820. 
 
                                                 




Figure (lV): Drawing showing different groups in Hobart Town, artist unknown, circa 1820
143 
 
The painting reveals on the left,  high-ranking administrators, possibly the Lieutenant 
Governor because of his plumed hat, the jetty warehouses of the merchants are shown left 
centre, a woman and child in fine clothing are in the centre foreground, while on the 
banks of the river a convict chain gang is at work with a supervisor. In the middle centre 
free settlers  can be seen chatting under a tree. On the far right foreground there are 
soldiers and on the far left bank across the river, a group of indigenous people. Many 
nineteenth century visual texts, such as this augment the identification made by Douglas 
Harper  (2005)
144  that  pictures are valuable essays of social change and human 
interaction. It also complements the assertion made earlier in this study that the desire to 
conquer one’s competitors  was a major reason for defamation actions in early Van 
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Thus, by reading the cases reported in newspapers, with texts written contemporaneously, 
and surviving official historical records, together with visual historical texts and a 
selection of contemporary and historical commentaries, the researcher addresses the 
problems of non-representative selection of materials, contradictory documentary 

























CHAPTER THREE: DEFAMATION  CASES FROM THE BENCH OF 
MAGISTRATES, YORKTON, PORT DALRYMPLE, VAN DIEMEN’S LAND 
 
This discussion of the Proceedings before the Bench of Magistrates is prefaced with a 
brief investigation about men who sat on the bench as magistrates. In Van Diemen’s 
Land, a man was first appointed a Justice of the Peace; some Justices of the Peace were 
subsequently appointed magistrates.   
 
1. Justices of the Peace 
 
The importance of the role of Justices of the Peace in the maintenance of a society’s law 
and order is embedded in English history. For example in the English Parliament held at 
Westminster on the Sunday before the Feast of the Conversion of Saint Paul, A. D. 1360-
1361, the sort of persons who could be Justices of the Peace and their powers were set in 
writing.
145 It was determined that only the most worthy of the counties and some learned 
in the law could be admitted to this select group.  
 
As a general rule, in each county the Justices of the Peace were comprised of one Lord 
and three or four of the most worthy. The Justices of the Peace had power over all 
offenders, rioters, barrators
146  and vagabonds, to hear and determine felonies and 
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trespasses. The punishment the Justices of the Peace could inflict included fines, which 
were required to be reasonable.
147 
 
In the Australian colonies, Captain Arthur Phillip, as first Governor-in-Chief, had 
authority to administer oaths of allegiance, appoint Justices of the Peace and other 
officers of the law.
148 Captain Phillip was given specific criteria which a man needed to 
fulfil before he could be appointed of Justice of the Peace. For example, the governor 
could not  admit to the office of Justice of the Peace any person whose ill-fame or 
conversation might occasion scandal. Thus, reputation was of paramount importance. 
The governor himself was required to ensure services of Christian worship were held in 
the colony every Sunday. At those services the Book of Common Prayer was to be read 
every Sunday and Holy Day and the Blessed Sacrament was to be administered according 
to the rites of the Church of England.
149 
 
The requirement of Church of England adherence as a foundational principle of the 
colony of Australia is a tenet that is frequently overlooked. However, the supremacy of 
the Church of England was embedded in the legal framework from the beginning of the 
English commune in the Australian colonies. This fact is relevant to a discussion of the 
appointment of Justices of the Peace, because a Justice of the Peace was required, on 
appointment, to sign a Declaration that he did not believe in substantiation of the 
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Sacrament. Thus, the three essential criteria for appointment as a Justice of the Peace in 
the colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land were: 
 
•  to have good character and reputation, 
•  to be a communicant member of the Church of England and  
•  to be male. 
Justices of the Peace undertook a wide variety of work in Van Diemen’s Land, including 
acting as coroners,
150  punishing wrong-doers for minor offences and making 
determinations about weights and measures.
151 
 
2. The magistrates of Van Diemen’s Land 
 
As mentioned, the essential criterion for becoming a Magistrate in Van Diemen’s Land 
was to be a Justice of the Peace. Hence the essential criteria for appointment as 
Magistrate, in the colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land were: 
 
•  to be a Justice of the Peace,  
•  to have good character and reputation, 
•  to be a communicant member of the Church of England, and  
•  to be male. 
                                                 
150 Judge Advocate’s Reports of Coroners’ Inquests, 1796-1820, County of Cornwall, New South Wales 
State Archives, Location 2/8286, 2 
151Alex  Castles, (1982), op. cit., 67-68 51 
 
Neither expertise nor experience in the law was a criterion. From this it can be inferred 
that the English administrators knew there were insufficient men with legal expertise in 
the Australian colonies to make it a requirement for appointment to the role of either 
Justice of the Peace or magistrate. 
 
Castles (1982)
152 notes that magistrates often exceeded their jurisdiction and there is at 
least one example of a Lieutenant Governor doing similarly. For instance, in 1814 
Lieutenant Governor Davey promised to pardon the commission of all crimes, except 
murder, committed by convicts who had become bushrangers, if such convicts turned 
themselves in by 1 December 1814.
153 
 
In 1816, New South Wales Governor Macquarie vested magistrates
154 with jurisdiction in 
regard to: 
 
•  labour,  
•  the wages of free men, and  
•  the regulation of apprenticeships.  
This jurisdiction applied in Van Diemen’s Land, because Van Diemen’s Land was not 
independent of New South Wales until 1824. In Van Diemen’s Land the magistrates 
determined the price of bread, frequently termed an assize of bread.  This bread price, 
which fluctuated according to the availability of wheat flour, was published regularly in 
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the Hobart Town Gazette.
155 At various times up to 1814 magistrates were also given 
authority to deal with payment defaults on small debts.
156 Castles (1982) uses records 
from the Hobart Town Gazette as evidence that a local Bench of Magistrates regularly sat 
in Hobart Town by 1816
157 and a Bench of Magistrate’s clerk was being paid fifteen 
pounds per annum in Port Dalrymple.
158 
 
The cases of Proceedings of the Bench of Magistrates against Charles Barrington and 
James Page discussed in this study confirm  that a Bench of Magistrates sat in Port 
Dalrymple as early as 1805. By 1821, there were eight magistrates in Van Diemen’s 
Land: 4 in the north and 4 in the south.
159 From 1825, Van Diemen’s Land magistrates 
were not to give judgment in cases of difficulty unless they were in the presence of Chief 
Justice Pedder.
160 The notion of difficult cases is not defined so presumably a magistrate 
knew when a case was difficult. 
 
3. Backgrounds of some of the Van Diemen’s Land magistrates 
 
The Colonial Secretary’s Records identify some of the men holding office as magistrates 
in Van Diemen’s Land up to 1825.
161 Their backgrounds are important in seeking to 
establish a perspective on the colonial system of justice. Primary reliance for biographical 
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details of the magistrates is placed upon entries in the on-line Australian Dictionary of 
Biography. The magistrates of Van Diemen’s Land whose lives are briefly considered in 
this study are  Thomas  Bell, George Gatehouse, George Prideaux Robert Harris, 
Adolarius William Henry Humphrey, Jacob Hackett  Mountgarrett, Francis Williams, 
Reverend Robert Knopwood, Richard Fryett, Thomas William Birch, and David Lord. 
 
It is of relevance and interest, particularly to an investigation of the extent that the Rule 
of Law was observed by decision-makers, to explore the backgrounds of some of these 
men. After all, they wielded immense power and influence over the lives of people who, 




Thomas Bell arrived in Hobart Town to take command of the military garrison of Hobart 
Town in 1818 and was appointed Inspector of Public Works, Justice of the Peace and 
engineer.
162 As a Justice of the Peace he often sat with another assessor and the Deputy 
Judge Advocate on the Lieutenant Governor’s Court. He was responsible for overseeing 
the building of many public buildings in Hobart Town and the stone bridge at Richmond, 
the oldest bridge still standing in Australia.
163  As a supervisor of public works it is 
recorded that he never ordered a convict to be flogged nor permitted overseers of gangs 
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to strike the convicts in the gangs.
164  In this he seems to have been unique in not 
misusing his power. 
 
Thomas Bell left Van Diemen’s Land in 1824 and was given a fond farewell: Hobartians 
remembered with gratitude that he had brought his troops to their rescue against the 





George Gatehouse is identified as a magistrate in the Colonial Secretary’s Records. It is 
more likely than not that he was the George Gatehouse who was tried as John Simpson at 
the Middlesex Gaol Delivery, England on 14 September 1803  and subsequently 
sentenced to seven years’ transportation for stealing from a dwelling house. After serving 
his sentence as John Simpson in New South Wales he returned to England in December 
1812. There he raised funds and, with a new identity, returned to New South Wales in 
1816 and was granted four hundred  acres of land by Governor Macquarie. George 
Gatehouse subsequently took up this land in Hobart Town.
166 He established a successful 
mercantile business with Anthony Fenn Kemp, using the business name of Kemp and 
Gatehouse.  
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George Gatehouse won the respect of the Van Diemen’s Land community, including that 
of the Lieutenant Governor’s Sorell and Arthur. An indication of this respect was his 
appointment to the committee of five who superintended the distribution of merino rams 
in 1820.
167 In Van Diemen’s Land George Gatehouse continued to amass land through 
grants and by purchase. He diversified his business interests. He became a brewer, miller, 
maltster and gardener, acquiring a reputation for the finest garden and orchard in New 
Town, harvesting one hundred and fifty pounds of tobacco in April 1821.
168 He was an 




George Prideaux Robert Harris 
 
George Prideaux Robert Harris  was a surveyor who spent his early life in Devon, 
England. Appointed in England in 1803 to be Deputy Surveyor of Van Diemen’s Land, 
he accompanied Lieutenant Governor Collins to Hobart Town in February 1804.
170Some 
of the initial surveys he undertook were of Betsy Island and the Hobart Town Rivulet, 
which he traced to its source on Mount Wellington or Table Mount as it was then called. 
He undertook an important exploration of Bruny Island, Storm Bay Passage and the Huon 
River, endeavouring to find cedar for Lieutenant Governor Collins.  
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He was appointed a magistrate in June 1804, by which time the colonial administration 
was building a town house for him and he had begun to cultivate a farm at Sandy Bay, 
having received a one hundred acre grant of land there. He was also appointed collector 
of quitrents in the colony, these being moneys to be paid to the colonial administration in 
order to discharge the land-owner from further burdens.  
An artist, George Harris painted water-colours of birds. He commemorated himself for 
posterity by including his name in particular items of Van Diemen’s Land fauna which he 
studied. For example, in 1806 he sent to England the first descriptions of the Tasmanian 
devil  sarcophilus harrisii  and later a specimen of the razor grinder cicada tettigonia 
harrisii. According to E. R. Prettyman,
171 George Harris had a dispute with another Van 
Diemen’s Land magistrate, Edward Lord, and in 1808, he sent a memorial to the Colonial 
Office about this.  It is claimed that in 1810 he edited Hobart’s first and short-lived 
newspaper the Derwent Star and Van Diemen’s Land Intelligencier.  
 
Adolarius William Henry Humphrey 
 
According to G.  H.  Stancombe,
172Adolarius William  Henry Humphrey was a 
mineralogist, who sailed from England with Lieutenant Governor David Collins in 1803. 
He was one of a party of men sent by Lieutenant Governor Collins in a vessel across 
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treacherous Bass Strait from Port Philip to Port Dalrymple in Van Diemen’s Land, to 
search for fresh water. The party found the Supply River, now named the South Esk 
River. At this site Adolarius Humphrey chiselled and hammered into the dolerite rock his 
initials ‘a.h.1804.’  This act of vandalism distinguishes him as one of Van Diemen’s 
Land’s early graffitists.  
 
In 1807 he accompanied surveyor Charles Grimes to Launceston and discovered the salt 
pans at Tunbridge. From 1810 he held a temporary appointment as a magistrate; this was 
made official in 1814 when it was confirmed by Governor Macquarie.  
 
In this role he meted out harsh punishments, for which he was loathed by the convicts. In 
retaliation, Michael Howe and other banditti burned his stacks and ransacked his house at 
Pittwater while the Brady band slaughtered many of the stud pigs and Saxon merino 
sheep he bred. For this, Mr Humphrey sought compensation from the government for his 
losses in 1815.  
 
 
Figure V: Convicts in a chain gang and marching back to prison barracks
173 
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Mr Humphrey was appointed a coroner in 1818, and Superintendent of Police and Chief 
Magistrate in Hobart. This appointment gave him enormous power. He was one of 
several witnesses to Commissioner T. J. Bigge’s enquiry, and gave evidence on licensing 
control, convicts, police, weights and measures and transportation.  
 
Mr Humphrey was well-liked by the executive administrators in Van Diemen’s Land, and 
in 1825 was appointed a member of both the Legislative Council and the Executive 
Council. In 1826 he sat on the inquiry into the conduct of Attorney General Gellibrand 
who was subsequently dismissed because of the finding. He retired in 1828 and died in 
1829. Both Lieutenant Governors Sorell and Arthur commended Mr Humphrey 
particularly for not seeking personal gain. However, it must be remembered that Mr 
Humphrey did receive a land grant – that surely was personal gain.  
 
Jacob Hackett Mountgarrett 
 
The factual content of this discussion of Jacob Hackett Mountgarrett derives from the 
Colonial Secretary’s Index
174 and from the biography written by Isabella Mead.
175 
 
Mr Mountgarrett came as a free surgeon on the vessel Glatton in 1803. He was appointed 
surgeon at Norfolk Island on 18 March 1803 and then appointed to act as surgeon at 
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Lieutenant Bowen’s southern settlement in Van Diemen’s Land on 29 March 1803.
176 
Between 1806 and 1808 his name is on the list of civil and military officers with a second 
class
177 spirit ration.  
 
When Lieutenant Governor Collins arrived in the Hobart Town settlement with his own 
medical personnel, Mr Mountgarrett’s medical services were no longer required there.
178 
Thus he was appointed surgeon at Port Dalrymple and magistrate on 31 August 1804.
179 
He subsequently received a grant of  six hundred  acres in the north of the island.
180 




Magisterial duty at Port Dalrymple was clearly a lingering source of rancor to Mr 
Mountgarrett because he complained of an insult received from Sergeant Hughes on 26
 
January 1809.
182 On 20 February 1809 he repeated his complaints of having been grossly 
insulted by Sergeant Hughes whilst in the execution of his duty as a magistrate.
183 Mr 
Mountgarrett was also a farmer at the  Derwent settlement and upon his dismissal as 
magistrate
184 his request to purchase two more working bullocks from the government 
stock
185 was granted. His grant of land was confirmed on 12 February 1811.
186  
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Records of 31 July 1813 show he was paid from the Police Fund on account of his labour 
for the government.
187 As a farmer he supplied cattle to the government herds at Port 
Dalrymple in 1817.
188 Mr Mountgarrett is one of many listed as owing quit rents.
189 He 
was subject to supervision as to when he left the colony. For example, on 25 May 1812 
he was permitted to return to Sydney to settle his private affairs
190and he was ordered not 
to absent himself from public duties except in an emergency on 30 April 1813.
191 In 1814 
it was alleged he connived in the escape of convicts George Williams and Peter Mills 
from Port Dalrymple,
192 the allegations being so strong that he was summoned to appear 
before a Civil Court in Sydney on this matter.




While in Sydney, however, Mr  Mountgarrett became ill and one of his arms was 
amputated.
195  Despite this physical handicap he continued as a surgeon at Port 
Dalrymple.
196 It was not until 1821 that Mr Mountgarrett was replaced as surgeon at Port 
Dalrymple, when he was then placed on half-pay.
197 It does not do to ponder the surgical 
services which would have been meted out to the residents of Port Dalrymple by a one-
armed surgeon in the years from 1814 to 1821.  
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Reverend Robert Knopwood 
  
Reverend Robert Knopwood, a Church of England vicar, was the first clergy person in 
Van Diemen’s Land, having arrived with Lieutenant Governor Collins’ expedition in 
February 1804.
199 He had previously served as a navy chaplain and in the West Indies.
200 
He served as a magistrate from 1804 to 1828,
201 a role which was onerous in more ways 
than one. For example, on 26 July 1826 Reverend Robert Knopwood records in his Diary 
that he sat on the Bench with Chief Justice Pedder from 10.00 am until midnight.
202  
 
Reverend Knopwood held a Master of Arts degree from Cambridge University. However, 
he was not just an academic. He had a background of familiarity with the countryside and 
the English seeds he brought with him became the first introduced crops on the island. An 
avid diarist
203 his diary provides a rich word picture of his life in colonial Van Diemen’s 
Land.  
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202 Robert Knopwood,  Diary, 26
  July 1826, reproduced in Alex Castles, (1982), op. cit., 263 
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Reverend Knopwood received generous land grants, for example, about one thousand 
acres at Clarence Plains, thirty acres in Hobart Town, together with the land where he 
built his house at Cottage Green, Battery Point.
204 Be that as it may, towards the end of 
his life he encountered financial hardship.
205  The monument erected over Reverend 




THE REVD ROBERT KNOPWOOD AM 
who died 18 September 1838 
Aged 77 Years 
He was the first COLONIAL CHAPLAIN 
IN VAN DIEMEN'S LAND 
Having arrived in 1804 with
LIEUT GOVERNOR COLLINS
He was a steady and affectionate
friend. A man of strict integrity and
active benevolence; ever ready to
relieve the distress and ameliorate
the condition of the afflicted.
This monument was erected by 
an obliged and grateful friend as a
mark of her respect. 
 
Figure Vl: The memorial to Reverend Robert Knopwood in a Hobart church yard
206  
Francis Williams  
Reliance is placed on the biography by R. F. Holder
207 for information about Francis 
Williams. Mr Williams was a mariner and merchant, who arrived in Sydney, New South 
Wales in April 1806. He did not have official permission to enter the colony but quickly 
set up as a merchant with Simeon Lord.
208 He was subsequently deported by Governor 
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Bligh in 1807 and after applying for permission to settle in New South Wales in 1809, 
returned to Sydney in January 1810.
209 This may well be one of the earliest examples of 
illegal immigrants being deported from Australia. 
Upon his return he again went into business with Simeon Lord and together they founded 
the wholesale and retail business named Lord and Williams. He was granted land and 
began farming in the Hawkesbury River area and was appointed trustee and 
commissioner of the turnpike between Sydney and the Hawkesbury River.
210 After one of 
his mercantile voyages for the firm in the vessel Hope in October 1812, his return journey 
was diverted to Hobart Town on Governor Macquarie’s orders. While there, Mr Williams 
bought stock to set up as a Van Diemen’s Land farmer and grazier.
211 
In March 1813, having returned to Sydney, Mr Williams was granted permission to 
exchange his eight hundred acres in the Hawkesbury district for a similar grant in Van 
Diemen’s Land. He dissolved his partnership with Lord, and relocated to Van Diemen’s 
Land in July 1813. In 1814 he was appointed a magistrate in Hobart Town.  
Mr Williams was unsuccessful as a farmer in Van Diemen’s Land and in February 1818 
returned to Sydney, accepting appointments at the Bank of New South Wales, firstly as 
an accountant and later as senior cashier.  He was asked to resign in September 1820 
when it appeared he had made an unauthorized transaction of two  thousand pounds. 
Shortly after his resignation it was discovered that the sealed bags of notes he had left for 
his successor were twelve thousand pounds  short. He was tried and convicted of 
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embezzlement in March 1822 and sentenced to transportation for fourteen years which he 
served as a clerk for government stores and later as a clerk to the Bench of Magistrates in 
Newcastle.  
He was granted a ticket-of-leave in 1828 and he set up as an agent in Newcastle until his 
death in 1831.
212 
Richard William Fryett 
For information about Richard William Fryett reliance is placed upon the  Australian 
Dictionary of Biography
213 which indicates that he left England for Sydney in November 
1814 as a free man, carrying funds of between one thousand and one thousand two 
hundred pounds with the intention of farming. Upon arrival, he was granted two hundred 
acres of land at Drummond, New South Wales, by Governor Macquarie.  
 
In 1818 Mr Fryett moved to Hobart Town, opened a store at his house in Bathurst Street 
and obtained an auctioneer’s licence. His business boomed and he supplied meat and 
grain to the government. In 1820 he bought four of the merino rams which Lieutenant 
Governor Sorell imported from Sydney and in 1821 received a grant of five hundred 
acres on the River Jordan in the island’s midlands.  
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He became clerk and salesman to the Cross Marsh Market Committee. He undertook 
auctioneering, and dealt in cattle and land. His fortunes changed in the 1842 depression 
and he became insolvent. 
 
Thomas William Birch 
 
Thomas William  Birch, according to his biographer G.  H.  Stancombe,
214  arrived in 
Hobart Town in May 1808 as a medical officer on the whaling ship Dubuc and remained 
as a settler.  
 
In Hobart Town he embarked upon activities of whaling, sealing, boat building and 
chartering. He also became a merchant, specializing in the export of whale oil and seal 
skins. He exploited the Huon pine forests in Port Davey, having been given the sole right 
to cut Huon pine there for a year in consequence of his claim to have discovered Port 
Davey in 1815.  
 





215writes that David Lord arrived in Hobart Town in March 1817 as a free 
settler, in order to join his emancipist father who had attained considerable wealth after 
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completing his seven year convict sentence. David Lord received a land grant of one 
hundred acres in 1817 and a further grant of seven hundred acres in 1819. Upon his 
father’s death in August 1824 his wealth increased further and by 1829 he owned two 
thousand acres through grants, eleven thousand, five hundred and sixty acres by purchase 
and four thousand, one hundred and fifty acres by lease.  
 
The Land Commissioners of Van Diemen’s Land noted in April 1827 that David Lord 
was the richest man in the island. These Commissioners cited him as an example of the 
defects of the colony’s land system wherein grantees who had improved their farms the 
least and defied all regulations, had become the only rich men on the island. The Land 
Commissioners further noted that David Lord neglected his cattle, allowing them to roam 
over an area of between eighteen and twenty  miles. The content of the Land 
Commissioners’ report resulted in Lieutenant Governor Arthur ordering an investigation 
into David Lord’s grants of land in 1828.
216 The result of the investigation did not auger 
well for Mr Lord’s reputation. The Surveyor-General found that David Lord had obtained 
large tracts of land in the eastern marshes by securing waterholes in the area. He had 
made very few improvements to any of his holdings. Despite this damaging report, 
official penalties seem not to have been imposed.
217 
 
Mr Lord’s ability to contrive land deals to his benefit can be found in his exchange of 
ninety acres, in 1824, to the colonial administration for the establishment of the town of 
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Richmond. He had acquired these ninety acres as payment for a debt. As exchange for 
them, David Lord received from the colonial administration five hundred and sixty seven 
acres of land near Oatlands.
218 
 
From 1820 David Lord had a pew in St David’s Anglican Church, and in 1822 donated 
the land for a Methodist church in Melville Street. His multi-denominationalism is further 
demonstrated in 1823, when he became  a member of a committee seeking the 
establishment of a Presbyterian Church.
219 
 
4. Deductions from the magisterial appointments 
 
These magisterial appointees have four characteristics in common: 
 
•  they were men,  
•  they had the ability to use the Van Diemen’s Land opportunity for personal 
power acquisition to their advantage,  
•  they were not of the Roman Catholic religious persuasion,  and  
•  they had no formal legal training.  
While each magistrate was able to initially gain from the Van Diemen’s Land experience, 
the ability to retain that bounty differed. This is demonstrated in the following figure:  
 






Magistrate  Skills on 
arrival in the 
colony 
Government job in the 
colony 




Thomas Bell  Engineer  Commander of Military 
Garrison, Inspector of 
Public Works 
Unknown  Left  colony in  1824, 
having arrived in 1818;   
well liked by 
administrators, convicts 
and free people 
George 
Gatehouse 
First arrived as 
convict John 
Simpson; 
returned as free 
immigrant 
Not employed by 
government; member of 
the Government 
Committee of Sheep 
Distribution;  private 
enterprise: maltster and 
farmer  
Granted land  Remained in colony;  
good fortune continued 
George Harris  Surveyor  Deputy Surveyor in 
Van Diemen’s Land 










Surgeon  Port Dalrymple 
Surgeon and private 
enterprise: farmer and 
merchant 




Mineralologist  Superintendent of 
Police; Chief 
Magistrate in Hobart 
Town 




Mariner   free enterprise: 
merchant and banker,  
Granted land   Left  colony  for  New 
South Wales  where good 
fortune changed  




 Granted land   Remained in colony; 
Good fortune continued 
Richard Fryett   Free immigrant   Private enterprise: 
auctioneer; merchant; 
clerk 
Granted land  Apparently remained in 
colony; Good fortune 
changed 
Thomas Birch   Medical officer  Private enterprise: 
whaler, sealer and 
merchant  
Granted land  Apparently remained in 
colony; Good fortune 
continued  
 
Figure (Vll): The fortunes of some Van Diemen’s Land magistrates  
 
 
In any case, regardless of the material achievements of each man during life in the colony 
of Van Diemen’s Land, death, the great leveller, eventually seized whatever power each 




220 conclusion that “overall the magistrates were for the most part, no 
more than representatives of their day and age working in the context of a convict 
colony” is open to discussion. For example, it is hardly accurate to describe each of the 
magistrates described above as being representative of the people in Van Diemen’s Land 
because each magistrate: 
 
•  was literate, 
•  had an acknowledged skill, trade or profession, 
•  had secured an official appointment, 
•  had paid employment, and  
•  had a position of power over others.  
 By comparison, most people in both Van Diemen’s Land at that time were: 
 
•  illiterate, 
•  unskilled, 
•  unemployed, and  
•  powerless. 
Thus it seems inaccurate to suggest that the members of the Van Diemen’s Land Bench 
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5. Stipendiary magistrates 
 
It is to be remembered that the first magistrates in Van Diemen’s Land – some of the men 
whose lives have just been discussed - undertook magisterial duties without receiving 
payment. Thus, they were men who gave their time, without remuneration, to perform 
tasks which most people would consider onerous. For this, they must be commended. 
 
In the course of time, the many official obligations together with the associated travel 
required to undertake magisterial duties, demanded too much time away from a 
magistrate’s personal work, for the honorary appointments to remain viable.
221 Thus, it 
became necessary to have a paid magistracy. From the commencement of his term of 
office in 1824, Lieutenant Governor Arthur made Stipendiary Magistrates the focal point 
for regulating the administrative and judicial business of magistracy in the island’s 
separate districts.
222  Castles  (1982)
223  informs that in Van Diemen’s Land there was 




The role of police in managing law and  order in Van Diemen’s Land cannot be 
overlooked. Before 1824, policing was overseen by local magistrates. Service in the 
constabulary was one way convicts could move towards respectability and freedom in the 
penal colony. The best behaved convicts were recruited as  Field Police or ‘petty 
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constables.’
224  Such convicts who were chosen to serve as Field Police were also 
disparagingly termed ‘felon police.’ 
 
Castles (1982)
225 informs that as early as 1796 a rewards system was introduced for 
convicts who undertook policing duties in New South Wales. Such rewards included a 
weekly ration of spirits and remission of sentence after carrying out duties to the 
satisfaction of magistrates for a specified period.
226 It could be that a similar reward 
system operated in Van Diemen’s Land for the Field Police. 
 
An attempt to regularize policing in the island came in The Van Diemen’s Land Police 
Act, 1833.
227 This legislation consisted of sixty-seven clauses, all of which regulated the 
behaviour of all people in the colony. It included matters such as curfews and the entry of 
police into private homes.
228 Thus, it can be concluded that, while magistrates seemed to 
have  had  administrative functions such as the organisation and control of law 
enforcement at the local level,
229 the field police had responsibility for observing and 
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7. Police magistrates 
 
At the instigation of Lieutenant Governor Arthur, the island of Van Diemen’s Land was 
divided into five police districts in 1827.
230 Police Magistrates were appointed for each 
district and paid from the beginning of 1827. This innovation can be seen as the first 
action to officially regularize the administration of local justice in the colony. 
 




Figure (Vlll): Depiction of Police Magistrate’s house at Oatlands, Van Diemen’s Land
231 
 
Police Magistrates, being lay people, untrained in the law, required guidance as to legal 
procedures and processes. For this purpose, Charles Rocher assembled a guide entitled 
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An Analysis of the Criminal Laws of England as Applicable to the Colony Giving and 
General and Comprehensive View of Crimes, their Punishments and the Evidence to 
Support them with the Statues by which they are created Appended.
232 There is a second 
part to this text. This was a Coroner’s Guide and it was written by P. S. Tomlins, in 1837, 
the Chief Clerk of Police in Van Diemen’s Land at the time. The instructions in Rocher 
and Tomlins’ text are important in that they are definitive of the criminal law in Van 
Diemen’s Land in the 1830’s. It is of interest that Rocher (1837)
233 cautions that the 
English criminal law is not wholly applicable in Van Diemen’s Land. Thus, variants in 
the colony’s criminal law had emerged by 1833, due to the island’s context.  
 
7. Proceedings of the Bench of Magistrates, Yorktown, Port Dalrymple, to investigate 
the conduct of Charles Barrington alias Hacket,  9 March 1805,
234  on the bench 
magistrates Mr Riley, J. P. and Captain A. F. Kemp, J. P.
235  
 
The English community of Port Dalrymple began on 5 November 1804, when Lieutenant 
Governor Paterson, and Mrs Paterson and seventy-four male convicts, two convict’s 
wives, sixty-four New South Wales’ corps and twenty women and fourteen children 
arrived.
236 Within four months, competition, jealousy and selfishness had led to gossip, 
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innuendo and ill-feeling between the members of the small, transplanted community, as 
the case against Charles Barrington reveals. 
 
The case against Charles Barrington appears to be the oldest official written record of the 
first Proceedings for defamation from the Bench of Magistrates in Van Diemen’s Land.  
The case began in March 1805. Charles Barrington, an emancipated convict,
237  was 
accused of the alleged slander of several administrators at Port Dalrymple and a libel on 
Mr Mountgarrett, surgeon, magistrate and farmer.
238 The charges were brought by Mr 
Mountgarrett.  
 
As an emancipated convict, Mr Barrington had been given the position of Principal 
Overseer
239  of convicts, with authority to set convicts to work for the government 
projects. On Sundays the convicts were free to labour for farmers for private emoluments. 
Some farmers, however, wanted to have the additional benefit of convict labour on 
weekdays. Mr Mountgarrett was one such farmer. 
 
The libel charge evolved from a letter dated 3 March 1805 written by Charles Barrington 
to Lieutenant Governor Paterson.
240  In the letter Mr Barrington informs Lieutenant 
Governor Paterson at Port Dalrymple that Mr Mountgarrett: 
 
•  sought increasing numbers of convicts to work on his farm on weekdays, and 
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•  sought government iron and steel for his private purposes. 
Mr Barrington, quite rightly, refused to grant these requests. As a consequence, Mr 
Mountgarrett caused trouble for him by insisting to the Lieutenant Governor that the 
content of Mr Barrington’s letter was untrue and consequently a libel. 
 
The slander charges evolved and were proved by having several convicts collaboratively 
testify that Mr Barrington had made various defamatory comments about various 
administrators. These comments included: 
 
•  allegedly referring to magistrate Mr Riley as a “damned ill-looking fellow” and 
“a common dirty bloody shoe-boy with not a penny to bless himself only what he 
was supplied by Governor King,”  
•  allegedly referring to magistrate Mr Mountgarrett as “ a damned rascal” and “a 
black snake,” and 
•  allegedly referring to magistrate Captain Kemp as “a mean pitiful scoundrel.”
241 
 
Charles Barrington appeared before magistrates Riley and Kemp, who at first instance, 
decided the case was too serious for them to pass judgment.
242 Nevertheless, Lieutenant 
Colonel Paterson desired them to continue investigating that matter, which they did.
243 
Magistrate Mr Riley had lobbied successfully for land grants in New South Wales. The 
following figure indicates that his New South Wales’ property was impressive:  
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In light of the alleged slander of themselves, it is little wonder that Mr Barrington was 
found guilty by Captain Kemp and Mr Riley and on 25 May 1805 was sentenced by these 
magistrates to three hundred lashes plus a further three-year’s labour for the Crown.
245 
Lieutenant Governor Paterson, however, on 2 June 1805, sought a review  of this 
punishment from the Judge Advocate in Sydney.
246Mr Barrington was kept in close 
confinement
247while the Judge Advocate’s opinion was awaited.  
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That opinion, under the hand of the Governor in Chief in Sydney dated 7 November 
1805, confirmed that  the Port Dalrymple magistrates  had  power to inflict the harsh 
punishment.
248  However,  Lieutenant Governor Paterson remitted the corporal part of 
Charles Barrington’s punishment because of the length of time the man had been held in 
close confinement.
249 The Lieutenant Governor confirmed the sentence of three year’s 
labour for the Crown, as well as confirming the sentence of another two year’s labour for 
the Crown meted out by the magistrates in August 1805.
250 
 
9. Proceedings of the Bench of Magistrates, Yorktown, Port Dalrymple, to investigate 
the conduct of James Page, 12 November 1805,
251 on the bench magistrates Anthony 
Fenn Kemp, J. P., Jacob Mountgarrett, J. P., and Alexander Riley, J. P.  
 
The second defamation case before the Bench of Magistrates at Port Dalrymple was that 
of Proceedings against James Page. The record of the Proceedings against James Page 
consists of a transcript apparently written by the magistrates, or a clerk, of the 
investigation of an instance of the behaviour of one man, James Page.  
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This was an action for slander. The Proceedings document indicates that the investigation 
was instituted because there was a ‘rumour’ which had come to the attention of the 
bench, that is magistrates, Kemp, Mountgarrett and Riley. The content of the rumour was 
that James Page, Constable in the colony of Van Diemen’s Land, had stated that Captain 
Symonds,
253  the Commander of H.  M.  supply vessel Lady  Nelson,  was off-loading 
government supplies to Mr Mountgarrett’s wharf. Interestingly, Mr Mountgarrett was one 
of the three magistrates hearing this Proceeding. There is no mention of any complaint 
having come from Captain Symonds. In actual fact, Captain Symonds was essentially the 
person being defamed.  He had due grounds for complaining that of the rumour that he 
was off-loading the supplies for the government settlement to a private individual.  
 
Figure (X): Drawing of a sailing vessel similar to H. M. S. Lady Nelson
254 
 
                                                 
253 The transcript of Proceedings at times shows Captain Symonds’ name as ‘Symonds’ and at other times 
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It can be inferred, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that Mr Mountgarrett was 
both a complainant as well as being one of the three adjudicators. 
 
The Proceedings consisted of three witnesses to the alleged slander -  James Field, 
William Owen and Thomas Kilberry - giving sworn evidence before the bench. Each 
witness was then examined on his evidence. Each of the witnesses concurred that James 
Page had, while doing his rounds of the huts in which they lived at Port Dalrymple, had 
said that  Captain Simmons, Commander of H.  M. vessel  Lady Nelson, was landing 
government stores, including rice and peas, at Mr Mountgarrett’s wharf, therefore leaving 
sailors short of their allowance on the Sydney run.
255   
 
Some of the comments in this testimony are so much embedded within the historical 
context that they require explanation. For example, the term ‘hut’ was used to describe 
the primitive houses the convicts built for themselves when they arrived in the colony of 
Van Diemen’s Land. They cut down trees, split the timber and made the primitive 
accommodation huts while living in tents. The bark covering some species of the native 
timber in Van Diemen’s Land was highly prized being used either as fuel for fires or for 
lining buildings. The Proceedings indicates that the Lady Nelson carried loads of bark 
from Van Diemen’s Land to Sydney.  
 
                                                 




Figure (Xl): Example of a convict hut
256 similar to those at Port Dalrymple  
 
 
James Page, the defendant, presented a written defence  to the bench
257  which is 
interesting because literacy was not a common characteristic of convicts in 1805. 
 
His defence stated: 
 
“I have never spoken anyway disrespectful of Mr Simmons. I never mentioned 
Mr Mountgarrett’s name. But such is the envy of those persons who appeared 
against me that they would swear away my life on account of my doing my duty 
strictly as a constable. I declare myself innocent.
258 I entirely leave myself to the 
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The bench found James Page guilty of wantonly defaming the character of Lieutenant 
Symmons. Basing their decision for punishment on the current insolence of many of the 
prisoners,  they  considered it  their duty to take decisive steps to  end such behaviour   
which had caused dissention and trouble in the colony  from  its establishment.  The 
Charles Barrington
260 case gave them a precedent for the punishment they would award 
for the offence. They considered the conduct of James Page
261  to have dangerous 
consequences  such as  promoting a mutinous disposition on board the Lady Nelson. 
Despite the exemplary manner in which he had done his duty as constable, the bench 
dismissed him from that position, sentenced him to one hundred lashes and labour for the 
Crown for one year to commence from the expiration of his original sentence.
262 
 
The magistrates regarded gossip and rumour to be a reason for the insolence of many of 
the prisoners and regarded it as their duty to take the most decisive steps to put a stop
263 
to rumour-mongering and slander. The magistrates had manifold tasks in the colony 
essentially  being  administrators, guardians of the colony’s morality, prison warders, 
upholders of the law, makers of the law, pioneer farmers and town planners. However, 
their first essential was to have a supply of manageable workers to attend to the tasks. 
The moment a worker became unmanageable he became a target for the horrendously 
hard punishments inflicted by the magistrates of Van Diemen’s Land.  
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The accused man, James Page, as a serving convict on whom the role of ‘constable’ had 
been conferred, was in an invidious position. The practice of choosing convicts to serve 
as constables had inherent potential problems. Castles (1982) notes that the appointment 
of convicts as ‘petty constables’ was not always filled with universal approbation, and the 
press sometimes referred to them as ‘Felon Police.’
264 
 
While the procedure of having trusted convicts fulfilling the role of police began when 
the English community began in Van Diemen’s Land, as mentioned in passing 
previously,  Lieutenant Governor Arthur is credited with formalizing it.  Lieutenant 
Governor Arthur, upon his arrival in Van Diemen’s Land, commissioned the best 
behaved convicts as ‘Field Police’ to assist in tackling the rise of bushranging.
265 
According to the Lieutenant Governor, the impact was “a most powerful effect in 
suppressing Bush-ranging by creating distrust and disunion among the Prisoner-
population.”
266 However, as the example of James Page shows, the manifestation of the 
jealousy and resentment of other convicts who were subjected to the authority of one of 
their peers, could be destructive. 
 
An undated listing for James Page in the Index to Land Grants in Van Diemen’s Land
267 
suggests that he was one of the early land grantees who subsequently failed to take up the 
land. After James Page completed his sentence it is more than likely that he wanted to 
exit Van Diemen’s Land. In this regard, the Colonial Secretary’s correspondence reveals 
                                                 
264 Alex Castles, (1982),  287 
265 ibid 
266 Arthur to Bathurst, 24 March 1827, H.R.A., Ser. lll, Vol. 5, 693-694 
267 Index to Colonial Secretary’s Correspondence, State Records Office, The Rocks, Sydney, Reel 3790 
and Fiche 3262, 4/438, 2 83 
 
that James Page accompanied the master mariner Eber Bunker through the New South 
Wales Cowpastures on 27 February 1821.
268 
 
Eber Bunker was master of The Albion  between 1799 and 1800 and in that vessel 
accompanied the Lady Nelson to establish the Derwent Settlement in 1803.
269 In 1806 
Eber Bunker brought his family to the colony of New South Wales and settled there.
270 If 
James Page had been in the first group of convicts sent to Van Diemen’s Land, it is 
plausible that he came to know Eber Bunker during the  voyage and also  at Port 
Dalrymple. Perhaps the two men shared a view of Van Diemen’s Land in which they 
preferred New South Wales. Thus the James Page noted as accompanying Eber Bunker, 
the master mariner, may well have been the same James Page who was punished for 
words which he maintained he never said in this Proceeding.    
 
The three witnesses who gave evidence to the bench clearly knew each other and the 
evidence indicates that they lived together in the same hut. It is not unreasonable to 
expect that cohabitation in an unfamiliar environment resulted in dialogue of a type in  
which the paucity of outside news generated a climate conducive of gossip, rumour and 
plotting.  
    
One of the witnesses, convict, William Owens arrived in Australia in 1797 on the ship 
Ganges and is listed as receiving an absolute pardon. An undated listing in the Index to 
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Land Grants in Van Diemen’s Land
271 indicates a land grant to William Owens. Castles 
(2007) confirms that it was the practice in Van Diemen’s Land to issue land grants to 
convicts
272 upon completion of their sentences or the granting of an absolute pardon.  
 
The total reliance upon oral evidence of peers who were subject to oversight by the 
accused is fraught with the potential for corruption. From 1788, when Van Diemen’s 
Land Lieutenant Governor Collins, was acting in the position of Judge Advocate in New 
South Wales, he refused to convict on the unsupported evidence of one person, according 
to Castles (2007).
273 This convention clearly was followed in the investigation of James 
Page at Port Dalrymple. However, it meant that the three men who gave evidence against 
him collaborated in their hearsay evidence and it was on this evidence that the bench 
convicted James Page. 
 
The very fact of their magisterial appointment elevated the men on the Bench  of 
Magistrates giving them preferential material rewards. For example, Henry Melville 
(1835)
274  informs that while magistrates were not paid a salary, they received other 
benefits such as rations for themselves and up to four of their servants as well as grants of 
land. Castles  (1982)
275notes that the appointment to the position of magistrate gave 
power and prestige.  
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Mr Mountgarrett, one of the three magistrates making a decision on the case, is also 
implicated in the slander. It is of interest to ponder the conflict of interest in this overlap 
together with the biographical details of the man. As well as being a government medical 
officer, Mr Mountgarrett was also a farmer at both the Derwent the northern settlements, 
receiving land grants in both places. He received approval to purchase animals from the 
government stock and sold produce from his farming activities to the government. He 
also supplied cattle to the government herds at Port Dalrymple in 1817.
276 As well, Mr 
Mountgarrett dabbled in merchandising, being identified as a merchant in the Colonial 
Secretary’s papers.
277 Records of 31 July 31
 1813 show he was paid from the police fund 
on account of his labour for the government.
278  Yet, despite being paid by the 
government for his services, Mr Mountgarrett did not pay his dues to the government of 
Van Diemen’s Land, being one of many men listed as owing quit rents.
279  
 
Mr Mountgarrett  can also be identified as a serial complainant: James Page was his 
second subject at Port Dalrymple, Charles Barrington being the first.
280 Mr Mountgarrett 
also made official complaints about Sergeant Hughes on 26 January 1809,
281 while on 20 
February 1809 he repeated his complaints of having been grossly insulted by Sergeant 
Hughes during the execution of his duty as a magistrate.
282 During his life, therefore, Mr 
Mountgarett  can be seen as not having  been a stranger to causing trouble: a serial 
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complainant himself, he surely gave others reason to complain about him. Mr Page was 
very unfortunate to have been his second victim of complaint in Port Dalrymple.  
 
The other person impliedly defamed was the master of the vessel, Captain Symmons, the 
person allegedly off-loading provisions at Mr Mountgarrett’s wharf. If Captain Symmons 
did off-load cargo at Mr Mountgarrett’s wharf, there are two possibilities: either he did so 
in accordance with instructions from Mr Mountgarrett or he  was complicit with Mr 
Mountgarrett in an underhand business project. Thus, the alleged conversation could have 
been as defamatory to Captain Symmons as Mr Mountgarrett claimed it was to himself. 
However, the Captain is not present at the Proceedings, nor does he provide an affidavit 
about whether or not he did off-load goods at Mr Mountgarrett’s wharf.  
 
This is an indication of the inherent bias of the Bench of Magistrates’ Proceedings. Mr 
Mountgarrett was considered by his fellow magistrates to be beyond reproach: thus, there 
was no attempt to determine the accuracy of the conversation. Similarly, the possibility 
that the Captain and Mr Mountgarett were complicit in the off-loading of cargo  is 
presumably not contemplated by the magistrates.  
 
The punishment was threefold:  whipping, removal from the office of police constable 
and an extra year of servitude. Van Diemen’s Land was a harsh physical environment and 
this may have been one of the reasons why punishment was so harsh. For example, 
Castles (2007)
283 notes that convicts were regularly whipped for minor offences, and 
probably more harshly disciplined than the convicts in New South Wales. The loss of 
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official records for the early period, however, prevents verification of this notion.
284 
Nevertheless, Castles provides compelling  anecdotal examples which point to such a 
conclusion.  For example, he quotes an Order given for Port Dalrymple, where the 
Proceedings against James Page were held, declaring: “Any convict showing the least 




   






This discussion of the Proceedings of the Bench of Magistrates in Port Dalrymple, Van 
Diemen’s Land, 1805, indicates the threads of misrepresentations and misconceptions 
which occurred in the attempts of government officials to administer justice. The 
fundamental principle of the Rule of Law, that all men are to be treated equally before the 
law, is not found in either of these cases.  
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Reliance on the testimony of witnesses reveals the potential for collaboration while the 
conflict of interest surrounding Mr Mountgarrett in both matters, supports the 
uncomfortable conclusion that injustice, rather than justice, was meted out to the 
defendants. In both of these cases before the Port Dalrymple Bench of Magistrates, the 
unrepresented defendants were of convict attaint and were  found guilty on the 
collaborative testimony of convicts over whom they had authority.  
 
Importantly, the decisions in the two cases indicate that the administrative hierarchy 
protected itself. The magistrates accepted the evidence of the convicts without any 
hesitation. There is no evidence of the magistrates having contemplated the possibility of 
witnesses’ collaboration or malice towards the two men with convict attaint who were 
fulfilling positions of responsibility.  
 
In the case of Charles Barrington, Lieutenant Governor Paterson failed to conduct an 
independent investigation regarding the complaints the convict supervisor made about Mr 
Mountgarrett. In the case of James Page, hindsight  suggests it would have been 
appropriate that the complaint brought by Mr Mountgarrett against James Page, should 
have prompted the Lieutenant Governor to investigate the claims of misappropriation.  
 
Thus, in both of these cases, the administration can be seen to have protected itself. Those 
holding executive positions of trust and responsibility apparently cocooned themselves 
within the belief that they were beyond corruption. The absence of an independent voice 89 
 
of power resulted in arbitrary decision-making. The Rule of Law, as known in Australia 



























CHAPTER FOUR: DEFAMATION CASES FROM THE LIEUTENANT 
GOVERNOR’S COURT OF VAN DIEMEN’S LAND 
 
1. The Lieutenant Governor’s Court of Van Diemen’s Land 
 
The Second Charter of Justice of New South Wales
287 promulgated on 4 February 1814, 
dealt only with civil matters. It abolished the Court of Civil Jurisdiction and created a 
Supreme Court, to be presided over by a judge appointed by a commission.  The judge 
was required to sit with two lay persons appointed by the governor. This Second Charter 
has relevance for Van Diemen’s Land because it established two other civil courts: the 
Governor’s Court for New South Wales and the Lieutenant Governor’s Court for Van 
Diemen’s Land.  
 
The Deputy Judge Advocate in Van Diemen’s Land would sit with two fit and proper 
persons appointed by the Lieutenant Governor of Van Diemen’s Land. Both of these 
courts - the Governor’s Court in New South Wales and the Lieutenant Governor’s Court 
for Van Diemen’s Land - were vested with jurisdiction to deal with civil claims in which 
the money or property did not exceed fifty pounds. Thus there was a  monetary 
jurisdictional limit for matters brought to the Lieutenant Governor’s Court, that limit 
being  fifty pounds.  Thus, in Van Diemen’s Land the first established court can be 
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identified as the Lieutenant Governor’s Court. In actual fact it was presided over by 
Deputy Judge Advocate Edward Abbott. 
 
Records from the Judge Advocate’s Office of New South Wales, dated 26 December 
1816 are illuminative of the work and responsibilities of the Judge Advocate in New 
South Wales. They can be applied to the work required done by the Deputy Judge 
Advocate in Van Diemen’s Land. The tasks included: 
 
•  the examination of the Depositions taken upon the committal of offenders, 
•  preparation of the Informations upon which they are tried, 
•  summoning of the necessary witnesses,  
•  exhibition of  Informations to the court, 
•  conduct of the trial, 
•  taking down the evidence, 
•  recording decisions, and  
•  taking charge of the records of the court. 
 
The major problem revealed in these duties is that the Judge Advocate simultaneously 
performs the offices of: 
 
•  magistrate,  
•  public prosecutor,  
•  judge, and  92 
 
•  determiner of the legality of the Informations drawn up and exhibited by himself. 
 
Thus, as the Judge Advocate was intimately involved in the preliminary areas of the 









Mr Samuel Bate was appointed first Deputy Judge Advocate for Van Diemen’s Land and 
arrived in Hobart Town on 14 May 1806. However, he acted only as a magistrate because 
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of the absence of courts of law.
289 Lieutenant Governor Collins granted him leave of 
absence from the position on 8 September 1807.
290  Governor Macquarie was not 
favourably impressed with Mr Bate’s performance in this role, complaining that he was 
totally ignorant of the law. Mr Bate was subsequently dismissed from the position by 
Lord Bathurst  in February 1814, following a recommendation from Governor 
Macquarie.
291   
 
Deputy Judge Advocate Edward Abbott was duly commissioned in February 1814 to 
preside over the first Lieutenant Governor’s Court in Van Diemen’s Land,
292 opening his 
court in December 1815. He had a military background and was untrained in the law, but 
this seemed not to matter.  Mr Abbott saw his court as a court of justice and right, being 
neither a court of equity nor law. What he meant by this is a matter of conjecture. Perhaps 
he was indicating that it was presided over by one who had no legal training. John West 
(1852)
293 identifies this court as a court of request. Again, this definition is open to 
conjecture: perhaps it suggests that persons with a problem made a request to the Deputy 
Judge Advocate, who would sit with two assessors, in order to formulate a solution.  
 
Deputy Judge Advocate Abbott did not collect fees for litigation involving amounts less 
than five pounds.
294 His official salary was eight hundred pounds per annum and, in 
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practice, the additional court fees which he was entitled to charge barely equalled this 
amount.
295 Thus, it can be inferred that Mr Abbott was not an overly greedy man, at least 
in regard to those who took their matters to his court. Importantly, because the 
jurisdictional limit for matters brought to the Lieutenant Governor’s Court was fifty 
pounds, the court can be seen as a forum for resolving disputes between the citizens, such 
as the non-payment of debts. It was, however, also  a forum for the resolution of 
defamation matters.  
  
Townsley
296notes that Mr Abbott was a very successful Deputy Judge Advocate and 
highly regarded in Hobart Town. One of the reasons for this may well have been because 
Mr Abbott, being a lay-person, adopted simplified procedures, reduced fees, argued by 
common sense and, with his two assessors, made decisions which the community 
regarded as fair.
297 There was no appeal from the Lieutenant Governor’s Court
298 but 
with ‘fair’ decisions being made an appeal structure was unnecessary. Mr Abbott 
continued as Deputy Judge Advocate until the office was abolished with  the 
commencement of the Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court in 1824. 
 
2. Defamation cases in the Lieutenant Governor’s Court of Van Diemen’s Land 
 
The defamation cases considered in this study are: 
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•  Rowland Walpole Loane v William Butcher,
299  
•  James Doharty v Thomas Mason and Eleanor his wife,
300  
•  Charles McDonald v William Presnell,
301   
•  John McCarron v William Cook,
302 and  
•  William Jennett v Richard Barker.
303  
These five cases came before the Van Diemen’s Lieutenant Governor’s Court during two 
sessions in 1820.
304 The dates of the cases in court, the magistrates sitting with Deputy 
Judge Advocate Abbott, and the decisions are shown in the figure below: 
CASE  DATE  MAGISTRATES  DECISION 
Rowland 




Birch & Fryett  For the complainant 
James Doharty v 
Thomas Mason 








5 July 1820  Bannister & Lord  For the complainant 
John McCarron v 
William Cook 
5 July 1820  Bannister & Lord  For the complainant 
William Jennett v 
Richard Barker 
2 August 1820  Bannister & Lord  For the complainant 
 
Figure (XlV): Defamation cases, dates, magistrates and decisions, Lieutenant Governor’s Court, Van 
Diemen’s Land, 1820 
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At the beginning of the session on 17 January 1820 a Memorandum of 13 January from 
His Honour Lieutenant Governor Sorell was read, appointing Mr Birch and Mr Fryett as 
magistrates.  It is  interesting  that His Honour Lieutenant Governor Sorell had just 
appointed Richard William Fryett and Thomas William Birch as members of the 
Lieutenant Governor’s Court and the Deputy Judge Advocate swore them in before this 
session of hearings began. Thus, for the case of Loane v Walpole,
305 magistrates Thomas 
William Birch and Richard William Fryett were sitting on the bench for the first time 
with Deputy Judge Advocate Abbott.  
 
 




3. Rowland Walpole Loane v William Butcher
307 
 
Rowland Walpole Loane v William Butcher
308is an action for slander which came before 
the Lieutenant Governor’s Court on 17 January 1820. 
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The facts of the case are that on or about 16 December 1819 in a public street of Hobart 
Town William Butcher maliciously accused Mr Loane of being a ‘sloviafer,’ a word 
which is interpreted in this study as ‘slavedriver.’ Mr Loane alleged that this naming 
resulted in causing great injury and detriment to his  character. Despite his frequent 
requests to Mr Butcher to pay damages or make reparation, Mr Butcher had refused to do 
so. Mr Loane, therefore, sought damages of fifty pounds in court.  
 
The court found for the complainant and awarded damages of five pounds. 
 
In this case, both the complainant and respondent appeared before the court. From this it 
can be inferred that the parties acknowledged: 
 
•  their own inability to resolve the problem, and  
•  the court’s capacity and power to do so.  
The offending word is difficult to read on the original, old court document. The closest 
interpretation is ‘slavdriver,’ bearing in mind phonetic variations and writing differences 
in the colony.  If the offending word is, in actual fact, ‘slavedriver’ the harm it caused to 
a person being so-labelled could have its origin in the ill-treatment of assigned convicts 
under the convict assignment system.  Under this system, free settlers could apply to the 
Administration to have convicts as labourers.  
 




Just fourteen years further into the future from this case, in 1833, Lieutenant Governor 
Arthur wrote that the assigned convict’s condition differed from that of a slave only in 
that the convict had a right to make a complaint to a magistrate, the master was not 
entitled to undertake corporal punishment of the assignee himself, and had property in 
him for a limited period only.
309 
 
William Douglas Forsyth  (1935)  compares convict assignment with slavery
310and 
concludes that indeed assignment was slavery. His reasoning is that, in assignment, a 
convict was compelled to obey every command of the master, on pain of being sentenced 
by a magistrate to flogging or worse, and in which his liberty of action is nullified.
311 
Forsyth (1935) maintains that New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land were colonized 
because of Britain’s need for a transportation system and further, that they were 
colonized by slave labour.
312  He relies on the affirmation of Lord Russell, who 
considered the convict assignment system in the Australian colonies was pure slavery.
313 
While these acknowledgements that assignment was slavery came fifteen years after this 
case, nevertheless, they provide a base for the inference that the term ‘slavedriver’ in 
1820 was considered highly prejudicial and harmful to reputation in Hobart Town.  
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This case can be said to reveal the powerlessness of the complainant and the court’s 
power to right a wrong. It identifies and denounces derogatory name calling as a negative 
value.  
 
4. James Doharty v Thomas Mason and Eleanor his wife
314 
 
The case of James Doharty v Thomas Mason and Eleanor his wife
315is an action for 
defamation and came before the court on 21 January, 1820, with Deputy Judge Advocate 
Abbott sitting with magistrates Richard William Fryett and Thomas William Birch. 
 
The facts of the case are that  James Doharty complained that the respondent and his wife 
Eleanor had assaulted the person of Judith, the complainant’s wife, by striking her 
repeatedly in the face and calling James ‘a robber’ and Judith ‘a whore.’ Damages of fifty 
pounds were sought. The court gave a verdict for the complainant and awarded sixteen 
pounds damages. Both the complainant and the two respondents appeared in court. 
 
The fact that the two respondents appeared in court suggests that the custom of 
defendants being joined and appearing together was followed in Van Diemen’s Land. 
The enjoinder of the criminal elements of assault - striking - and derogatory name-calling 
for a civil matter are of interest. There is the combination of fear, threat and physical 
damage with the assault, as if it were a criminal matter, together with the derogatory 
name calling as in a civil matter. 
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In colonial Van Diemen’s Land, where there was a disproportionate number of male and 
females, the ratio in 1820 being about six men to one woman, a woman’s reputation was 
very important. It was established by her own behaviour, economic situation and the 
status of her male relatives.
316  Thus the labelling of Mrs Doharty as ‘a whore’ was   
serious defamation.  
 
The labelling of Mr Doharty as a ‘robber’ was also highly defamatory in the colonial 
environment. This was due to the fact that bankruptcy was a common occurrence for 
settlers in early Van Diemen’s Land. The punishment for bankruptcy was imprisonment 
which compounded the problem. While languishing in gaol the bankrupt’s property was 
likely to be stolen and, while any grant of land was likely to be usurped by squatters, with 
stock and equipment being stolen. Thus, labelling Mr Doharty ‘a robber’ was tantamount 
to putting him in the same category as felons in the colony, while the labelling of Mrs 
Doharty ‘a whore’ was tantamount to implying she was a prostitute.  
 
Clearly the bench agreed that damage had been caused because they  found for the 
complainants, awarding damages of sixteen pounds. This amount was lower than the fifty 
pounds damages sought by the complainant. Nevertheless, as the jurisdictional limit for 
the Lieutenant Governor’s Court was fifty pounds, it could be that the maximum amount 
was sought as a matter of course. 
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The report can be said to reveal the powerlessness of the complainant in the face of a 
physical and verbal assault and the court’s power to right a wrong. It identifies and 
denounces derogatory name calling as a negative value.  
 
5. Charles McDonald v William Presnell
317 
 
The case of Charles McDonald v William Presnell
318 is an action for libel and came 
before the Lieutenant Governor’s Court on 5 July 1820.
319  Deputy Judge Advocate 
Abbott was sitting with magistrates William Bannister and David Lord.  
 
The facts of the case are that the defendant William Presnell was in debt to Charles 
McDonald. In order to pay his debt, Mr Presnell gave Charles McDonald two promissory 
notes. Mr Presnell publicly asserted - through placing an advertisement in The Hobart 
Town Gazette and Southern Reporter, and by broadcasting by delivery of hand bills and 
word of mouth - that Mr McDonald had forged the promissory notes. The amount for 
which the promissory notes were drawn is not stated. It was not unusual for promissory 
notes to be drawn for very small amounts. 
 
Promissory notes were a common method of payment in the colony because supplies of 
notes and cash were limited. The essential characteristic of a promissory note is that it 
becomes due and payable. The defences of a forged signature and signature under duress 
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or intoxication became common in order to evade payment of just debts.
320 Thus, by 
publicly asserting that the defendant had forged the promissory notes enormous damage 
was wrought upon his character. Further, the defendant refused to pay the debt to the 
plaintiff. Thus this case has two matters: one is of libel and the other is failure to pay a 
debt. 
 
The practice of hearing two matters simultaneously seems to have been adopted in the 
Lieutenant Governor’s Court, as revealed in the previously discussed case of James 
Doharty v Thomas Mason and Eleanor his wife.
321  Perhaps  this practice was 
implemented as a means of expedience to get as many matters through the court in as 
little time as possible. 
 
The bench clearly found Mr Doharty’s complaint proved, however, the damages awarded 
are small, just one shilling, together with costs of one shilling for bringing the action. 
This could indicate that the promissory notes were for small amounts. It also relieved the 
complainant of being out of pocket for the expense of bringing the action to court. The 
bench’s judgment clearly indicates its disapproval of the publication of a false statement 
about a person’s credit.  
 
6. John McCarron v William Cook
322 
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The case of John McCarron v William Cook
323came before the Lieutenant Governor’s 
Court on 5 July 1820. Deputy Judge Advocate Abbott and magistrates William Bannister 
and David Lord were on the bench 
.  
The facts of the case evolve from John McCarron’s work as pound-keeper, a role in 
which  his duty was to impound any straying animals. On one  particular day Mr 
McCarron was driving strayed bullocks belonging to William Cook to the pound. Mr 
Cook verbally publicly abused him, to the extent that Mr McCarron felt fear for his own 
physical safety. The comments Mr Cook directed to Mr McCarron were scandalous and 
tended to injure Mr McCarron’s character.  Mr McCarron sought damages of twenty 
pounds. 
 
In this case there are three matters: 
 
•  Mr Cook’s obstruction of Mr McCarron in the lawful undertaking of his duties as 
pound-keeper,  
•  Mr Cook’s slandering of Mr McCarron, thus injuring his character, and 
•  Mr Cook’s assault upon Mr McCarron, resulting in Mr McCarron’s fear for his 
physical safety.  
However, the only matter which is of concern in this discussion is Mr Cook’s slandering 
of Mr McCarron. 
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The importance of a town pound is discussed in the article Town Pound of Corinth, 
Maine
324where it is noted as a significant reminder of eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century agricultural-based life. The pound was an enclosure where strayed farm animals 
were kept until claimed by their owners, the fee for retrieval of the animals being 
determined by the length of time the animal stayed in the pound.  The pound keeper had 
the task of capturing stray animals, taking them to the pound and caring for them until 
claimed by their owners. In the case of animals not being claimed the pound keeper had 
to arrange sale for its sale. 
 
The necessity of having a pound in a developing agricultural colony such as Van 
Diemen’s Land is illustrated in the case of Morrisby v Olding  (1830)
325  where the 
straying of cattle upon sown land was said to have resulted in damage to crops. That case 
also suggests that in Van Diemen’s Land a pound keeper was either appointed by the 
Lieutenant Governor or slipped into the role by custom and subsequently approved by the 
Lieutenant Governor. By the authority of Van Diemen’s Land Government Orders, all 
stray cattle were to be driven to the nearest pound and a notice published in the Hobart 
Town Gazette three times advertising that the cattle would be put up for public sale on a 
particular date, if not claimed beforehand. If the owner of the animals collected them 
before the auction date, pound fees and damages were to be paid to the pound keeper. On 
the other hand, if the animals were sold, the pound keeper deducted his fees and damages 
from the sale.   
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Figure (XVl): Man with cattle
326  
 
A typical example of an Impounding Notice is found in the Hobart Town Gazette and 
Van Diemen’s Land Advertiser of Friday 24 December 1824: 
“Impounded at the Coal River on 17 December (Instant) a large mousecoloured 
Working Bullock, no brand marks, wide horns, off horn broke (sic) at the tip, and 
blind of the near eye. If not owned within 14 days he will be sold to defray 
expenses. Apply to Mr Puckett Pound Keeper Coal River Bridge.”
327. 
In Morrisby v Olding (1830), one of the witnesses, Mr Ayton, who was pound keeper at 
Newtown, stated the customary charges of pound keepers as being six pence a head for 
the first ten days, and six pence a day for feeding. The amount of the charge, however, 
seemed to be at the discretion of the pound keeper.  
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Mr Ayton’s testimony in that case also reveals some of the problems associated with 
pound keeping. For example, he states that some pound keepers sold cattle twice, while 
other pound keepers went out of their way to find cattle – not necessarily straying cattle - 
which could be brought to the pound, presumably more for the purpose of engendering 
income for the pound keeper than for a proper purpose. Perhaps it was the malpractice of 
pound  keepers that caused Mr Cook’s outburst to Mr McCarron. Perhaps, too, the 
prevalence of this malpractice was the reason behind the lower award of damages.  
The bench found for the Mr McCarron, thus acknowledging his complaint was made out. 
However, the award of damages was one guinea,  considerably lower that the 
complainant’s request for twenty pounds.   
 
7. William Jennett v Richard Barker
328 
 
The case of William Jennett v Richard Barker
329 is an action for slander and came before 
the Lieutenant Governor’s Court on 2
 August 1820, with Deputy Judge Advocate Abbott 
and magistrates Bannister and Lord on the Bench. 
  
The facts of the case are that William Jennett alleged Mr Richard Barker did unjustly and 
maliciously propagate a certain wicked report that he (William) did take away or convert 
to his own use a set of Bills of Exchange to the value of five hundred pounds, the 
property of the late Denzil McCarthy. This slander injured William Jennett’s good name, 
fame, credit and reputation and Mr Barker was refusing to pay damages to Mr Jennett.  
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Mr Jennett did not seek a specific amount of damages: clearly he had confidence in the 
discretion of the court. Mr Jennett was a non-convict police officer. The slander was that 
he had stolen from a deceased person. Hence, the defamation could be said to have been 
aggravated. It hit at the role of law and order in the colony.  
 
The bench found for the complainant, setting the damages at three pounds, with costs to 
be no more than the damages, that is, a maximum of three pounds.  
 
8. Summation of content from the Lieutenant Governor’s Court cases  
The figure below shows the content of the selected Lieutenant Governor’s Court cases:  
CASE NAME  SPECIES  OF 
DEFAMATION  & 
DAMAGES 
SOUGHT 
OUTCOME  AWARD 
Roland Walpole Loane v 
William Butcher 
Slander  –  named a 
‘slavedriver’; 
Sought £50 damages 
Deputy Judge Advocate 
& Magistrates Birch & 
Fryett found for 
Complainant 
Damages of £5 
James Doharty v 
Thomas mason &  his 
wife Eleanor 
Defamation  –  called 
James a ‘robber’ and 
wife ‘a whore’; Sought 
£50 damages 
Deputy Judge Advocate 
& Magistrates Birch & 
Fryett found for 
Complainant 
Damages of £16 
Charles McDonald v 
William Presnell 
Libel  –  published a 
notice in a newspaper 
that Charles McDonald 
had forged Promissory 
Notes; 
Sought £50 damages 
Deputy Judge Advocate 
& Magistrates William 
Bannister & David Lord 
found for Complainant 
Damages of 1/0 and 1/0 
costs 
John McCarron v 
William Cook 
Defamation  –  publicly 
abused John 
McCarron, the pound-
keeper while fulfilling 
his official duties; 
Sought £20 damages 
Deputy Judge Advocate 
& Magistrates William 
Bannister & David Lord 
found for Complainant 
Damages of £1/10/0 
William Jennett  v 
Richard Barker  
Slander- 
said William Jennett 
stole £500 Bill of 
Exchange; 
No specific amount of 
damages sought  
Deputy Judge Advocate 
& Magistrates William 
Bannister & David Lord 
Deputy Judge Advocate 
& found for Complainant 
Damages of £3/0/0 and 
costs not to exceed 
£3/0/0 
 
Figure (XVll): Summation of content from the selected Lieutenant Governor’s cases 
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9. Underlying values, and power and powerless polarities 
 
The underlying values and power and powerless polarities identified in the selected 
Lieutenant Governor’s cases are shown in the following figure: 
 
CASE NAME  ARBITER  VALUE  POWER & 
POWERLESSNESS 
Roland Walpole Loane 
v William Butcher 
Deputy Judge 
Advocate & 
Magistrates Birch & 
Fryett  




Power of the court to maintain 
standards of behaviour 
James Doharty v 




Magistrates Birch & 
Fryett  
Importance of 
maintaining a man’s 
credit worthiness and 
a woman’s chaste 
reputation 
Power of the court to maintain 
standards of behaviour 





Bannister and David 
Lord  
Importance of 
maintaining a man’s 
credit worthiness  
Power of the court to maintain 
standards of behaviour 





Bannister and David 
Lord  
Importance of 
supporting an official 
in undertaking his 
administrative duties 
Power of the court to maintain 
standards of behaviour 





Bannister and David 
Lord  
Importance of 
maintaining a man’s 
credit worthiness  
Power of the court to maintain 
standards of behaviour 




10. The species of defamation 
 
The species of defamation is the type of defamation, that is, whether it is slander or libel. 
Of the five cases considered from the Lieutenant Governor’s Court, four were for slander 
and one was for libel. Thus the figures indicate that the more prevalent species of 
defamation action was slander. This is not surprising considering the general lack of 109 
 
literacy in the community. The species of defamation for the selected Lieutenant 








11. The values supported by the Lieutenant Governor’s Court 
 
There were five Lieutenant Governor’s Court cases selected for discussion. Within those 
five cases, four values were attacked by defamation. These values were a man’s credit 
worthiness, the support of an official undertaking duties, appropriate treatment of 
assigned servants and a woman’s sexual propriety. The decisions show that in the five 
cases, these four values were upheld by the court.  
 
In one case, that of James Doharty v Thomas Mason and his wife Eleanor, there were two 
values attacked: one was for calling James ‘a robber’ and one was for calling his wife ‘a 

















The following figure indicates the values:  
 
•  column 1 = a man’s credit worthiness 
•  column 2 = the support of an official undertaking duties 
•  column 3 = appropriate treatment of assigned servants 
•  column  4 = a woman’s sexual propriety 
The figure shows the maintenance of a man’s credit worthiness occurring in the ratio of 
3:1. The chart also indicates the support of an official in undertaking duties occurring in 
the ratio of 2:1. Thus the figures support the conclusion that a man’s credit worthiness 
was: 
•  a vulnerable aspect of reputation,   
•  a likely aspect of a man’s reputation to be attacked, and  
•  a likely subject for defamation actions. 
As well, the figures support the conclusion that: 
 
•  an official, fulfilling his official duties, was a likely target for public criticism,  
•  likely to be defamed in the course of his official duties, and 











In each of the five cases considered, the complainants sought the assistance of the court 
to protect reputation and in each case the court found for the complainant. In three cases, 
the complainants  were private members of  the public, while in two cases  the 
complainants were individuals who held official administrative positions. For example, 
Rowland Walpole Loane,
330  James  Doharty
331  and Charles McDonald
332sought the 
protection of the court for having been defamed in a private capacity, while John 
McCarron
333and William Jennett
334 sought a remedy from the court after having been 
defamed in their official capacity, Mr McCarron as pound keeper and Mr Jennett as non-
convict police officer.  
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It can, therefore be inferred, that the Lieutenant Governor’s Court acted to protect the 
reputation of private individuals and individuals working in official administrative 
capacities equally. 
 
Although the damages awarded in each case were not high, the court’s decision affirmed 
the importance of protecting reputation. 
 
It is of interest to note that of these five cases, three had combined causes. For example: 
  
•  in James Doharty v Thomas Mason and Eleanor his wife
335there was physical 
assault  of the woman, in combination with  slander of Mr Doharty with the 
labelling of the term ‘robber’ and of Mrs Doharty with the labelling of the term 
‘whore,’  
•  in Charles McDonald v William Presnell
336 the two causes were Mr Presnell’s 
libelling of Mr McDonald as well as Mr Presnell’s failure to pay his debt to Mr 
McDonald, and   
•  in  John McCarron v William Cook
337  Mr McCarron, the pound keeper,  was 
slandered by Mr Cook as well as being assaulted by him through the creation of 
fear for his life..  
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Thus, it can be inferred that the Lieutenant Governor’s Court, be it for reasons of 
efficiency or whatever, accepted cases where an apparent criminal cause was concealed 
behind a civil cause.  
 
These selected cases support the conclusions that: 
•  the individual, alone, was powerless to protect his reputation,  
•  it was acknowledged that the individual was entitled to seek the court’s assistance 
to protect reputation, whether an official or private individual,  
•  the Lieutenant Governor’s Court had power to act to protect the individual’s 
reputation, and  
•  the Lieutenant Governor’s Court considered the individual’s reputation worthy of 
protection.  
Thus in the Lieutenant Governor’s Court of Van Diemen’s Land, the selected cases seem 
to reveal that:  
•  slander was the most common form of defamation in Van Diemen’s Land up to 
1820,  
•  a man’s credit worthiness was the most common attribute attacked in defamation, 
and  
•  the Lieutenant Governor’s Court was the individual’s protector. 
These decisions of the Lieutenant Governor’s Court show that the court protected the 
reputations of individuals in a private capacity, as well as individuals who were working 
in an official capacity. Thus, the Rule of Law appears to have been upheld with both 
private and official complainants being given relief.   114 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT SITTING IN 





The first sitting of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Van Diemen’s Land in its 
Civil Jurisdiction was held when Judge Baron Field visited Hobart Town from Sydney in 
February, 1819, and heard the case of Barker v Jennett.
338  
 
As mentioned previously, the Second Charter of Justice of New  South  Wales
339 
promulgated on 4 February 1814, created a civil jurisdiction in a Supreme Court, to be 
presided over by a judge appointed by a commission.  As well as being a Civil Court, this 
court was ordained a Court of Equity, and was empowered to administer justice in a 
summary manner according to or as near as possible to the Rules of the High Court of 
Chancery in Great Britain.
340  The judge was required to sit with two lay persons 
appointed by the Governor.
341  
 
Judge Baron Field was commissioned as judge of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales on 14 May 1816.
342 Castles (1982) informs that Judge Baron Field, in addition to 
writing poetry, wrote treatises on the law. For example, in 1811 Judge Field wrote an 
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Analysis of Blackstone’s Commentaries. In Australia, the judge put his literary skills to 
use in drafting a set of Rules for the Supreme Court.
343 These Rules were approved by 
Governor Macquarie in April 1817.
344  Judge Field’s regular yearly  salary was  eight 
hundred pounds,
345 augmented with income from court fees, which Governor Macquarie 
approved, increasing the judge’s salary to two thousand pounds per annum.
346 
 
Judge Baron Field visited Van Diemen’s Land, with his wife, in 1819, to hold a sitting of 
the Supreme Court in the colony.
347 He was welcomed to Hobart Town with all the pomp 






Figure (XXl): Raising the flag on the Derwent River
349 
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At the time of this visit, the judge admitted former convict English solicitor Mr Brodribb 
pro tempore as Attorney of the Court
350 and indicated that suitors could appear through 
their agents or by themselves.
351 This can be taken as a consequence of the lack of trained 
legal personnel in Van Diemen’s Land at the time. 
 
2. The case of Barker v Jennett
352 
 
The case of Barker v Jennett
353 is an action for slander
354 and is reported in the Hobart 
Town Gazette of 6 February 1819.
355 As mentioned previously, Judge Baron Field heard 
this case on his first visit to Van Diemen’s Land from Sydney, to adjudicate civil cases 
with damages above fifty pounds.
356 This civil case was the only case ready to be heard 
at the time of Judge Baron Field’s first visit to the island colony. 
 
The origins of this case lie in October 1818, when the plaintiff, Mr Barker, was arrested 
because someone had complained to the magistrates that Mr Barker had said he intended 
horsewhipping another man. As a result, Mr Barker was arrested and kept in a prison cell 
overnight. The following day he was publicly exonerated when the magistrates dismissed 
the charge because it was based upon unsubstantiated hearsay. However, when Mr Barker 
walked away from the magistrates’ decision, Mr Jennett, who was in conversation with a 
group of people, upon seeing Mr Barker, was heard to exclaim the words, “There stands a 
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public perjured informer.” Mr Barker was enraged by this comment and subsequently 
instituted the present action against Mr Jennett for defamation.  
 
The Hobart Town Gazette headlines the report of the case: “An action for damages for 
slanderous words spoken.”
357 This headline attracts attention to the nature of the action 
and predicts the possibility of damages being awarded. Legalistic language is used, for 
example, long sentences  with a cause and effect style. The first sentence with its 
statement of the facts in a particularly long sentence is a good example of the heavy style: 
 
“In October last the defendant brought an action in the Lieutenant Governor’s 
court to recover from the plaintiff his expenses in consequence of being 
summoned  and bound over to keep the peace following a complaint to the 
Magistrates by Anthony Fenn Kemp based on a report to him by the plaintiff’s 
clerk of threats imputed to the defendant towards Mr Kemp to horsewhip him.”
358 
 
The writer of this report was apparently Mr Thomas Wells, an emancipist and an 
accountant.
359 His method of writing court reports was confirmed in his evidence to the 
Bigge Commission in 1820.
360  Mr Wells stated that he attended court and made 
contemporaneous notes of proceedings. Later, away from the court, he revised and 
developed the notes into publishable report format. After this revision, Mr Wells gave his 
draft report to either the Lieutenant Governor’s office or the judge, to be read by either 
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the Lieutenant Governor or the judge, who corrected the reports at their discretion. The 
revised report was then given to the printer.
361 This method can be said to account for the 
dense style of writing in this report. It also reveals the supervision that was exercised over 
court reporters. Despite being a competent writer and having authored a book about 
Michael Howe,  one of Van Diemen’s Land’s most violent bushrangers,
362  Thomas 
Wells’ court reporting was subject to strict supervision.  
 
The fact that Judge Field tampered with the reporter’s notes of this trial also accounts for 
the report being written as a lesson to the community. For example, it states that the judge 
“emphatically counselled against the tendency of people living in a settlement in a small 
society” such as Van Diemen’s Land,  to “avoid bringing into the courts of law suits 
founded on tale telling, as in the present case.”
363 It seems that the judge took upon 
himself the role of the determiner of values to be upheld in the colony. Thus, the court 
report advocated and set appropriate community standards. 
 
After considering the facts of the case, Judge Baron Field decided that the justification 
for Mr Jennett’s statement was completely made out and pronounced the deposition made 
by the plaintiff to be a perjury.
364 Thus, the judge decided for the defendant, Mr Jennett. 
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Of particular interest is the fact that in the Lieutenant Governor’s Court sitting of 2 
August 1820, the same William Jennett was the complainant in a slander case against 
Richard Barker,
365 a case discussed in the chapter of Lieutenant Governor’s Court cases 
in this thesis. It would seem there is evidence to infer that the parties in these two cases 
were the same and Mr Barker had on-going difficulty with the administrative duties of 
Mr Jennett.  
 
Mr Jennett was the Chief Constable at Kangaroo Point,
366 a position of high authority 
which bases the inference that he came to the colony as a non-convict. As a police officer 
in the colony he had an administrative role of responsibility in maintaining law and order. 
As a police officer he had the specific task of arresting Mr Barker and imprisoning him 
overnight, following Mr Kemp’s report to the magistrates of an impending horse-
whipping to be given him by Mr Barker. Thus, Mr Jennett was an official performing a 
task in his official capacity when he arrested Mr Barker. However, he was not performing 
an administrative task when he audibly stated of Mr Barker, in public, “There stands a 
public perjured informer.”
367 The justification Mr Jennett gave in court for this comment 
is not stated in the report. However, the judge accepted it.  
 
The report’s conclusion that: 
“The learned judge reprobated in strong terms the idea that a clerk or servant 
deserved praise for carrying to his employer tails(sic) and reports of every 
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is significant. It identifies there were different strata in the colony’s populace, and affirms 
the importance of preventing intimacy in the relationship of clerks and servants with 
employers. This establishes the base for the arbitrary practice of justice in the society. 
Judge Baron Field reveals an unsympathetic attitude towards the plaintiff. His Honour’s 
comments suggest a lack of warmth towards the small island community, particularly the 
report’s final comment:  
 
“The learned judge emphatically counselled the people of the settlement, in such 
dissentions as small societies are most peculiarly liable to, to avoid bringing into a 
court of law suits founded like the present upon tale bearing.”
369 
 
At times, the meaning intended in the report is almost unintelligible, due to the density of 
its language. For example:  
 
“His Honour expressed his opinion that the garbled repetition of expressions of 
that kind, more particularly when guarded by a qualification repeated over and 
over again, at the moment of them being used like the present, was pernicious and 
meriting the most pointed reprobation, as tending to encourage assault where the 
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person spoken of had spirit to resist the reflection, or to appeal to the protection of 
the magistrates, which could only be supported by perjury.”
370 
 
The underlying foundation is a hierarchical attitude towards a small society wherein 
sectors in the community are maintained. There is inherent criticism of the development 
of intimacy in a master – servant relationship. Clearly Judge Baron Field takes the view 
that masters and employers must keep their servants and employees at a distance. While 
it was feasible to maintain distance between master and servant and employer and 
employee in a structured and established society, Van Diemen’s Land was an unstable 
community. The various strata – convicts under sentence, emancipated convicts, free, 
aboriginals, and administrators - were themselves experiencing a transition of identity. 
Thus, they sought stability in relationships, bonding with others as best they could. The 
employer and master, respectively relied heavily upon the servant or employee for labour. 
Out of this reliance for labour came other species of alliance developed, such as 
camaraderie, companionship and friendship.  
 
The judge pronounces judgment from his own elevated station in life, without taking 
account of the differences of the lives of those seeking a remedy in court. His Honour had 
a generous salary, position, prestige, the intellect and education which enabled him to 
write,  and the necessary influential contacts which enabled him to have his writings 
published. On the other  hand, the plaintiff, Mr Barker, was fighting to retain his 
reputation in a small community, in the face of a damaging comment made by a police 
officer in a public place. In accepting the justification of the defendant police officer, 
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Judge Baron Field concedes that there are times when it is acceptable to speak ill of a 
person in moments of irritation.
371 Regrettably for Mr Barker, and any other defamed 
person,  the judge does not  understand the  disastrous consequences of those careless 




Clearly, Mr Barker’s reputation was likely to have been damaged by the defamatory 
comment made by Mr Jennett in public. The Rule of Law which insists that every person 
is subject to the ordinary law in the jurisdiction
372seems to have been practised more in 
Mr Jennett’s favour than Mr Barker’s. The decision indicates that Mr Jennett was 
justified in defamatory name-calling of Mr Barker, yet the actual justification is omitted. 
This omission grounds the inference that it was an arbitrary decision, based upon 
protecting those holding positions of power in the administration. Also, Judge Baron 
Field’s use of the defendant’s justification to base his decision, suggests that the Rule of 
Law was not followed in this decision. The attitude expressed by the judge indicates that 
His Honour identified different strata within the colonial society and seems to hint that 
these sectors ought to be kept separate. Thus, it can be inferred that His Honour is 
prefacing the notion that different standards of access to the law is appropriate for 
different groups, for example, employees and servants. If this is an accurate interpretation 
of the judge’s comments, it strongly suggests that the judge’s philosophy, in this case, 
was contrary to the Rule of Law. 
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The establishment of the Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land under the New South 
Wales Act 1823 (Imp.) 4 Geo. lV, c. 96, separated Van Diemen’s Land from New South 
Wales and provided for  Van Diemen’s Land to have its own Legislative Council.
373 
There were to be between five and seven people on the Legislative Council, but only the 
Lieutenant Governor was empowered to initiate legislation. Under section 24 of the said 
New South Wales Act 1823 (Imp.) it was possible for the proposed legislation to become 
law if just one member of the Legislative Council agreed with it, provided  that the 
Lieutenant Governor held the belief that such legislation was essential for the peace and 
safety of the colony.
374 Section 26 allowed a law to be approved by the British parliament 
even if all members of the Legislative Council opposed a law it, while section 25 vested a 
special emergency power in the Lieutenant Governor, empowering him to make laws 
without the assistance of the Council if there were actual or threatened insurrection or 
rebellion in the colony. The only real brake on the Lieutenant Governor’s legislative 
power came from section 29, which required the Chief Justice to certify that a proposed 
law was not repugnant to the Laws of England, and consistent with them, so far as the 
colony’s circumstances would permit. 
 
Sections 24, 25 and 26 of the New South Wales Act 1823 (Imp.) show that executive 
power was firmly entrenched in the colony. Also, section 29 indicates the embedded 
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close relationship of the Lieutenant Governor and Chief Justice. This is cause for concern 
for the contemporaneous subsistence of the existence of the Rule of Law in the colony of 
Van Diemen’s Land. 
 
Be that as it may, the Act provided Van Diemen’s Land with some autonomy in its 
practice of justice, by giving it a Supreme Court with its own judiciary. Importantly, the 
Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land was given jurisdiction to hear civil matters 
beyond the fifty pound damages limit. As well, the criminal jurisdiction enabled ex 
officio prosecutions for criminal libel. 
 
The selected slander cases in the Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land discussed in this 
chapter are: 
Thomson v Clark, March 1825,
375 
Lucas v Copperwaith, 8 May 1833,
376  
Benjamin v Griffiths, 9 July 1834,
377 
Houghton v Reid, 22 August 1834,
378 
Jennett v Baudinet, 15 January 1835,
379 and 
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2. Establishment of the Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court 
 
Essentially, then, the New South Wales Act 1823 (Imp.) 4 Geo. lV, c. 96
381 provided for 
the establishment of a Legislative Council in New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land 
and separated Van Diemen’s Land and New South Wales. Thus, this Act  gave Van 
Diemen’s Land independence from New South Wales. To this end, Van Diemen’s Land 
attained a degree of autonomy in its ability to make laws relevant to its own context. 
 
Section 1 of this Act  abolished the first Supreme Court established under the 1814 
Charter, and in its place two new Supreme courts were to be established by the Crown. 




There were four elements in the jurisdictions of the three courts of common law granted 
to the two new supreme courts, that is, the Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court and New 
South Wales Supreme Court. These were:  
 
•  criminal jurisdiction to try all serious criminal offences including treason, murder, 
rape and stealing,
383 
•  authority to deal with civil cases,  for example use and ownership of land, 
contracts, torts (previously in England referred to as ‘fictions’ when merchants 
                                                 
381 New South Wales Act 1823 (Imp.), 4 Geo. lV, c. 96 
382 Alex Castles, (1982), op. cit., 133 
383 ibid 126 
 
said contracts were made overseas when actually they were alleged to have been 
made in “St. Mary-le-Bow” in Cheapside),
384 
•  Court of Exchequer powers, for example levy taxes to the Crown, plus Court of 
Equity powers, under section 6, and  
•  the control and supervision of  inferior courts and government officials,  such as  
the prerogative writs of prohibition, mandamus, certiorari and habeas corpus.
385  
For the purposes of this particular research project, it is the authority to deal with civil 
cases which is of interest. Under this arm, the court had power to hear civil matters such 
as private actions of defamation. The criminal jurisdiction is relevant because it provides 
authority for the ex officio prosecutions for criminal libel to be brought. 
 
Castles (1982)
386 discusses other relevant sections in the New South Wales Act of 1823, 
including: 
 
•  s.1: whereby the judge was to receive a salary in lieu of all court fees; 
•  s.2: whereby both the New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land Supreme courts 
were “at all times Courts of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery”, that 
is, they had full jurisdiction for criminal cases;  
•  s.3: which gave the Supreme Courts jurisdiction for piracy and other criminal 
offences committed at sea; 
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•  s.4: authorising trial by jury for criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court. Such 
a jury would consist of seven commissioned officers of the armed services who 
could be challenged on the basis of interest or affection. Also under this section, 
Attorneys General could proceed against accused persons by way of Informations 
in the Supreme Court, with the judge making a determination with two  Justices 
of the Peace, referred to as Assessors;  
•  s.6: giving authority for Justices of the Peace to join the judge as assessors of 
fact. Under this section, if both parties in a civil matter agreed, there could be 
juries of twelve; 
•  s.15: giving authority to the Governor to convene a Court of Appeals as one 
appellate court for both New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land. In cases 
where a determination had been made by a jury of twelve, only errors of law 
could be appealed. This section  provided that in Appeal cases from Van 
Diemen’s Land, the Governor would be assisted by the Chief Justice of New 
South Wales; 
•  s.16: allowing appeals to the Privy Council for amounts exceeding two thousand 
pounds, with the Court of Appeal being required to determine the security; 
•  s.18:  giving  the Supreme Courts  jurisdiction for minors and mentally 
incapacitated;  
•  s.19: authorising local authorities to create Courts of General or Quarter Sessions 
to determine matters summarily without juries, such courts having  jurisdiction for 
criminal matters and special powers with respect to convicts, including 128 
 
jurisdiction to hear offences committed by convicts on the voyage out, with 
jurisdiction to extend transportation for three years on a charge being made out; 
•  s.20: authorising the Governor to establish a Court of Requests for matters not 
exceeding ten pounds; 
•  s.21: authorising the Governor and Chief Justice to develop rules and procedures 
for the Court of Requests. Importantly, for the attempt to stifle arbitrariness in the 
practice of the law, under this section Justices of the Peace were prevented from 
meeting “out of sessions;” thus one magistrate alone could not punish; and  
•  s.22: giving the Supreme Courts jurisdiction for all suits and complaints for Debts 
and Contracts for the payment of money due up to the time of insolvency, thereby 
giving authority for the appointment of trustees to sell up debtor’s assets and 
distribute proceeds to creditors. 
Overall, then, these sections demonstrate a movement towards increasing the colonies of 
New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land practice of justice according to their own 
contextual requirements.  
 
A more humane approach to the implementation of justice is discernible in section 21, 
which attempts to curb the indiscriminate and unconscionable behaviour of individual 
magistrates  in misusing their power  to punish convicts. There is a move towards 
acknowledging the different vulnerabilities in society, with section 18 giving jurisdiction 
to the court for minors and mentally incapacitated persons. This is a particularly 
important in a society where children were being apprenticed in trades, as in the case of 129 
 
Lucas v Copperwaith,
387 and young girls were sexually vulnerable in a male-dominated 
society, as in the case of Houghton v Reid,
388 discussed in this chapter.  
 
3. Chief Justice Pedder and Puisne Judge Montagu 
 
Chief Justice Pedder officially opened the Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court on 31 
March 1824.
389 Chief Justice Pedder had been admitted to the Bar in 1820 in England and 
had practiced in Chancery matters.
390 Thus, His Honour had limited experience in the 
practice of the law at the time of his appointment.  
 
In Van Diemen’s Land Chief Justice Pedder developed a very close professional and 
personal relationship with Lieutenant Governor Arthur, as revealed in his letters to the 
Lieutenant Governor.
391 The case of R v Magistrates of Hobart Town, 8 July 1825, Chief 
Justice Pedder shows that His Honour did not consider Van Diemen’s Land ready for the 
trial of criminal offences by civilian juries
392at that time. Hence, it was not until 1834 that 
jurors determined civil matters in Van Diemen’s Land. 
 
In 1833 Algernon Montagu was commissioned as Puisne Judge, having been admitted to 
the Bar in England in 1826 and appointed to the position of Attorney General of Van 
Diemen’s Land in 1828.
393 Castles (1982)
394 informs that Algernon Montagu was not the 
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first Puisne Judge commissioned for Van Diemen’s Land. Alexander McDuff  was 
appointed to that role under the Second Charter of Justice, but failed to undertake the 
position. Puisne Judge Montagu, then, can be seen to have shared with Chief Justice 
Pedder limited experience in the practice of the law in England. Nevertheless, having 
fulfilled the role of Attorney General in the colony for five years, Judge Montagu brought 
experience of the context of Van Diemen’s Land to the bench. 
 
4. The case of Thomson v Clark, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, March 
1825,
395 Chief Justice  Pedder on the bench 
 
This was a case of defamation by slander.  On the court documents the matter is notated 
as ‘trespass on the case’. The facts of the case are that the plaintiff, James Thomson, had 
established a successful school for young men in Hobart Town, Van Diemen’s Land. He 
alleged that on 26 October 1824, George Carr Clark, a wealthy Hobart Town merchant, 
had a conversation with John Montagu, a nephew of Lieutenant Governor Arthur. The 
conversation was held in a public place in Hobart Town and it was heard by many by-
standers.  
 
During the conversation, Mr Montagu told Mr Clark, in the presence of others, that Mr 
Thomson had left his country in disgrace. Further, that Mr Thomson had concealed 
himself in the coal-hole of the Brig Urania to journey to Van Diemen’s Land, and was 
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now constantly intoxicated and unable to pay his debts. Mr Clark advised Mr Montagu to 
inform his uncle, the newly arrived Lieutenant Governor Arthur, of this. 
 
The impact of this public conversation on Mr Thomson was enormous and immediate. 
Thereafter, people of standing in Hobart Town, such as Roderic O’Connor and Jocelyn 
Thomas, ignored Mr Thomson. As well, several children were withdrawn from his 
school. As a result, Mr Thomson’s school business was severely injured.  
 
Mr Thomson sought the assistance of Mr Thomas Young, a solicitor who had been 
admitted to the Roll of Practitioners in the Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land on 14 
October 1824.
396 Mr Young, on behalf of Mr Thomson, instigated an action of trespass 
on the case against Mr Clark, claiming two thousand pounds in damages. 
 
In his affidavit attached to the summons,
397 Mr Thomson states he was a good, true, 
honest, just and faithful servant of Great Britain, currently a subject of the colony of Van 
Diemen’s Land. He states he had always behaved and conducted himself appropriately. 
He was respected, esteemed and accepted by and amongst all of his neighbours and other 
good and worthy subjects of Van Diemen’s Land. Thus, the affidavit indicates that there 
was not a scintilla of truth in Mr Clark’s comments to Mr Montagu.  
 
Mr Clark ignored the first summons, so a second summons was sent which he wisely did 
not ignore. If Mr Clark had ignored the second summons, his default would have been 
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recorded.  The plaintiff, James Thomson would then have been at liberty to proceed to 
trial ex parte,
398 that is, in the absence of the defendant. Mr Clark then formally denied 
Mr Thomson’s allegations.
399    The plaintiff’s pleadings
400  re-iterated the allegations, 
noting, additionally, that Mr Clark was well aware of the happy state and premises of Mr 
Thomson’s school and his good standing in the community in Hobart Town. 
 
In court, however, James Thomson was non-suited.
401 The term non-suit indicates that a 
case is abandoned at trial, with judgment being given against the plaintiff.
402 In other 
words, the defendant submits that the plaintiff has insufficient evidence to ground the 
complaint and the court agrees. In this particular matter the court provided no salve for 
the damage caused to Mr Thomson’s credit worthiness by the slanderous words allegedly 
spoken by the defendant.  
 
The result of this case can be taken as a comment on the influence of the Hobart Town 
merchants, of which George Carr Clark was a member. They wielded  influence and 
power through their money and real estate. There is no way of knowing whether it was 
Mr Clark’s influence and power which resulted in the judge agreeing with his non-suit 
submission.  There is, however, a sinister side  to  this case which, when disclosed, 
highlights the competitive nature of the entrepreneurial merchants in Hobart Town. 
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Figure (XXll): A mill owned by George Carr Clark
403 
 
George Carr Clark settled in Hobart Town, Van Diemen’s Land in 1823, carrying a letter 
of recommendation from Downing Street, London.
404 He had formerly been a partner in a 
London silk firm which, despite some good times, had run into debt.
405 Upon his arrival 
in Hobart Town, Mr Clark received a two thousand acre grant of land. He also began 
buying property in Hobart Town and by August 1828 his real estate in the town was 
valued at five thousand, six hundred and eighty-four pounds. His wealth in Van Diemen’s 
Land continued to increase throughout his life. 
 
In June 1823, Hannah Davice, a teacher, arrived in Hobart Town from England. She 
brought with her a business partner and an apprentice teacher, as well as equipment for a 
school. Upon arrival in Van Diemen’s Land, Miss Davice received a two thousand acre 
grant of land in the island. On 18 December 1824, Hannah Davice married George Carr 
Clark and opened a school in Hobart Town. In 1825, she moved her school to Carr Field 
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House in Murray Street, Hobart Town. These new premises were custom built as a school 
by her husband, George Carr Clark.
406 
 
The result of this case is a comment about the substantial influence wielded by the Hobart 
Town merchants, of which George Clark was a member. It seems that this merchant’s 
power had increased to the extent that it enveloped wide aspects of the colony’s society. 
People apparently believed comments made by this member of the Hobart Town 
merchant fraternity. The influence and power of this particular businessman may have 
impacted upon the Rule of Law in the decision of non-suit. Independent assessment may 
not have been undertaken by the court. The decision exemplifies the powerlessness of a 
person such as James Thomson to influence the court, when pitted against a person of 
wealth, prestige and social standing such as George Clark. Certainly the danger of slander 
in the small Hobart Town community is clearly shown, with Mr Thomson’s business 
being severely damaged.  
 
The case can also be read as an indicator of a devious tactic used by a particular business 
person in 1825 to damage competition. Interestingly, as a further indication of the power 
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5. Lucas v Copperwaith
407Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 8 May 1833, Chief 
Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
This case was an action for slander. Counsel for the plaintiff was Mr Gellibrand while the 
defendant was represented by Mr George Hesse, a lawyer who was admitted to the Roll 
of Practitioners of the Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court on 25 April 1833.
408 The 




The facts of the case are that the fifteen year-old son of Mr Lucas was apprenticed to Mr 
Copperwaith, a wheel-wright. After about six months,  the lad left the position. Mrs 
Copperwaith subsequently visited a legal practitioner and had a writ prepared in which 
the lad was described as a “runaway” and stating further  that he had “taken with him a 
quantity of property.” 
 
Mrs Copperwaith subsequently met the lad’s grandfather, Mr Faulkner, in Mr Swan’s 
shop, and told him that his grandson had “taken four shillings and sixpence in copper out 
of a basin that lay on the mantelpiece.” When the lad subsequently visited his uncle at 
Brown’s River, he was refused admittance to the house in consequence of Mrs 
Copperwaith’s statement to the grandfather.  Mr Lucas took action against Mr 
Copperwaith on behalf of his son. He did not specify a particular amount of damages 
being sought. 
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In this case a parent is taking  legal action to protect his slandered minor child. Mr 
Copperwaith is the defendant, even though it was his wife, Mrs Copperwaith, who 
slandered the lad, for example, “The defendant is a wheelwright, residing at the corner of 
Bathurst and Argyle streets.”
410  It is, however, Mrs Copperwaith’s verbal statement to 
the grandfather, Mr Faulkner, informing him that his grandson was a “runaway” and had 
taken money from their home, which grounds this action for slander. The impact of Mrs 
Copperwaith’s statement to the grandfather reveals the incestuous, gossip-ridden nature 
of the small island community of Van Diemen’s Land. The comment was first made in a 
public place of commerce, Mr Swan’s shop, and was subsequently broadcast throughout 
the family, reaching family members as far away as Brown’s River.  
 
The use of the term “runaway” by Mrs Copperwaith to describe the behaviour of the lad 
is deeply offensive because at the time, convicts who absconded from their assigned 
masters or the government work gangs were described as “runaways.” Thus the use of the 
term, “runaway” to describe the lad’s behaviour in leaving his employment, subtly 
relegated the apprentice to the status of an absconded convict. The following 
advertisement from the Hobart Town Gazette of 18 March 1825 is illustrative of the term 
“runaway” being used by the Hobart Town Police Office for escaped convicts:  
 
                                                 








Numerous examples of harsh punishment inflicted upon convict boys who absconded can 
be found in the newspapers. For example, in the Hobart Police Court of 9 January 1835, 
John McGuinnes, a boy assigned to Mr Steward, was charged by his master with 
absenting himself from his master’s service twice within a fortnight. Without having any 
opportunity to give a defence, and with no adult to assist him in defending himself, the 
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convict boy was sentenced to twelve lashes on the breech.
412 Similarly harsh punishment 
of convict absconders is demonstrated in the Country Police Court report of 13 January 
1835, with two convict boys, John Knott and Giles Brown being ordered to spend twelve 
months at Point Puer, the Van Diemen’s Land correction centre for absconding boys.
413  
 
An apprenticeship was relegated to the same status as a convict assignment in servitude 
by the act of verbally labelling the Lucas lad as a “runaway” because he had left his 
apprenticeship.  In combination with the allegation that the lad had “taken four shillings 
and sixpence in copper out of a basin that lay on the mantelpiece,” this slander was 
particularly serious.  
 
In 1835, people convicted of theft at the colony’s Quarter Sessions were regularly 
imprisoned with hard labour. For example, in the Quarter Session on Friday 9 January 
1835, Peter Williamson, who was convicted of stealing four pounds of salt pork, was 
sentenced to twelve months’ of hard labour.
414 Thus there were precedents for dealing 
harshly with young lads who absconded and people convicted of theft. 
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Figure (XXlV): Representation of a nineteenth century robber about to be surprised
415 
 
The Tasmanian of 10 May 1833 reports that Mrs Copperwaith had “dictated a ‘whereas’” 
to Dr Ross’ law clerk regarding the Lucas lad. This “whereas” refers to the writ, and the 
comment is indicative of the fact that Mrs Copperwaith had taken the first step towards 
instituting civil action. It is difficult to find the reason for this action and it suggests that 
there was some confusion about the appropriate legal process. For example, if the lad’s 
apprenticeship had been evidenced in documentation, and depending upon the wording of 
such documentation, it is possible that an action for breach of contract could have been 
grounded. Such action would have lain against the father, rather than with his minor son. 
The probability ought not to be overlooked that Mrs Copperwaith’s motive in instituting 
civil action was to extort damages from the lad’s father, perhaps for the skills which had 
been taught to the lad in the six months of the apprenticeship. 
 
The court found for the plaintiff. This indicates that the bench recognized the importance 
of protecting a minor’s reputation in regard to honesty and credit worthiness, with the 
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assessors under the direction of His Honour finding for the plaintiff and awarding 
damages of twenty pounds. The report emphasizes the assessors’ subordination to the 
judge with the words, “the assessors under the direction of His Honour.”
416 The decision 
could also be interpreted as being as much determined by the importance of maintaining 
the family’s reputation as the lad’s.  For example, the inherent values of respect for the 
Lucas lad’s family are apparent in the Tasmanian’s description of the grandfather as “a 
respectable old gentleman.”
417   
 
This is a very important decision in that it acknowledges the rights of a worker to leave 
employment at will.  The  Rule of Law principle founds  this  decision,  in that the 
apprentice’s essential freedom of choice regarding his life choice of work is protected.  
 
From the perspective of the slander species of the jurisprudence of Van Diemen’s Land 
defamation, the essential elements can be identified as: 
 
•  a statement,  
•  by word of mouth,  
•  to another person, and 
•  which brings another person into ill repute. 
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6. Benjamin v Griffiths, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 9 July 1834,
418 Chief 
Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
This was an action for defamation and malicious prosecution. The case was before a civil 
jury whose names
419 were: R.  O’Ferrell, J. Petrue, Nathaniel Olding, Nathaniel Lucas, 
Charles Read, William Omega, James Priest, David Lord, G. F. Read, George Peart, J. C. 
Pinker and Thomas Pearce. The plaintiff was represented by Mr Gellibrand while the 
Attorney General, and the Solicitor General
420 represented the defendant. 
 
The facts of the case are that the plaintiff, Mr Benjamin, was the proprietor of the York 
and Albany Hotel in Oatlands, a settlement located in central Van Diemen’s Land. On the 
night of 13 January 1834 the defendant, Mr Griffiths, in an intoxicated condition, sought, 
and was given accommodation for the night at the York and Albany. On 15 January, 
1835,  Mr Griffiths  attended the Police Station at Oatlands and informed the Police 
Magistrate, Mr John Whiteford, that Mr Benjamin had beaten him and robbed him of four 
five-pound notes, when he stayed at the York and Albany, the previous night. Mr Griffiths 
alleged that the four five-pound notes, being twenty pounds in total, had been pinned to 
the inside of his waistcoat pocket. 
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The report in the Colonial Times of 15 July 1834
421 gives full coverage of the testimony 
and cross-examination of the witnesses. All witnesses testified to the honesty of Mr 
Benjamin and the serious deterioration of his business since Mr Griffiths had begun 
speaking about being robbed and beaten by the publican. All witnesses also testified to 
having observed Mr Griffiths drinking gin on the night of 13 January, and acknowledged 
his subsequent state of intoxication.  Mr J. C. Stracey, a man commissioned to sell the Inn 
in the months following the slander of Mr Benjamin, had been unable to find a buyer 
because of the serious diminution of the Inn’s business and goodwill since the event. 
 
The plaintiff’s barrister wished to examine Mr Sutton, the defendant’s solicitor, on the 
extent of the defendant’s property, clearly with a mind to damages. The defendant’s 
solicitor objected on the grounds of solicitor-client confidentiality. However, Chief 
Justice Pedder over-ruled the solicitor’s objection, whereupon Mr Sutton replied that he 
believed Mr Griffiths to be a man of property. From the perspective of twenty-first 
century Australian legal practice, Chief Justice Pedder’s over-ruling of the solicitor’s 
objection is not easy to understand. It is mandatory for Australian legal practitioners to 
observe solicitor-client privilege on pain of disciplinary action by the relevant 
professional body for breach. This can be seen as an example of executive power 
intervening in and controlling the delicate relationship of the practice of the profession.   
 
The Attorney General, for the defendant, stated that he was without a brief, due to the 
instructing solicitor, Mr Sutton, having misunderstood the date of the trial. Consequently 
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the Attorney General sought to have the trial postponed. Mr Gellibrand, for the plaintiff, 
refused the adjournment. Thus, no witnesses were called for the defendant.  
 
Chief Justice Pedder directed the jury that they must be convinced the defendant charged 
the plaintiff without any reasonable or probable cause and also that he was injured in his 
name and business by the reports circulated by the defendant.  After retiring for a short 
time the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the charge of slander and assessed 
damages at sixty-five pounds. The judge reminded the jury that they had not given a 
verdict for the charge of malicious prosecution, to which the foreman stated that they 
acquitted the plaintiff of any knowledge of the robbery. 
 
The jury asked the court if they could bring in a general verdict,
422 that is, a verdict by 
which the jury gives one verdict for both charges, as opposed to resolving specific fact 
questions. The court assented. Subsequently the jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff 
generally and again set damages at sixty-five pounds. 
 
The request to bring in a general verdict is important. It indicates that the jury had paid 
careful attention to the evidence given by the Acting Police Magistrate at Oatlands, Mr 
Whiteford. Mr Whiteford testified that on 15 January the defendant formally complained 
to him on oath that he had been robbed by Mr Benjamin. The Police Magistrate asked the 
defendant to return in two or three hours, in order to give Mr Whiteford time to consult 
with a colleague. As the defendant did not return, the Police Magistrate considered the 
charge had been abandoned. Consequently, the Police Magistrate did not issue a warrant 
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because he considered it was a “vague charge.”
423 This begs two tantalizing questions to 
which there appear to be no obvious answers: 
  
•  Firstly: was there, in actual fact, a malicious prosecution if the Police Magistrate 
did not issue a warrant and indeed took no further action on the defendant’s 
complaint? 
•  Secondly, albeit the Information was read out in court, how did the plaintiff know 
about the “malicious prosecution” if the Police Magistrate had taken no further 
action on the Information? 
The matter of Benjamin v Griffiths returned to the Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land 
on 5 September 1834, when it was heard by Chief Justice Pedder and Puisne Judge 
Montagu. This time, the Attorney General sought a new trial because he claimed the 
previous single general verdict given for the two charges was contrary to evidence. At the 
heart of the Attorney General’s plaint was the difference in costs attached to a general 
verdict as distinct from a verdict on each count. A general verdict required the defendant 
to pay the costs of the plaintiff’s witnesses, while a verdict on each of the counts would 
have required the plaintiff to have paid the costs of his witnesses. 
 
Additionally, the Attorney General complained that the defendant’s case had not been 
heard in court, due to the fact that the instructing solicitor Mr Sutton had misunderstood 
the date when the case was set down for trial.
424 The Attorney General endeavoured to 
foist all the blame for the instructing solicitor’s error on the Clerks of the Court, who, 
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according to the Attorney General had verbally indicated the incorrect day for the trial to 
Mr Sutton and maintained unclear written records of court timetables. However, the 
Chief Justice remained loyal to the Clerks of the Court, stating that the solicitor was in 
error for not checking the Court Diary himself and relying on a verbal statement from the 
clerks, “made perhaps in the hurry of business.”
425 
 
Their Honours did not consider the General Verdict of 9 July in any way contrary to 
evidence. Nevertheless, their Honours reserved their decision on the request for a new 
trial until they had spoken to the Clerk of the Court, Mr Rocher. On 12 September 1834, 
Mr Rocher was unable to attend court because of illness. Consequently their Honours 




The case indicates that the court required legal practitioners then - as it does now - to be 
vigilant and maintain a high standard of professional practice. By refusing to allow a new 
trial simply because the instructing solicitor had made a mistake, the court showed it 
would not allow its time to be wasted. This aspect of the decision, being an insistence 
upon appropriate standards to be observed by practitioners, can also be seen as an 
endeavour to protect the practice of court procedure from degenerating into  the realms of 
randomness and arbitrariness.      
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The court’s decision to allow the jury to deliver a general verdict can be seen as an 
indication of sympathy for the good-natured publican plaintiff whose credit worthiness 
reputation had suffered damaged by the slander of the unappreciative drunken patron. In 
a way, the decision it can be seen as protection of the commercial or merchant sector of 
society. 
 
7. Houghton v Reid, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 22 August 1834
427 Puisne 
Judge Montagu on the bench  
 
This was an action for slander brought by Mr James Houghton, on behalf of his daughter, 
Emma Houghton, a minor, against Mr Charles Reid.
428 The plaintiff was represented by 
Mr Gellibrand, and the Solicitor General represented the defendant. The plaintiff alleged 
that on 27 January 1834 in his house, in the presence of several men, the defendant stated 
that Mr William Field was responsible for making Miss Emma Houghton pregnant and 
had then abandoned her.  
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Figure (XXV): Scrimshaw painting of a grieving woman
429 
 
The case was heard before a civil jury comprised of William Barnes, George Allen, 
William Burnley, Patrick Carolon, Andrew Burrell, William Bonnolly, John Anderson 
Brown, John Bickerton, George Aylwin, William Bransgrove, Joseph Atkinson and 
Edmund Bartlett. 
 
Several of the men who were at the Houghton home for  a dinner party that evening were 
called to court to prove the statement. However each man refused to name the 
conversation which had taken place at a private dinner party. One man, however, Mr 
Gavin Ralston, stated that he had made a memorandum of the conversation soon after it 
had occurred. He thus testified to the correctness of Mr Reid’s slanderous statement. The 
Solicitor General submitted that the plaintiff be non-suited. However, his Honour, Judge 
Montagu, allowed the case to go to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff 
and awarded damages of one hundred pounds.  
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The attempt by the Solicitor General to non-suit the plaintiff may well have succeeded 
had it not been for the one witness, Mr Gavin Ralston, who had made a contemporaneous 
note of the conversation. This witness was also sufficiently independent to have broken 
ranks with the other men  at the dinner party, who chose to remain silent about the 
slandering of a young woman.  
 
There is an underlying potential for criminal action to be taken in this matter, in that 
Emma Houghton was a minor.
430 Consequently, Mr William Field, the man named in the 
conversation as having caused Emma Houghton’s pregnancy, and subsequently 
abandoning her, was in jeopardy for having sexually consorted with a minor. Alex  
Castles (1982) mentions that a man was executed after a conviction for carnal knowledge 
in 1844, even though the colonial authorities were well aware that this was no longer a 
capital offence in Britain.
431 Thus, if the content of the rumour were true, Mr Field would 
have had every reason to fear the consequences.  
 
On the other hand, if the content of the rumour were untrue, Mr William Field, the man 
held out by Mr Charles Reid as being responsible for Emma Houghton’s purported 
misfortune, was slandering Mr Field. Thus, Mr Field had the basis for an action of 
defamation against Mr Reid and possibly against the newspapers for the publication of 
the report of this case. 
 
The report in the Launceston Independent is ambiguous in that it states:  
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“That Mr William Field, who had paid his attention to the plaintiff, Miss Emma 
Blauchard Houghton, had ceased to pay his address to her, after having got her in 




The use of the pronoun ‘he’ in the final line may have been an intentional attempt to 
disguise the suggestion that the lady had gone to George Town for the birth of a baby.  
From the perspective of the slander species of the jurisprudence of Van Diemen’s Land 
defamation, this case is important because it introduces a new element to the essential 
elements, that is, publication in a private place, as well as a public place. For example, 
slander is: 
 
•  a statement,  
•  by word of mouth 
•  to others, 
•  in a private or public place, and 
•  which brings another person into ill repute. 
The slander in this case attacks a young woman’s sexual propriety and the court acts to 
provide solace in the form of monetary damages. Unfortunately, the publication of the 
case in the local newspapers would have resulted in further damage in the local 
community to the young woman’s reputation.   
                                                 
432 Launceston Independent, 23 August 1834 150 
 
 
8. Jennett v Baudinet, 15 January 1835,
433 before Assistant Police Magistrate Mr 
Thomas Mason 
 
This case did not come before the Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land. It came before 
the colony’s Police Magistrate in the Police Court. It is included, in this study, however, 
because it was published in the newspaper and provides an interesting perspective on the 
way information about the components of slander were broadcast to the community. 
 
This was an ex parte complaint by Mr Jennett, Chief Constable of Kangaroo Point, to the 
Assistant Police Magistrate, Mr Thomas Mason, in the Police Court. Mr Jennett 
complained that Mr Baudinet had slandered and defamed him in private, without any 
third party being present. Mr Mason informed Mr Jennett that in complaints of this nature 
the prosecution must be conducted at the expense of the private prosecutor. Further, Mr 
Mason stated that the allegedly slanderous words were addressed only to prosecutor 
himself and not published by Mr Baudinet, the alleged defamer, in any other way or to 
any other person. Thus, the slander’s essential element of publication was not made out. 
In fact, in this instance, the publication of the words was made by Mr Jennett himself to 
Captain Forster. The matter was postponed.  
 
This case is an example of an informal  complaint made by an official -  the Chief 
Constable at Kangaroo Point -  in the course of his duties, possibly in order to determine 
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whether the Assistant Police Magistrate would take action for him. Perhaps at best it can 
be categorised as a ‘test case.’ The response of Mr Mason is important because it: 
 
•  sets out the essential for publication criterion for defamation, and 
•  clarifies the distinction in legal costs between private actions for slander 
brought by individuals and criminal actions brought by the Crown.  
For slander, the words must be published by the defamer to a person or persons other 
than the subject. In private actions, the individual complainant is personally responsible 
for legal costs, while in a criminal prosecution, costs are met by the Crown.  
 
The publication of Jennett v Baudinet under the heading ‘Police Reports’ in the 
newspaper True Colonist
434can be seen as providing an important educational service to 
the colony. Mr Jennett’s interest in taking action diminished when he was informed he 
would be responsible for costs and, most importantly, the essential of publication had not 
been met. Thus, the publication of this report would leave readers with no doubt that to 
establish grounds for an action for slander, the words must be published by the alleged 
slanderer and defamer, as distinct from publication by the person allegedly slandered and 
defamed.   
 
 
This case is important from the perspective of the slander species of defamation, because 
it demonstrates that the essential elements are: 
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•  a statement,  
•  by word of mouth, 
•  to another person, 
•  in either  a public or private place, and 
•  which brings another person into ill repute. 
 
 
9. Wise v Kemp, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 17 October 1835
435Chief 
Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
In this case the plaintiff, John Wise, brought an action for slander against the defendant, 
Anthony Fenn Kemp. The Attorney General represented Mr Wise and the defendant was 
represented by the Solicitor General. The matter was heard before a jury.
436 
 
Mr Wise, a publican, alleged that Mr Kemp used offensive expressions regarding the way 
he conducted his business. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had, while 
in a crowded public street, called him a “swindler” in the way he conducted his business 
in a crowded public street.  
 
Witnesses were called to give testimonial evidence. Mr W. Wise, brother of Mr John 
Wise, testified that Mr Kemp had approached him in a crowded street on 4 or 6 April. On 
                                                 
435 Tasmanian, 23 October 1835 
436 The names of the jury are not provided. 153 
 
that day, Mr Kemp referred to the fact that Mr John Wise had called his creditors together 
and stated that Mr John Wise, the publican, was a swindler. Mr W. Wise was, at the time 
of the conversation, owed one hundred pounds by his brother John.  
 
Mr John Wise had called together his creditors, of his own accord, in an endeavour to 
make arrangements to pay his debts. At that meeting he had debts of about eight hundred 
pounds and was unable to pay his debts as they became due. Mr Swanston, witness for 
the Derwent Bank, testified that the plaintiff had been endeavouring to obtain a bank loan 
of about three hundred pounds in April or May. However, the bank had not been satisfied 
with the security offered, so the loan request was declined. The defendant did not provide 
any evidence but apparently relied on the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses 
by the Solicitor General. 
 
In summing up for the jury the Chief Justice directed the jury to find for the plaintiff if 
they were satisfied that the expression of “swindler” was used to describe the plaintiff 
with respect to his business. However, His Honour said it is not actionable to call a man a 
“swindler” who is not in business, or if the term is not in respect to his business. 
 
The jury took some time to reach a decision for the plaintiff. The decision was four 
counts for the plaintiff with special justification for the defendant on the first, second and 
third counts. Damages of one farthing were awarded on each of the four counts with His 154 
 
Honour deciding in regard to costs. This decision was so inconsistent and contradictory 
that on 17 November 1835 the court agreed that a second trial was required.
437 
The second trial was held on 11 December 1835.
438 After deliberating for twelve hours, 
the jury could not agree. Thus the jury was discharged and the cause was to be tried a 
third time. Whether the matter did, in fact, return to court for the third time is unknown.  
 
The importance of this case for the slander species of defamation in Van Diemen’s Land 
is to be found in the comment of His Honour Chief Justice Pedder, to the jury, that is, that 
the term “swindler” is only slanderous when it is directed at a man in the course of his 
business.  It would seem that the comment was made in this case in regard to the 
plaintiff’s course of business. The comment certainly attacked his creditworthiness. The 
award of one farthing damages at the first trial is important because it relieves the 
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10. Summation of content from the selected Supreme Court slander cases 
 
The figure below shows the content of the selected Supreme Court slander cases: 
 
 
CASE NAME  SPECIES& DAMAGES 
SOUGHT 




Slander D Attacked P’s credit 
worthiness: said he could not 
pay his debts; said he stowed his 
way to VDL in a vessel’s coal 
hole; said he was always 
intoxicated; P sought £2,000 
damages 







Slander – credit worthiness ; D 
said the apprentice P stole 4/6; 
& D called the lad a ‘runaway’;  
No quantum of damages sought 
CJ Pedder and 
assessors Andrew 
Crombie and Roderick 
O’Connor. 
Found for the plaintiff 




Slander  –  credit worthiness 
attacked; D said the Plaintiff 
publican  stole £20; No quantum 
of damages sought 
CJ Pedder and a civil 
jury of 12 men.  
Found for the plaintiff 




Slander - D verbally attacked a 
young woman’s sexual 
propriety;  
No quantum of damages sought 
Puisne Judge Montagu 
and a civil jury of 12 
men.  
Found for the plaintiff 





Test case before Police 
Magistrate; P said D verbally 
attacked him in private in the 
course of his public duties  
Police Magistrate; 
  
Found requirements of 
publication were not 
met  
Test case abandoned 
Wise v Kemp 
(1835) 
 
Credit worthiness: D called P ‘a 
swindler’ in the way he 
conducted his business; No 
quantum of damages sought 
CJ Pedder and a jury of 
12; 
First trial found for the 
jury;  
Second trial jury could 
not decide; 
Third trial decision 
unknown 
First trial 1 farthing 
damages on each 
count;  
Second trial jury 
could not decide; 
Third trial decision 
unknown 
 




11. Underlying values, and power and powerless polarities 
 
The underlying values and power and powerless polarities identified in the selected 





CASE NAME  ARBITER  VALUE  POWER & POWERLESS 
POLARITIES 
Thomson v Clark 
(1825) 
 




Powerlessness of the 
slandered P when the court 
accepts the D’s non-suit 
rejoinder  
Lucas v Copperwaith 
(1833)  
 
CJ Pedder and 
assessors Andrew 




maintaining a male 
minor’s credit 
worthiness  
Power of the court to protect 
a male minor apprentice’s 
reputation  
Benjamin v Griffith 
(1834) 
 
CJ Pedder and a civil 






Power of the court to protect 
a publican’s reputation from 
slanderous attacks by an 
intoxicated patron 
Houghton v Reid (1834) 
 
Puisne Judge Montagu 




maintaining a minor 
female’s sexual 
propriety reputation  
Power of the court to 
compensate a minor female 
whose sexual propriety 
reputation has been destroyed 
by a male 







protecting a public 
officer’s reputation in 
the course of his 
duties  
Powerlessness of the 
government official to take 
legal action when he is 
verbally abused in private in 
the course of undertaking his 
official duties  
Wise v Kemp (1835) 
 







Powerlessness of the  P 
whose credit-worthiness 
reputation as a businessman 
is slandered when the court 
seems unable to make a 
conclusive decision  
 
Figure  (XXVll): Underlying values and power and powerless polarities identified in the selected 




12. The species of defamation 
 
The species or type of defamation in these cases is slander. The specific quality attacked 
in the slander is identified. There were six cases selected for discussion, one being a 
matter before the Police Court. Of the five cases considered from the Supreme Court for 
slander, four were for credit worthiness of a businessman in the performance of his 
business, one was for the destruction of a woman’s reputation of sexual propriety. The 
one case before the Police Court was for verbal abuse of an official in private. Thus the 157 
 
figures indicate that the more prevalent cause of court proceedings for slander was for an 
attack of a businessman’s creditworthiness in business. This is not surprising, considering 
the competition between businessmen in the community. The following figure indicates 




Figure (XXVlll): The specific nature of the slander attacks compared 
 
 
13. The values supported by the court 
 
As mentioned previously while there were six cases selected for discussion, one was just 
a mention in the Police Court. Thus, within those five Supreme Court cases, six values 
were attacked by slander. In the case of Thomson v Clark, three values were attacked: 
credit worthiness, sobriety and appropriate migration. However, in this case the court 
declared a non-suit. 
 
Thus, in the five cases, two values were upheld by the Court decisions: the maintenance 











Category 1  Category 2  Category 3  Category 4 
Series 1 
Series 2 158 
 
 
The chart indicates the values, with the maintenance of a man’s credit worthiness 
occurring in the ratio of 3:1,  
series 1 = maintaining a man’s credit worthiness, and  
series 2 = maintaining a woman’s sexual propriety reputation 
 
In the case of  Jennett v Baudinett, a test case before the Police Court Magistrate, there 
was no support offered to the official who had been privately verbally abused in the 
course of his duties: slander’s essential element of publication of the slander was missing.   
Thus the figures support the conclusions that a man’s credit worthiness was: 
•  a vulnerable aspect of reputation,   
•  a likely aspect of a man’s reputation to be attacked, and 
•  a likely subject for slander actions, and  
that a woman’s sexual propriety was: 
•  a vulnerable aspect of reputation, and 
•  a likely aspect of a woman’s reputation to be attacked,  
in the Van Diemen’s Land community at that time. 
 
The following figure represents these values as identified in the selected cases: 159 
 
 




In each of the five Supreme Court slander cases considered, the plaintiff sought the 
assistance of the court to protect reputation. The court found for the plaintiff in four 
cases, initially, and then, because of lack of clarity, in the jury’s award of damages, in 
three cases. The court allowed a non-suit for one case, Thomson v Clark, the case where a 
very powerful defendant had  a vested personal business interest in destroying the 
plaintiff’s business reputation.  
 
Damages in two  cases seemed adequate, being twenty pounds and sixty-five pounds 
respectively,  for  the  slandering of a man’s creditworthiness in business. Damages 
awarded to the minor female whose sexual propriety reputation was damaged were high, 











Series 2 160 
 
 
The case in which damages of one farthing were initially awarded and then subsequently 
set down for another trial, can be seen as an example of the court’s inability to give 
appropriate direction to a jury. This inability allowed the plaintiff to suffer further 
damage to reputation  
 
The jurisprudence of these sampled cases supports the conclusion that: 
 
•  the individual, alone, is powerless to protect his reputation,  
•  the individual is entitled to seek the court’s assistance to protect reputation,  
•  the court has power to act to protect the individual’s reputation, and 
•  the court is subjective in determining whose reputation is worthy of protection.   
 
Thus in the Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, the selected cases support the 
conclusion that:  
 
•  a man’s credit worthiness in business was the most common attribute attacked in 
slander, and  
•  the Supreme Court was selective in determining which  individual’s reputation it 
would protect. 161 
 
This final conclusion is based upon the apparent arbitrariness in the court’s decision in 
the case of Thomson v Clark
439 and a degree of incompetence in Wise v Kemp.
440 Both of 
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In this chapter selected libel cases brought before the Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s 
Land between the years 1826 and 1835 are discussed. The facts of each case are stated 
and the case and decision are discussed. The power and powerless polarities and values 
are identified. Finally, deductions from the overall selection of libel cases are made. The 
selected cases are: 
•  Murray v Stephen, 12 April 1826
441 
•  Butler v Bent, 12 January 1830
442 
•  Kennedy v Bent 15-16 January 1830
443 
•  Butler v Bent, 10 May 1830
444 
•  Fereday v O’Connor, 13-16 December 1831
445 
•  Meredith v Murray, 11 June 1833
446  
•  O’Connor v Meredith, 10 July 1833
447  
•  Schaw v Meredith, 17 July 1833
448 
•  Cookney v Brodie, 17 December 1833
449 
•  Murray v Murray, 11 December 1835
450 
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2. Murray v Stephen 12 April 1826,
451 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
In this case Mr Murray brought five charges of libel against Mr Stephen, writer of the 
letter, the colony’s Solicitor General. Mr Murray alleged that Mr Stephen had written a 
letter to the Lieutenant Governor stating that Mr Murray: 
•  had written hostile letters to the colonial government signed ‘Colonist,’  
•  was a former convict,  
•  had been dismissed from being Superintendent of Police in New South Wales,  
•  had been brought to the Police Office on charges affecting his character, and  
•   had lived in a state of concubinage.  
Mr Murray sought damages of two thousand pounds.  
 
 
Figure (XXX): Pencil drawing of Mr Alfred Stephen
452 
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Mr Murray had sought the letter from the Lieutenant Governor but His Excellency 
refused to provide it. Mr Murray’s witnesses, Captain Montagu and Mr Charles Arthur, 
proved that the original letter was in the possession of the Lieutenant Governor. Mr 
Charles Arthur had made a copy of the original letter in his own hand-writing. This was 
produced in court. Mr Arthur’s evidence was ruled inadmissible by Chief Justice Pedder, 
on the basis that the copier was as liable as the original writer of the libel. Chief Justice 
Pedder further ruled that secondary evidence of the existence of the letter could not be 
received while the original document was in existence. Thus, by refusing to give up the 
original document, the Lieutenant Governor stymied proceedings. As the Lieutenant 
Governor’s power was beyond the reach of the judicial process, the letter could not be 
obtained. 
 
Chief Justice Pedder concluded that the plaintiff must be non-suited. 
 
Mr Murray cited the case of Campbell v McArthur, a Sydney case, in which a Bill filed in 
Equity resulted in a Decree for the defendant. The plaintiff had then lodged an appeal and 
that case subsequently went to the Privy Council in England. Mr Murray agreed to a 
decision being recorded for the defendant so that he could move for an appeal. However, 
instead of seeking an appeal, on 19 April Mr Murray sought a new trial,
453which 
apparently did not eventuate.  
 
This case is important because it shows the ability of the Lieutenant Governor to stifle 
libel proceedings in a court of law merely by refusing to produce a key document. Thus, 
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the colony’s penultimate executive administrative officer used his power to block a libel 
action. The colony’s chief judicial officer used his power to protect the Solicitor General 
through offering the plaintiff the choice of a non-suit or a decision for the defendant. 
Instead of the Rule of Law being applied, this is an example of what may well be termed 
the Rule of the Administration.  
 
3. Butler v Bent, 12 January 1830,
454 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
The court used the time in this matter on 12 January 1830, by Chief Justice Pedder 
explaining his understanding of the ‘new libel Act,’ frequently referred to as Mr Fox’s 
Act. Under this Act juries are judges of fact and law in libel cases. His Honour declared 
that in all future libel cases between private persons he would, in consequence of the Act, 
consider it proper for trial by juries. His Honour reminded the court that before Mr Fox’s 
Act the judge was only required to leave the fact of printing or publishing to the jury. 
However, His Honour continued, since Mr Fox’s Act juries now had the full right of 
judging both the fact and the law: the jury is to decide the whole case. 
 
4. Kennedy v Bent, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land 15-16 January 1830,
455 
Chief Justice Pedder on the bench, Captain Bell and Mr Beaumont, Assessors 
 
This was an action for libel brought by the plaintiff Mr Kennedy, the Under Sheriff of 
Van Diemen’s Land, against Mr Bent, proprietor, printer and publisher of the Colonial 
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Times  newspaper. Solicitor General, Mr Stephen, represented Mr Kennedy and Mr 
Gellibrand represented the defendant, Mr Bent. 
 
The plea was justification, hence counsel for the defendant, Mr Gellibrand, addressed the 
court first because the order is reversed in such cases.  
 
The facts basing the case are that in November 1828, Mr Thomas Wells was declared 
insolvent by the Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land. Messrs Cook and Mather were 
appointed trustees. On 1 March 1829 the Act  under which Mr Wells was declared 
insolvent, expired. At that time the trustees had not gone into possession of Mr Wells’ 
property. Thus Mr R. L. Murray, a judgment creditor, issued a writ of Fieri Facias under 
which the sheriff levied Allendale, Mr Wells’ property.  
 
Mr Wells informed the sheriff that a portion of Allenvale belonged to his insolvent estate 
and was vested in his trustees, while another portion of the property belonged to other 
persons. Mr Wells entered into an agreement with the sheriff that the property should be 
sold and the sheriff hold the proceeds until it could be determined who should be paid. 
On the advertised auction day, Mr Kennedy proceeded to Allenvale with the trustee, Mr 
Cook, and two other persons. He put up Allenvale  for sale half an hour before the 
appointed hour of noon, contrary to the notice he had received from Mr Wells. Several 
people had gone to Allenvale for the sale but when they arrived at noon the sale was 
ended. The evidence of the other sheriff in regard to selling property was that he always 167 
 
waited but Mr Kennedy did not.
456  The property was sold in  five lots. Mr Cook 
purchased three lots, together with a horse, a cart and bullocks and three hundred sheep. 
Mr Cook’s friends, Mr Haywood and Mr Marshall, purchased the other two lots, as well 
as another horse and a winnowing machine, which was not exhibited, at prices far below 
their value.  
The next day Mr Cook sold the horse he had purchased for thirteen pounds and ten 
shillings for thirty pounds, and exchanged the cart and bullocks which he had purchased 
for six pounds, for the other horse which his friend Mr Haywood had purchased for nine 
pounds. 
 
An article was subsequently published in the Colonial Times, which included the 
statement that: 
 “Mr Kennedy exhibited a precipitancy and a disregard to the interests of 
one party by leaning towards the other in a manner perfectly new and 
altogether irreconcilable with the impartiality which ought ever to attend 
the proceedings of justice.” 
 
The use of the term ‘insolvent’ is, in the early twenty-first century, a term reserved for 
companies which are unable to pay their debts as they fall due. The term ‘bankrupt’ is 
currently used for individuals in the same situation. Alex Castles (2007)
457 discusses the 
distinction made in English law between the terms ‘bankruptcy’ and ‘insolvency’ noting 
that ‘bankruptcy’ was limited to acknowledged traders who were irrevocably in debt, 
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while non-traders in the same position were termed ‘insolvents.’ Castles informs that 
while in England the goods of bankrupt traders were sold and the proceeds shared equally 
amongst creditors, insolvent traders were often imprisoned until they could meet their 
financial obligations. The English distinction, therefore, survives in Kennedy v Bent, with 
Mr Wells being described as an insolvent.  
 
This case is notable in that it was the first instance in the colony of the defendant giving 
his case first. Mr Stephen saw this as an advantage
458 to the defendant. Mr Gellibrand, in 
defence, made the following points:  
•  there was no intention to impute to Mr Kennedy anything dishonest, 
dishonourable or corrupt,   
•  there was a very wide distinction between an attack upon the public conduct of a 
man in his public duties and the character of a private individual,  
•  the article was about the conduct of Mr Kennedy in his public role, and  
•  the whole of the article was true.  
Mr Gellibrand relied upon the dictum of Lord Ellenborough in the English case of the 
King v Lambert and Perry to support the defence. Mr Stephen spoke in strong terms of 
the way the defendant conducted the Colonial Times. Indeed, the personal attack by 
Solicitor General, Mr Stephen, upon Mr Bent suggests that the plaintiff was motivated as 
much by the government’s stand against those who wanted a free press, as it was upon 
those who criticised government officials in the exercise of their official work.
459 In turn, 
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Mr Gellibrand attacked Mr Stephen for attacking his client and his newspaper.
460 Thus, 
both parties had able legal representation.  
 
From the report it can be inferred that counsel’s oral ability was highly valued by the 
colonial community. For example, Mr Stephen, Solicitor General and counsel for the 
plaintiff, is reported as speaking for four  hours “with the greatest zeal, talent, energy and 
eloquence,”
461 while Mr Gellibrand, counsel for the defendant, was reported as having 
addressed the court in a manner which “we are utterly unable to do justice,”
462 his speech 
occupying two hours while “his exertions were equally able and animated.”
463 Clearly, 
barristers then, as now, vocalised enthusiastically in court. Chief Justice Pedder stated he 
was “so fatigued after having sat twelve successive hours” that he adjourned the court 
until the next day.
464 
 
The underlying theme of this case is that insolvent debtors should be protected from 
being sacrificed by the improper behaviour of sheriffs. For example, the evidence of the 
sheriff, Mr Fereday, shows the unfairness of sheriffs’ sales in general, in his statement, “I 
waited for the plaintiff’s solicitor who came specifically to bid for the property.”
465 This 
statement shows that a plaintiff who was a creditor with a mind to obtaining particular 
property, could wait for the defendant to be unable to pay his debts as they fell due, issue 
proceedings, institute sale of the property and legitimately purchase it.  
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Mr Gellibrand reminded the court of the difference between a civil action and a criminal 
information for libel, emphasising the great difference being that in criminal libel, 
whether the matter is true or false, it cannot be justified, whereas in civil libel, if the 
defendant can justify what he said, that is, if he proves that what he wrote is true, he is 
entitled to the verdict.
466 Thus, Mr Gellibrand submitted, the court need only decide if 
what had been written was  true. Mr Gellibrand did not, however, mention the civil 
standard of proof being on the balance of probabilities. 
 
In summing up for the assessors, Chief Justice Pedder stated that in all cases where the 
justification is made out, the assessors must find for the plaintiff. If the justification is not 
made out there must be a finding for the defendant.
467  If Mr Kennedy had acted 
precipitously and the article means that, only the smallest damages were appropriate. The 
judge urged the assessors to apply the real meaning of the words
468 used in the article. In 
particular, the assessors were to distinguish whether the defendant meant that the sheriff 
made an honest error which worked injury or, on the contrary, took advantage over the 
power of the sale and actively sought to favour one party over the other. It was upon 
these principles that the assessors were to regulate damages.
469 
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The judge then indicated that his role was to go through each of the counts and consider 
them separately, to decide the extent to which they are borne out by the evidence.
470 This 
judicial comment indicates that the determination of whether or not the pleas were made 
out by the evidence would be made by the judge, not the assessors.  
 
The judge and assessors retired together to make a determination. They found for the 
plaintiff on all six counts pleas but in two counts found in part for the plaintiff: that is, 
they found the plaintiff did not wait a reasonable time for persons expected to come to 
bid at the sale and two lots sold for considerably less than their value.
471They awarded 
damages of one hundred pounds to the plaintiff, these being assessed generally.  
 
This was an extraordinary result. The two main thrusts of the defendant’s complaint in 
the article against the sheriff were found to have been made out, yet the damages awarded 
to the plaintiff were considerable. This decision clearly favoured the official in the course 
of public duties over a private individual.  
 
On 6 February 1830 Mr Gellibrand sought a new trial for the matter.
472 He gave a two 
hour speech
473 advocating that the damages awarded were excessive, and, in particular, 
Mr Kennedy did not follow the custom of waiting for buyers, selling the winnowing 
machine without it being present.
474 This request for a new trial is tantamount to an 
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appeal. Chief Justice Pedder was asked by counsel to look again at the decision he had 
made regarding the damages and the pleas.  
 
The judge’s comments upon the assessment of damages for libel are of particular interest, 
based apparently, upon a time when feelings were of limited consequence in determining 
damages. For example, the judge commented:  
 
“I know of no standard by which the injury to feelings can be measured in cases 
such as the present. It is utterly impossible in cases of libel, slander, seduction or 




Following submissions from both Mr Gellibrand for the defendant and Solicitor General 
Mr Stephen for the plaintiff, the judge decided that the real question to be investigated 
was, “what is the nature of the libel and the situation of the party libelled.”
476 Based upon 
those two factors the judge decided immediately that the damages were not excessive.
477 
In regard to the pleas, however, the judge concluded that he would fully reconsider them 
and return to court as soon as possible.
478 
 
The decision in this case indicates that the court favoured the interests of administrative 
officers in the performance of their official duties over the interests of members of the 
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general populace. The Rule of Law was subverted behind the Rule of the Administration. 
While legal practitioners who represented members of the general populace endeavoured 
to have justice accorded to their clients, those in positions of administrative power 
ensured that arbitrary arguments prevailed. 
 
5. Butler v Bent, Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court, 10 May 1830,
479 Chief Justice 
Pedder on the bench 
 
This was the first civil trial by jury under Fox’s Libel Act. A method of selecting the jury 
had to be determined. Forty-eight persons were summoned for jury service. The first idea 
was to write the names of the forty-eight men on cards and place the cards in a box. The 
first twelve names drawn from the box would comprise the jury. This lucky-dip method 
was abandoned. Instead, it was decided that counsel for each party would select twenty-
four men and from these each counsel would strike out six. The remaining twelve would 
comprise the jury. In this case, the twelve men who were selected to comprise the jury 
were: Dr Ross, foreman, Messrs Mawle, Watchorn, Bunster, W. Lewis, Guy, Hopkins, 
Mather, Wilson, Wise, Stokell and Walker.
480The case for the plaintiff, Mr Butler, was 
stated by the Solicitor General. There were six charges in all for articles inserted in the 
Colonial Times by Mr Bent, the proprietor, printer and publisher. 
 
The first article described a visit to a lawyer’s office. The lawyer demonstrated an 
uncaring attitude about a debtor’s inability to pay and the debtor’s personal liabilities. 
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Finally the article states that the original debt is swollen by the lawyer’s extortionate fees. 
The article is written in the first person and names are not mentioned.
481 The second 
article was based upon the detail of a visit by Dr Crowther to the plaintiff, lawyer Mr 
Butler, wherein Mr Butler and Dr Crowther had a fight over Mr Butler’s exorbitant fees. 
The third article was entitled From Loo Choo and applied the analogy of a reptile to Mr 
Butler.  
 
Various witnesses were called to testify that they recognised Mr Butler as the person 
described in the articles. The first article is probably based upon the case of a real debtor, 
Mr Wilson, who was taken into custody on 8 April 1829 and discharged on 6 January 
1830 for inability to pay a debt of twelve pounds and ten shillings, to which were added 




Figure (XXXl): Court room scene
483 
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Of the thirteen prisoners incarcerated for debt on 9 October 1829 in Hobart Town, six of 
the thirteen were in prison under a writ issued by Mr Butler and three had detainers 
against them by Mr Butler.
484 
 
In Van Diemen’s Land the arrest of debtors for non-payment of debts was a harsh reality. 
The amount of the debt incurring the penalty of imprisonment increased over time from 
ten pounds to fifteen pounds. In England, legislation known as Mr Weston’s Act was 
passed in 1827 requiring the amount of the debt to be twenty pounds before the debtor 
could be arrested. The English legislation came into operation in Van Diemen’s Land in 
March 1829.
485 Therefore, the imprisonment of Mr Wilson on 8 April for non-payment of 
his debt of twelve pounds and ten shillings was illegal. However, when the amount of Mr 
Wilson’s original debt of twelve pounds and ten shillings was added to Mr Butler’s legal 
costs of seventeen pounds, fourteen shillings and seven pence, Mr Wilson’s total debt 
was in excess of twenty pounds.    
 
The second libel was based upon a disagreement between lawyer Mr Butler and medical 
practitioner Dr Crowther.
486 Mr Butler issued Dr Crowther with a bill giving him ten 
days’ to pay, while issuing a summons on the same day as the bill. When Dr Crowther 
attended Mr Butler’s office to pay the account and persuade the lawyer to abate his costs, 
Mr Butler threatened Dr Crowther.
487  The details of this visit were subsequently 
published in letters which were signed The Hermit, a pseudonym for a man whose name 
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was Simon Stukley. Mr Butler accused Dr Crowther of writing and publishing these 
letters. Dr Crowther, however, did not write The Hermit articles. He admitted he had 
recounted details of his fearful visit to Mr Butler to about fifty persons,
488 in particular 
the fact that Mr Butler came near Dr Crowther asking if he had iron in his face.
489 
 
The third libel was based upon the attribution of iron-heartedness to Mr Butler,
490 and 
emanates from the imprisonment of Mr Wilson for five months upon the writ issued by 
Mr Butler.
491 In defence, counsel admitted publication of the articles but insisting that the 
identity of the author was unknown. Mr Bent published the articles because he considered 
them to be necessary in order: 
“to advance morality and to correct evil, to shew (sic) the rise and progress of the 
colony, to mark evil doers, and by the force of example shame them for their 
misdeeds.”
492  
Mr Butler had been admitted to the Roll of Legal Practitioners in Van Diemen’s Land on 
26 July 1824.
493  The onerous responsibilities attaching to a legal practitioner were stated 
by counsel, who stated that “every member of this court is a public character and every 
public character is public property.”
494 
 
The anonymous writer of the libels considered it proper to bring before the public the 
parts of the lawyer’s professional conduct considered to be highly injurious to the public 
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interests,
495 in particular, the high costs of legal services. However, no attack is made 
upon the lawyer’s private life, leaving the domestic scene and private life untouched.
496 
Mr Gellibrand instructed the court of his view of the difference between criminal libel 
and civil libel. In criminal libel there is a breach of the peace, while in civil libel the 
defendant can use justification, that is prove that what is written is justified,
497 such as 
publication providing a service to the public.  
 
His Honour Chief Justice Pedder summed up for the jury after the trial of nine and a half  
hours.
498 The judge told the jury that no public man is to have his conduct subjected to 
public animadversion and reproach.
499 Regarding the plea of justification, the jury were 
to determine if what the defendant had written was untrue and if so was it about the 
plaintiff in his professional character with a view to bring him into public hatred and 
contempt.
500 Finally the judge directed that if the material facts are proved, the jury were 
to find for the defendant; if not, the finding was to be for the plaintiff.
501 The judge’s 
meaning in this direction is ambiguous, as could be expected after such a lengthy 
hearing.
502 The jury returned at midnight, deciding for the plaintiff on all counts except 
the conversation which occurred between Mr Butler and Dr Crowther, which they 
decided was justified. They awarded damages of eighty pounds to the plaintiff. 
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James Dally’s (2003)
503 limited edition publication of R. L. Murray’s reports of the case 
of Butler v Bent, 1830, provides the reader with all of the reports of the case, in one 
readable format.  
 
The decision validates the legal practitioner’s high costs. This can be read as an 
acknowledgment that the price of legal advice and representation was high, thereby 
putting it out of reach of the general populace.  While the legal practitioner, Mr Butler, 
was working in private practice, as distinct from working in an administrative position, 
nevertheless, his knowledge, skill and expertise put him as a member of a privileged 
profession. The decision virtually endorses the imposition of high fees upon debtors in 
Van Diemen’s Land, a practice which created severe injustice. By this decision the court 
can be seen to approve miscarriage of equitable principles by those whose skills and 
professional expertise enabled them to occupy positions of trust and service in the colony.   
6. Fereday v O’Connor, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 13-16 December, 
1831,
504 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
In this case the plaintiff, Mr Dudley Fereday, Sherriff of Van Diemen’s Land, brought 
twelve counts in all - seven for malicious prosecution, four for slander and one for libel
505 
- against the defendant, Mr Roderic O’Connor, Surveyor General of Main Roads.  
Solicitor General Mr Stephen represented the plaintiff, Mr Dudley Fereday. Mr 
Gellibrand represented Mr O’Connor. Assessors were A. Moodie and J. Beaumont, Esqs. 
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The facts of the case are selectively harvested
506 from The Tasmanian 21 December, 
1831, Colonial Times 14 and 21 December 1821 and The Courier 17 December 1931.  
In October 1828 Mr Fereday discounted a Bill of Exchange for Mr McShane. Before the 
bill was due Mr Fereday paid it to Mr Young for consideration of an IOU.
507 Mr Young 
paid the Bill into the Derwent Bank but it was dishonoured. Mr Young took legal action, 
obtained judgment and Mr McShane’s property was sold. On the morning of the sale Mr 
McShane asked the sheriff, Mr Fereday, to postpone the sale. Mr Fereday referred Mr 
McShane to Mr Young, the man who had brought the action on the dishonoured bill.  
Mr McShane returned to Mr Fereday with Mr Roberts. Mr McShane had sold sheep to 
Mr Roberts for one hundred pounds but had not delivered the sheep. Together, the men 
agreed that Mr Roberts would accept a Bill of Exchange for one hundred pounds, which 
would be held by the sheriff, Mr Fereday, as a deposit. It was agreed that if Mr McShane 
did not deliver the sheep to Mr Roberts, the Bill would be given to Mr Roberts. 
The sale of Mr McShane’s property took place as advertised and sold for one hundred 
and seventy guineas, a price higher than expected. At the sale various other lots were sold 
first. Mr Hays, the under sheriff, conducted these earlier sales, after which he 
momentarily stopped proceedings, being unsure of whether the McShane property was to 
be sold. One of the lots at the sale was under an execution order from the case of Murray 
v Wells. This advertised property had been claimed, so the under sheriff decided not to 
put it up. 
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Shortly after the sale ended, Mr Carron, one of the sheriff’s bailiffs, informed Mr 
McShane of the price his property had fetched. Mr McShane appeared pleased and 
returned to the sheriff’s office, demanding the difference between the sale price, one 
hundred and seventy guineas, and the amount owed to Mr Young, which was one 
hundred pounds. There the matter rested. 
In May or June 1829, Mr Fereday dismissed Mr Hays from the office of under sheriff. Mr 
Hays vowed to take revenge on Mr Fereday for this. Mr Hays persuaded Mr McShane to 
write to the Lieutenant Governor, complaining of the way Mr Fereday conducted the sale 
of his property. This letter was written in Mr Hays’ writing. Mr McShane’s complaint 
was that the sheriff consented to take Mr Roberts’ Bill of Exchange in part payment of 
the execution, and in consideration of which he agreed to postpone the sale, but instead, 
he sold the property. Mr Hays swore to this. The matter then rested.  
In June 1830 Mr McShane met Mr O’Connor and told him of his complaint against Mr 
Fereday.  
In May 1831, Mr O’Connor agreed to purchase privately, for three hundred pounds, from 
the executors of the late Mr Hammond, land adjoining his property at Cottage Green.  
This property was subject to an execution order issued by Mr Gavin for an amount less 
than three hundred pounds which was owed to Mr Gavin.  Mr O’Connor sought to 
purchase the property for three hundred pounds from the sheriff, but the sheriff 
considered it necessary, in the proper discharge of his public duties, to sell the property 
by public auction. This he did and on 5 April the property was bought by Mr Hewitt for 
four hundred and thirty pounds at public auction. This annoyed Mr O’Connor. 181 
 
Consequently, he wrote to the Lieutenant Governor accusing Mr Fereday of auctioning 
Mr Hammond’s land to gratify a personal grudge against Mr O’Connor. Mr Fereday 
replied with a libel action against Mr O’Connor.  
 
Figure (XXXll): Cattle on Cottage Green
508 
On 19 May Mr O’Connor visited the Police Office to have Mr Fereday charged with 
perjury for having sworn to the order in which the sales wrongly took place. This was 
despite the fact that Mr O’Connor was not personally involved in the matter. 
Contemporaneous notes of this visit were made by Mr Boyd, the Chief Clerk. On 28 May 
Mr O’Connor again visited the Police Office seeking to have a further charge of perjury 
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against Mr Fereday. The examinations at the Police Office, together with Mr O’Connor’s 
behaviour, apparently caused havoc with Mr Fereday’s reputation. Thus Mr Fereday took 
this private action against Mr O’Connor in the Supreme Court. 
The reports of this case are challenging to read, with counsel for both parties making 
lengthy representations. For example, the Solicitor General’s opening address for the 
plaintiff  occupied approximately four hours
509  of the court’s time.  Counsel for the 
defendant, Mr Gellibrand, occupied three hours in his summing up submissions, merely 
outlining the case.
510  The case itself occupied four days of the court’s time,
511a fact 
which the Courier decried: 
“We lament extremely that the trial should have taken place at all, so little 
creditable to either party and we sincerely hope that we shall never again see the 
valuable time of a court of justice nor the labour and attention of men of legal 
talent employed on such occasions.”
512 
However, the court case was not the only misuse of public time in this matter. Mr 
O’Connor’s claims had been investigated at the Police Office for twelve days, prior to 
this Supreme Court action.  
 
In the Supreme Court proceedings the Solicitor General read all of the twelve days’ of 
Police Office evidence, including the statements of witnesses Mr Hugh McShane, Mr 
Adey, Mr Young, Mr Collins, Bernard Carron, Mr Hays, Mr Crouch, Mr Patsons, Mr 
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Sorell, Mr McShane, Mr Smith, another of Mr Hayes, Mr Roberts, Mr Butler, Mr Risely, 
Mr Bilton and Mr Gellibrand, all of which were contemporaneously notated in shorthand 
and transcribed by Mr Ross.
513 
 
The magistrates at the Police Office dismissed Mr O’Connor’s request for court action 
without calling Mr Fereday. Thus, Mr O’Connor failed at the Police Office, with Mr 
Mulgrave, Mr Mason and Mr Hone finding no further proceedings should take place 
because the evidence produced was insufficient
514 to ground a prosecution. Hence Mr 
Fereday’s action against Mr O’Connor for the damage caused to his reputation. In the 
Supreme Court there were twelve counts in all: seven for malicious prosecution, four for 
slander and one for libel. The court placed an order against publication of the count of 
libel. The defendant pleaded not guilty generally, to the counts for malicious prosecution, 
that is, the general issue. Thus for these seven counts all facts of the charge are put in 
issue. For the charges of slander, the defendant pleaded that he did not speak as charged. 
To the count of perjury the defendant pleaded justification of perjury.   
 
In court Mr Gellibrand, for the defence, made much of the expression “passed away,” the 
term used by Mr Fereday in his affidavit to describe the manner in which Mr McShane’s 
bill was handed over to Mr Young. However, the Solicitor General testified in court that 
he himself had changed this expression to “paid away,” considering the term “passed 
away” to be a “Scotticism.” It was this term “paid away” which gave rise to the inference 
of dishonesty and the subsequent attempt by Mr O’Connor to charge Mr Fereday with 
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perjury, even though Mr O’Connor had no part in the transaction. Thus, the vulnerability 
of the common instruments of commercial transaction is highlighted in this case. In the 
colonial society where currency was scarce, the IOU and Bill of Exchange were 
necessary instruments of transaction. Nevertheless, their potential to be misinterpreted, 
whether innocently or by design, was a fact of life.  
 
Mr Hone, barrister and Master of the Court, summoned by the Police Magistrate, Mr 
Mulgrave to assist with the investigation at the Police Office, gave the court a clear 
interpretation of “paying away” in commercial transactions. Mr Hone considered if a 
party hands over an unendorsed Bill of Exchange, thereby making himself liable for its 
amount to another party, for the express purpose of suing upon it, that is a “paying 
away.” However, if an IOU is given for a Bill of Exchange, and the giver thereby 
becomes liable for the amount, that is a giving away. The giving of a Bill of Exchange, 
without an endorsement, Mr Hone concluded, to be strong presumptive evidence of its 
being no payment; but, if an IOU were given, that would rebut the presumption.
515 The 
clear testimony of Mr Hone indicates his commercial legal acumen.  
The plaintiff’s case unfolds more as a defence of Mr Fereday than a plaint against Mr 
O’Connor. For example, the Solicitor General attacks each of the charges made by Mr 
O’Connor, as if in defence of Mr Fereday. In other words, the justification of Mr Fereday 
appears to be of primary importance in attacking Mr O’Connor’s claims. For the charges 
of perjury made by Mr O’Connor, the Solicitor General identifies the essential elements 
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of perjury as the mind being in fault and directed by a wicked and fraudulent design.
516 
Counsel then shows how these elements were not met by Mr Fereday through a candid 
discussion of the circumstances.  
The primary attack made upon Mr O’Connor by the Solicitor General on behalf of Mr 
Fereday, is that the defendant is a public officer, a wealthy capitalist, large landowner, 
and large stock-owner. Thus, the qualities regarded as being positive elements in an 
individual are attacked. However, in the case of Mr O’Connor, the inference is that these 
qualities of power are used inappropriately. The defendant’s hatred  towards the plaintiff 
is revealed. 
 
The Solicitor General details the circumstances surrounding each of the claims made by 
Mr O’Connor to reveal their lack of substance. The absurdity of Mr O’Connor’s claims is 
further emphasized by the testimony of Mr Fereday’s witnesses, who explain and clarify 
circumstances. For example, solicitor, Mr Young, explains to Chief Justice Pedder the 
circumstances surrounding the settling of the affidavits in Mr Stephen’s office and the 
alteration of the “passed away” to “paid away.” He states,  
“In the original affidavit of Mr Fereday, the following words were originally 
inserted, the bill was “passed” to the plaintiff. Upon the above consultation, the 
word “passed” was altered to “paid away,”  
thus corroborating the testimony of counsel Mr Stephen.
517 Similarly, Mr Young dispels 
the shadow of dishonesty attempted to be cast by Mr O’Connor concerning the payment 
of the Bill of Exchange:  
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“I prepared a warrant of attorney from McShane to Mr Fereday, to secure 
payment of the bill; I delivered it when executed to Mr Fereday; Mr Fereday 
deducted from the one hundred and fifty pound bill eighteen pounds and fifteen 
shillings discount, and the whole which I received was two guineas for the 
warrant of attorney.”
518 
The Solicitor General uses metaphorical language, which in the twenty-first century 
would generally be considered politically and culturally offensive, to describe Mr 
O’Connor’s behaviour towards Mr Fereday. For example,   
“Why, like the savage Indian place him at a stake to inflict upon him the severest 
tortures, severer than the savage Indian inflicts, for he gives a final blow and 
strikes his victim dead.”
519  
However, at the time of the case, it was barely three decades since Captain La Perouse 
had suffered death at the hands of indigenous islanders in other parts of the world. As 
well, relations between the indigenous people of Van Diemen’s Land and the English 
settlers were troubled, and indigenous peoples were, at the time, generically known as 
‘Indian.’ Thus, apparently no offence was taken at the use of this language. 
 
Mr Stephen sought punitive damages for two reasons: not merely to compensate Mr 
Fereday for the treatment to which he had been exposed, but because it was appropriate. 
For example he states, “It is the only method of shewing  (sic)  your sense of his 
atrocity.”
520 Mr Stephen’s plea for the verdict for the plaintiff is an important revelation 
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of the underlying reason for taking legal action against attacks upon the character of 
another person, that is,  to maintain the peace and harmony of the community, for 
example,  
“I ask by your verdict to prevent the peace and comfort of the community from 
being disturbed by such malicious proceedings – to protect others from being 
subjected to such base and cruel attacks.”
521 
 
Testimonial evidence given by Mr Mulgrave, Police Magistrate, to the court revealed an 
unflattering character portrait of Mr O’Connor.  For example, when Mr O’Connor   
appeared before the Police Magistrate on 19 May 1831, Mr Mulgrave understood Mr 
O’Connor to say he not only did so for the purpose of justice, not just to prove the 
perjury, but also to show something deteriorating Mr Fereday’s character, who had 
brought an action for damages against him.
522 Mr Mulgrave understood Mr O’Connor to 
say that if he could prove Mr Fereday had been guilty of perjury it would reduce the 
amount of damages Mr O’Connor would have to pay for libelling him.
523 Fortunately for 
Mr Fereday’s case, Mr Ross had made shorthand notes of the entire proceedings at the 
Police Office. Thus this damaging evidence against Mr O’Connor could be verified in 
court. 
 
A further aspect of Mr Mulgrave’s evidence which tended to adversely impact upon Mr 
O’Connor’s defence was that a Mr Jennings, acting on behalf of Mr O’Connor, wrote to 
Police Magistrate, Mr Mulgrave, stating that Mr O’Connor did not want the magistrates 
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to adjudicate as to whether a case was made out to prosecute Mr Fereday for perjury.  
Instead, Mr O’Connor wanted the Attorney General to make the determination. The 
Attorney General, Mr Gellibrand, subsequently represented Mr O’Connor at the Supreme 
Court trial, so it can be inferred that Mr O’Connor held the belief, whether it be grounded 
in fact or fantasy, that Mr Gellibrand would give him a more sympathetic hearing than 
the magistrates at the Police Office. 
 
Surprisingly, Mr O’Connor rarely attended the examinations of witnesses, according to 
Police Magistrate Mr Mulgrave
524 and it can be inferred he was not in court for the first 




The court deliberated for four hours, deciding for the plaintiff on charges one to eleven 
inclusive.
526 On counts one, three, five and seven damages of two hundred pounds were 
awarded, on counts two, four, six and eight damages of one hundred pounds were 
awarded and on counts of ten and eleven damages of one hundred pounds were awarded, 
with a total damages award of four hundred pounds. The court found for the defendant on 
count twelve. Of the verdict, the Colonial Times comments:  
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“Mr Fereday has the satisfaction of his capital being increased by four hundred 
pounds and Mr O’Connor has to pay tolerably dear for having a lesson which we 
hope if not useful to him may be of service to others.”
527 
The jury’s statement is almost incomprehensible, it being, “On the plea of justification 
we are not unanimous but we find for the plaintiff against them.”
528 The decision was met 
in court by Counsel for the defendant requesting both a new trial for some of the counts 
and a non suit for other counts.
529 
 
The Tasmanian of 14 April 1832 indicates that the matter returned to court with Mr 
Gellibrand, Attorney General, again for the defendant, arguing for a new trial. Mr 
Fereday was again represented by the Solicitor General, however Mr Stephen had, by 
then, been replaced in that role by Mr Ross. In giving his decision, His Honour was 
critical of a third person, that is, Mr O’Connor, becoming involved in the original matter, 
that is, the loan to Mr McShane, the selling of the late Mr Hammond’s land, the Sheriff’s 
action and the IOU and the Bill of Exchange. For example, His Honour stated, “We 
found nothing to justify a 3
rd party, wholly unconcerned in the affair, standing forth to 
institute a proceeding.”
530 Nevertheless, His Honour was prepared to grant a new trial for 
the counts of slander.
531 This did not satisfy the Attorney General, who harangued the 
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court for another three hours seeking a new trial
532 for all counts. His Honour deferred 
giving a decision on that day.  
 
On 17 April 1832 the Tasmanian reports that His Honour Chief Justice Pedder, after due 
consideration, decided to grant the rule nisi
533 that is a new trial for the counts of slander 
allegedly perpetrated by Mr O’Connor on Mr Fereday. 
 
The case of Fereday v O’Connor highlights the critical importance of land ownership to 
settlers in colonial Van Diemen’s Land. Disappointment at being prevented from 
purchasing the property at Cottage Green at his own price festered in Mr O’Connor’s 
mind, causing him to defame Mr Fereday.  The Courier of 17 December 1831 provides a 
revealing comment about the colony’s press: “Were we to detail the whole of the 
recriminatory expressions used by both sides we should expect ourselves to be the subject 
of a trial for defamation.”
534  
 
Of the trial itself, it is as if the Courier had a prescient expectation the case would be 
discussed some day in the future because it concludes, “It can only be accounted for 
among the other anomalous practices of the present day which posterity will gape at.”
535 
 
This case reveals the vulnerability of persons holding positions of administrative 
responsibility in the colony. The defendant, an individual with economic power 
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endeavoured to circumvent appropriate procedures in order to ensure his own ends were 
met. The court acts in this case to protect the reputation of persons holding administrative 
positions of responsibility in accordance with the Rule of Law.  
 
7. Meredith v Murray, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land 11 June 1833
536 Chief 




In this case Mr Meredith is the plaintiff, bringing an action for libel against the defendant, 
Mr Murray. The Attorney General and Messrs Cartright and Allport represented the 
plaintiff and Mr Gellibrand and Mr Thomas Young appeared for the defendant. 
 
The plaintiff alleged that Mr Murray, while editor and proprietor of the Tasmanian 
newspaper, published a libel on 14 January 1832. The libel was about a public meeting 
held at the Hobart Town Court House on 23 May 1831, regarding the writing of a petition 
to the British Parliament. At that meeting a committee was appointed consisting of 
Messrs Kemp, J. T. Gellibrand, Horne, Gregson, Edward Abbott, Smith and Meredith.
538 
Two members, Mr Meredith and Mr Smith, however, could not continue to sit on the 
committee because of their absence from Hobart Town.  
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Mr Murray was subsequently asked to publish, a copy of correspondence between the 
committee and the sheriff regarding the meeting.
539 In response, Mr Murray published an 
article, the final paragraph of which constituted the alleged libel upon Mr Meredith. This 
paragraph was: 
“Still, however, if the five gentlemen, Messrs Kemp, Abbott, Gellibrand, Horne 
and Gregson yet wish us to insert the correspondence, we certainly shall not 
hesitate to do so because a name, which we apprehend every man of common 




The plaintiff sought damages of five thousand pounds.
541 
 
The damages sought are extremely high, so high, in fact, that it can be wondered if the 
plaintiff was serious. The Attorney General, for the plaintiff, stated that, at first glance, 
the person alluded to could be either Mr Meredith or Mr Smith. However, it could not be 
Mr Smith because, upon reading the article, Mr Smith immediately hastened from the 
Coal River, visited Mr Murray and was re-assured it was not himself.
542  Thus the court 
was required to make a determination of the identity of the person allegedly libelled, 
essentially through inference. 
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The apparent irregularity of Mr Gellibrand acting for the defendant, and being mentioned 
in the offending article as having been on the committee, is not canvassed. The Attorney 
General informed the court that the two issues to be decided were: whether the paragraph 
applied to Mr Meredith and if so, is it libel. The Attorney General insisted that the 
assessors alone were to determine the case. His Honour Chief Justice Pedder could assist 
them with his opinion but the assessors were to be the judges of the whole matter.
543 
 
Mr Melville’s testimony reveals that the script of the Tasmanian  was burnt every 
fortnight by Mr Murray and manuscripts were customarily returned to their authors after 
publishing.
544 This is helpful in explaining the scarcity of original early Van Diemen’s 
Land documents. Alex Castles (2007)
545  frequently remarks upon the problem of 
ascertaining accuracy due to the loss or disappearance of records. It could be that the 
enormity of effort required for survival in a penal colony meant that the early colonists 
were tunnel-visioned on the present, with little regard for the future.  
 
Notably, Mr Edward Abbott, called twice as a witness for the plaintiff, did not appear.
546 
Mr Abbott, as Van Diemen’s Land’s Deputy Judge Advocate, had presided over the 
Lieutenant Governor’s Court for the life of that court. Mr Gellibrand, for the defendant, 
sought a non-suit based upon several grounds. The first – that the paper produced could 
not be received in evidence because it was not signed and delivered by the printer 
himself, at the office of the Colonial Secretary, according to the provisions of the 
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Newspaper Act - was overruled by Chief Justice Pedder, because the paper signed and 
delivered was sufficient. The other grounds for non-suiting, however, were that the 
allegations could not be maintained, and there was no proof that the plaintiff attended the 
meeting, nor of nomination of persons to the committee,  nor that Mr Murray was the 
author of the article. These grounds were accepted by the court.  
 




It is pertinent to consider details of Mr Robert William Felton Lathrop Murray’s life
548 in 
seeking to understand this case. Early in life Mr Murray claimed descent from a Scottish 
baron and in English journals in the early 1800’s he was referred to as Sir Robert Lathrop 
Murray.
549 He attended Cambridge University and became an officer in the 2
nd Royal 
Manx Fencibles in 1795.
550 
 
In 1797 Mr Murray married Alicia Marshall in Northern Ireland. Of this marriage a 
daughter was born, and this child was living with Mr Murray’s relative, Ann Lathrop, in 
1803. Mr Murray declared he did not regard his marriage to Alicia Marshall as legal and 
in 1801 he married Catherine Clarke and this woman bore him a daughter. English law, 
however, did regard Mr Murray’s marriage to Alicia Marshall as legal. Thus, he was tried 
for bigamy and found guilty. Unhappy with his conviction, Mr Murray had Catherine 
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Clarke
551 write a petition to the Prince Regent. This petition was published, together with 
Mr Murray’s objections to his conviction and a report of the trial as An Appeal to the 
British Nation
552 and forwarded to the House of Commons, supported by Sir Samual 
Romilly. The House of Commons  rejected Mr Murray’s appeal. Thus, in 1815 Mr 
Murray was convicted of bigamy and transported to Sydney, New South Wales, for seven 
years. However, he was pardoned in Sydney shortly after his arrival. Tough luck for the 
two women - Alicia Marshall and Catherine Clarke - who had been duped into an alliance 
which clearly they considered legal and had borne children to Mr Murray.   
  
In New South Wales after receiving his pardon for bigamy he used his linguistic and 
literary skills to work his way up from clerk to Assistant Superintendent of the Police 
Office. He then left New South Wales for Van Diemen’s Land and over the next eight 
years was given large land grants in the island, becoming a successful farmer.  
 
Mr Murray was also a gifted writer. In Van Diemen’s Land he engaged in letter writing 
under the pseudonym of ‘A Colonist’ between 1824 and 1825, attacking, amongst other 
topics, the administration’s attempts to control the press. He continued his verbal attacks 
on the administration as editor of the Hobart Town Gazette on 8 July 1825 and of the 
Colonial Times from 19 August 1825 to 4 August 1826. E Morris Miller (1952) points 
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out that Mr Murray was careful to criticise the officials and administration of Lieutenant 
Governor Arthur, as distinct from the Lieutenant Governor himself.
553 
 
Mr Murray’s saving grace appears to have been his practice of Freemasonry in Van 
Diemen’s Land. When he began Murray’s Austral-Asiatic Review on 6 February 1828, 
continuing under various titles and eventually becoming the Tasmanian and Austral-
Asiatic Review until it ceased publication on 26 June 1846, he demonstrated a mellow 
attitude to the administrators in the colony. Much, therefore, can be said for the civilising 
influence of Freemasonry and the woman he married on 1 December 1827. This lady, Mr 




It seems a legitimate case can be made out for the relationship between such biographical 
details and a defendant whose plaintiff is non-suited. Mr Murray’s determination to 
escape from marriages which clearly were not to his liking, reveals an indomitable spirit, 
which carried through to his predisposition to find loopholes to avoid prosecution, for 
example, ensuring that there was no proof that he was the author of the offending article.  
His ability to find excuses and pose them as legitimate reasons is as evident in the 
argument that there was no proof of nominations of the persons to the committee, as the 
argument that the marriage to Alicia Marshall was invalid because the woman was under 
age.  The capacity to disregard convention in the quest for getting his own way is as 
apparent in ensuring that there was no proof that the plaintiff was at the meeting, as it is 
                                                 
553 E. Morris Miller, (1952),  op. cit., 70 
554 H. M. Murray, Australian Dictionary of Biography, op. cit., 273 197 
 
in having Catherine Clarke write a letter of appeal to the Prince Regent. The ability to 
recognise opportunity, and act upon it to advantage, is as discernible in his use of 
Freemasonry to achieve respectability in the opinion of the colony’s administration, as it 
was in his development of a fortnightly procedure whereby all manuscripts of the 
newspapers were burnt, thereby ensuring the legitimate expunging of evidence.  
 
Mr Meredith, the complainant of the libel, was Mr Murray’s materially successful equal 
in Van Diemen’s Land, having established himself as a flourishing sheep-farmer from the 
parent flock he brought with him from England, together with developing a profitable 
sealing and whale oil export trade, a thriving boat-building and hiring business, and 
lucrative seasonal cropping and flour-milling activities.
555  However, Mr Meredith 
developed an antagonistic attitude towards Lieutenant Governor Arthur’s policies, in 
particular the licensing of the press and his biographer
556  suggests this antagonism 
constituted a severe restriction on Mr Meredith’s personal life and public spirit.  
  
On the other hand, Mr Murray learned to restrain his criticism, realising this was essential 
for him to thrive in Van Diemen’s Land.  Thus, Mr Murray’s indomitable personal spirit 
and ability to accurately interpret the parameters of power, are exemplified in the present 
case. These qualities, in conjunction with the good offices of his counsel Mr Gellibrand, 
and the concurrence and good will of the court, ensured that the plaintiff’s allegations 
could not be maintained.  
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The decision is important in that it reveals the court’s non-suit decision when contextual 
evidence shows the defendant is an intimate of those with administrative power. The Rule 
of the Administration seems to be conveniently applied, rather than the Rule of Law. 
 
8. O’Connor v Meredith, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land , 10 July 1833, Chief 
Justice  Pedder on the bench




This libel action was brought by the plaintiff, Mr O’Connor, proprietor of the Colonist 
newspaper, against the defendant Mr Meredith, for printing and publishing an article in 
The True Colonist of 14 May 1833, entitled ‘Private and Confidential.’ Messrs Gellibrand 
and Ross appeared for the plaintiff and the defendant appeared for himself, with 
assistance from Messrs Cartwright and Allport. 
 
The article of 14 May is not republished in the Tasmanian but it is published in the case 
report in The True Colonist of 16 July 1833
559 and was read in court by Mr Gellibrand. 
The article is a description of an “arrant adventurer” who is “loathed and hated by all 
good men,”
560  for example: “The Governor, being under the thumb of an errant 
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The implication is that Mr O’Connor, as Inspector of Roads and Bridges, where he placed 
many convicts  for employment in the colony’s works, could place convict men for 
private purposes, including the private purposes of the Lieutenant Governor. The name 
‘O’Connor’ is absent from the article.  
A further article was published in The True Colonist of 25 June, its offensive words 
including the following:  
 
“Another attempt is now being made, and by the same parties to deal a blow at the 
Press, for an article in the Colonist of 14 May, which one of the worthies has 
claimed applicable to himself. How this man, who it is well known has been the 
author of most of the stiletto attacks upon private individuals, which have week 
after week appeared in the Colonial Times and its twin brother, the Tasmanian, 
can exhibit himself before the public as a prosecutor in a case, and call upon 
persons to give an identity to an ideal picture, to which a personal application can 
only be given by means of perjury, and to his own disgrace, we cannot, for the 
soul of us, conjecture.”
562 
 
These extracts comprised the essential cause of the action.
563 
 
Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr Gellibrand, identified the two critical questions to be 
determined. These were, did the article apply to Mr O’Connor and if it did, was it 
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libellous?
564 The issue of press independence is introduced. Mr Gellibrand identifies a 
free press as an inestimable blessing, as distinct from a licentious press which “attacks 
the private history of individuals, insults their morals, outrages the usages of society and 
becomes a curse instead of a blessing.”
565  
 
Motivation for the article may well have been jealousy over the amount of land owned by 
Mr O’Connor. Roderic O’Connor sailed into Van Diemen’s Land with his two sons, 
William and Arthur, in his own ship, Ardent in May 1824.
566 Mr O’Connor immediately 
received a one thousand acre land grant on the Lake River. Within four years he had 
trebled the size of his land-holdings, and upon his death in July 1860, he owned eleven 
properties, totalling sixty-five thousand acres and had ten thousand acres leasehold. The 
extent to which this was due to the patronage of Lieutenant Governor Arthur enjoyed by 
Mr O’Connor, remains a matter of conjecture.  
 
Appointed as the colony’s third Commissioner of Survey and Valuation in 1826, for two 
years Mr O’Connor examined all of the  island’s settled districts, providing detailed 
reports and surveying a road route from north to south of the island. In his subsequent 
appointment as Inspector of Roads and Bridges, he had control of hundreds of convicts 
employed in public works. He employed convict labour, through the assignment system, 
on his own properties and was a strong supporter of the transportation system.  
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Figure (XXXlll): Convict gang being marched to a construction task
567 
 
Mr O’Connor was a magistrate and a member of the Caveat Board, a body established to 
investigate disputed land claims. Thus Mr O’Connor was powerful and wealthy. He 
superintended New Wharf improvements on land which, known as Cottage Green, once 
belonged to Reverend Mr Robert Knopwood. It was subsequently sold at public auction 





Witnesses mention the land ownership of the parties. For example, Dr Turnbull, having 
resided in the colony for eight years, understood Mr Meredith to be one of the largest 
landholders in the colony
570 and Dr Ross considered Mr Meredith to be a rich man.
571 Mr 
Meredith’s own words in court suggest his gentrification, saying he had been “dragged up 
from my residence in the country.”
572  Perhaps the status accorded land ownership 
emanates from the reason given by one of the witnesses, Mr Thomas Young that the 
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English free settlers had come to the colony as “adventurers.”
573 The colonial adventure 
included land ownership, something which, in England, was difficult, save for a minority 
through inheritance.  
 
In court, procedure ensuring untainted testimony was followed, with all witnesses, except 
the one under examination, ordered to leave the court.
574 All advocates used rhetoric in 
court, perhaps playing to the entertainment aspect the court scene provided. Being duly 
reported in the newspapers, the media acknowledged the entertainment value of court 
cases for readers, aside from the legal principles. For example, Mr Gellibrand 
“impulsively gave vent to a fine and manly burst of indignant feeling”
575 and “displayed 
considerable animation,”
576 while, when “Mr Meredith rose to reply, at first he appeared 
to struggle with a sudden rush of feeling, which for a few moments, overpowered the 
faculty of speech.”
577 Mr Meredith’s father had been a barrister and solicitor in England, 
so perhaps some of the father’s advocacy talents persisted in the son.
578   Mr Meredith 
used various analogies, some of which relied upon Biblical motifs while others spoke of 
the hobbies of the English gentry, such as portraying himself as a hunted hare being 
pursued by lawyer hounds.
579 
 
Mr O’Connor and Mr Meredith entered Van Diemen’s Land in similar ways, obtaining 
land and increasing personal fortunes.  For example, Mr George Meredith, with partners 
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Joseph Archer and T. G. Gregson, chartered the ship, Emerald for his voyage to the 
colony. With his wife Mary, five children and passengers including the Amos family, 
John Kerr, Francis Desailly and cousin, John Meredith, they sailed into Hobart Town as 
free settlers on 13 March 1821.




David Hodgson in the Australian Dictionary of Biography clearly describes how, through 
letters of introduction to Lieutenant Governor Sorell, Mr Meredith selected land at Oyster 
Bay, on the island’s east coast, giving him access to the sea for marketing. At Oyster Bay, 
he diversified from grazing to whaling, sealing, tanning and flour milling. Unlike Mr 
O’Connor, Mr Meredith, came into conflict with Lieutenant Governor Arthur over 
matters such as seeking an elected legislature and freedom for the press. He also had 
problems with bushrangers who raided his house and killed a servant. Nevertheless, in 
material wealth, possessions and land, Mr Meredith was Mr O’Connor’s equal. 
 
Mr Meredith reveals an irresponsible attitude to peoples’ reputations in explaining the 
origin of the libellous article. He states the article was: 
 
“The production of an after dinner joke, the contribution of several individuals. It 
was a sort of experimental cap, thrown out in a moment of conviviality to fit any 
person who might please to wear it.”
582 
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In summing up to the assessors, Chief Justice Pedder commented “very forcibly” upon 
Mr Meredith’s admission, stating it “filled him with horror.”
583  Chief Justice Pedder 
directed the assessors to consider the whole of the article, rather than taking passages 
singly.
584  His Honour also stated the publisher of a journal is liable for its contents 
regardless of where he is residing when the journal is published.
585 
 
Chief Justice Pedder and the two assessors deliberated for half an hour
586 and gave a 
verdict for the plaintiff, awarding damages of two hundred pounds. 
 
 
This case reveals the vulnerability of holders of administrative positions in colonial Van 
Diemen’s Land due to the underlying jealousy of free settlers who have power 
themselves because of personal wealth. The decision shows the court making 
determinations  which protect the reputations of those who hold such administrative 
positions of power.  
 
9. Schaw  v Meredith, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 17 July 1833,
587 Chief 
Justice  Pedder on the bench 
 
The plaintiff, Major Schaw, was commander of the convict ship Lotus, and provided 
rescue to the shipwrecked victims of the Hibernia. The Colonist published an article 
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imputing that Major Schaw ill-treated the rescued victims. The plaintiff sought damages 
of one thousand pounds for the false, scandalous, defamatory, cruel and malicious libel, 
published in the Colonist, under the title ‘Loss of the Hibernia’ 28 May 1833.
588 
Mr Ross represented Commander Schaw. The defendant, Mr Meredith, proprietor of the 
Colonist, represented himself, assisted by solicitors Cartwright and Allport. 
 
The twelve men selected from the thirty-four men summoned to form the civil jury were: 
John Dunn, banker, William Goulston, chandler, Benjamin Guy, general dealer, George 
Gatehouse, brewer, Thomas Haskell, victualler, James Clarke, butcher, John Folley, 
farmer, William Clark, cooper, Bernard Hill, sawyer and violin player, William Cowley, 
brewer, John Hanson, carpenter and Edward Howard, general dealer. In this case the 
occupations of the members of the jury are given. This was not the usual practice in the 
selected cases. 
 
Figure (XXXlV): The convict hulk Dougherty (1819)
589 a vessel probably similar to the Lotus 
 
The True  Colonist  published a paragraph on 9 July 1833, attempting to mollify the 
plaintiff’s damage,
590 interestingly, just eight days before the matter went to trial. In court 
the defendant attempted to avoid liability by insisting he had privately offered the 
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plaintiff reparation, which was refused,
591 and he was the proprietor of the Colonist, as 
distinct from the writer of the offending article.
592  
 
Interestingly, Mr Andrew Bent, as Treasurer of the newspaper, deposed how he obtained 
the story. He had eavesdropped on survivors of the Hibernia, the people who had been 
rescued by the Lotus, and heard them complaining of Captain Schaw’s treatment.
593 
Without making further enquiry about the veracity of the comments he had heard while 
passing by in the street, Mr Bent wrote the story.
594 The defendant reminded the jury, by 
quoting Fox’s Libel Act, that they were to judge the law as well as the fact.
595 The 
entertainment value caused by the case is apparent from the newspaper’s comment that 




In summing up, His Honour Chief Justice Pedder, informed the jury that the defendant’s 
absence when the libel was written was immaterial in law; further it was no answer to say 
the article was published “by report.”
597Also, if the defendant had wished to offer up the 
author of the libel – that is the particular people complaining about Captain Schaw -  he 
ought to have done so in time.
598  His Honour cautioned the jury that while the 
defendant’s evidence to justify the writing of the libel must be rejected, nevertheless, Mr 
Meredith, the proprietor of the newspaper, was not to be considered in a worse point of 
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view.
599 His Honour’s dislike of Fox’s Libel Act is evident in the comment that while the 
jury was to determine the whole case, nevertheless, His Honour’s functions were not 
absolutely taken away and he was entitled to make some observations on the subject.
600 
This His Honour did, stating that he considered the article was a libel.
601 
 
After deliberating for two hours, the jury returned to ask the judge if they could return a 
Special verdict,
602  to which His Honour agreed. After further deliberation the jury 
returned a verdict for the plaintiff with damages of fifty pounds.
603 
 
In this decision the court protects the plaintiff who acted from the humanitarian and age-
old mariner’s duty to give aid to all in peril on the sea. Commander Schaw was also a 
member of the colonial administration as the vessel under his command, the Lotus, was a 
convict transport. 
 
10. Cookney v Brodie, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land 17 December 1833, 
Puisne Judge Montagu on the bench
604 
 
This action for libel was brought by Mr Cookney against Mr Brodie, for printing and 
publishing a libel in the Independent newspaper.
605 The plaintiff was represented by Mr 
Gellibrand and the Solicitor General represented the defendant. 
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The libel consisted of an advertisement stating that Mr Cookney had sent his belongings 
in a bullock cart to Hobart Town and secretly left his residence in Launceston. The 
advertisement concluded with the words, “An honest man is the noblest work of God.” 
The plaintiff interpreted the article as suggesting that Mr Cookney left Launceston 
without paying his debts. This caused distress and loss of “peace of mind”
606 to both Mr 
and Mrs Cookney. 
                                          
Figure (XXXV): Depiction of coach transport used in colonial Van Diemen’s Land
607 
 
Mr Henry Melville was at the time the proprietor of the Independent newspaper.  Mr 
Tremlett, in the Independent office, refused to insert the advertisement without authority. 
This authority was subsequently given by Mr Brodie, who paid for one insertion of the 
advertisement.  
 
Judge Montagu stated that Mr Brodie incurred liability for the consequences of 
publication
608by paying for the insertion of the advertisement. Thus the judge determined 
the defendant’s liability during the case. The defendant pleaded the general issue without 
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justification interpreted by Mr Gellibrand as the defendant’s admission that the content of 
the libel is false.
609  
 
The plaintiff’s character was then put in issue, with Mr Tremlett giving evidence of 
rumours in Launceston that the plaintiff was “considerably in debt” and his “character, 
according to rumour, was very indifferent.”
610 Dr Ross gave his interpretation of the 
advertisement, acknowledging that it imputed Mr Cookney is a swindler, not to be trusted 
and a man who desires not to pay his debts.
611 The Solicitor General’s address to the 
assessors continued to destroy the plaintiff’s character, insisting that “rumours were 
afloat injurious to the plaintiff’s character” and that unless the assessors considered the 
plaintiff had a character to lose they could not “give anything more than the very smallest 
amount of damages.”
612  Judge Montagu continued the destruction of Mr Cookney’s 
character in summing up. The judge relied on the testimony of the two witnesses, one 
who gave evidence that “there were rumours about”
613 and Dr Ross’ interpretation of 
what “the advertisement imputes to Mr Cookney,”
614   to conclude the plaintiff’s 
character is poor.  
 
After retiring to deliberate together for just ten minutes, the judge and the assessors 
returned a verdict for the plaintiff and assessed damages of twenty pounds.
615 
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The libel in this case is an example of an attack upon a man’s credit-worthiness through 
inference. Although the court’s decision was for the plaintiff, this case reveals prejudicial 
and biased judicial comment towards the libelled plaintiff. The damage caused to the 
plaintiff by the libel was exacerbated by the comments of the bench and certainly by the 
publication of the court report. 
 
11.  Murray v Murray, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 11 December 
1835
616Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
In this case the plaintiff, Mr Alexander Murray, took action for a libel against the 
defendant, Robert Lathrop Murray. It is unclear whether the parties had legal 
representation. 
 
A civil jury was empanelled but subsequently dismissed by Chief Justice Pedder because 
the pleas contained matter which His Honour considered would be improper to place on 
the court records. The pleas were not signed by a legal practitioner. 
 
Mr Alexander Murray, the plaintiff, was the Town Surveyor. Mr Robert Lathrop Murray, 
the defendant, was the publisher of the Tasmanian newspaper. It can be inferred that the 
matter involved land.  
 
Interestingly the case does not appear to have been reported in the Tasmanian.  
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The dismissal of the jury by the Chief Justice because of the content of the defendant’s 
pleas, suggests the colony’s land grant methods may have been involved. His Honour’s 
reason for discharging the matter was that the content of the defendant’s pleas was 
“improper to place upon court records.”
617 Thus, the judge was aware of the possible  
judgment of history upon the matter in the pleas.   
 
The defendant, Mr R. L. Murray, was married to the daughter of people with whom 
Lieutenant Governor Arthur appeared to have a friendly relationship; Lieutenant 
Governor Arthur and Chief Justice Pedder had a close friendship, as revealed in 
continuing correspondence over the  years,
618  and they were both members of the 
Legislative and Executive Councils.
619 It may have been that the material in the pleadings 
would have embarrassed the executive or revealed the administration in an unflattering 
light.  
 
It may have been a convention at that time in Van Diemen’s Land that legal practitioners 
signed the pleas they drafted. The probable inference that the judge was trying to make 
was that because the pleas were not signed by a legal practitioner, it is likely they were 
not drafted by a legal practitioner. If the pleadings had not been drafted by a legal 
practitioner, they may have contained evidence instead of fact. Thus they could have 
been struck out by the defendant. The Chief Justice’s dismissal of the jury, then, can be 
seen as a way of striking out, what could have been, in law, defective pleadings. This is, 
however, conjecture. It seems clear that Chief Justice Pedder took steps to ensure that 
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matters which could possibly be viewed as improper in the way the colony’s land survey 
was undertaken, would be hidden from history’s view.    
 
In this case Chief Justice Pedder prevented a plaintiff from bringing a libel case against a 
member of the administration. Whatever the judge’s motivation, this is an example of the 
Rule of Law being overridden by the Rule of the Administration. The plaintiff was 
prevented from having the matter dealt with in court by what appears to have been an 
arbitrary act of the judge. As the plaintiff, Mr Alexander Murray, was a member of the 
colony’s administration, it is probable that the defendant, Mr R. L. Murray, had defamed 
him in the performance of his official duties.  It is open to conjecture that the judge 
prevented the action because of His Honour’s personal relationship with the defendant. 
 
12. Summation of content from the selected Supreme Court libel cases 
The  following  figure shows a summation of the content identified in the selected 







CASE NAME  SPECIES& 
DAMAGES 
SOUGHT 
OUTCOME  AWARD 
Murray v Stephens  12 
April 1826, 
620 
£2,000.  CJ Pedder found for the defendant  nil 





Fox’s Libel Act 
explained 
CJ Pedder  Not Applicable: 
Fox’s Libel Act 
explained 
Kennedy v Bent  15-16 
January 1830
622, 
No specific amount 
of damages sought 
CJ Pedder and the assessors Captain 
Bell and Mr Beaumont, 
found for the plaintiff 
£100 damages 
Butler v Bent, 10 May 
1830
623 
No specific amount 
of damages sought 
CJ Pedder and a civil jury  of 12: Dr 
Ross, foreman, Messrs Mawle, 
Watchorn,  Bunster, W Lewis, Guy, 
Hopkins, Mather, Wilson, Wise, 
Stokell and Walker, decided for the 
plaintiff on all counts except the 
conversation with Dr Crowther, 
which they said was justified 
 £80 damages 
 






CJ Pedder and assessors A. Moodie 
and J. Beaumont, Esqs. found for the 
plaintiff 
£400 damages  
 






CJ Pedder and 2 assessors: William 
Wilson and Adam Turnbull MD, 
Esqs
627 non-suited the plaintiff 
Non-suit 
O’Connor v Meredith, 
10 July 1833
628 
No specific amount 
of damages sought 
CJ Pedder with 2 assessors Charles 
Swanston and Charles 
McLachlan
629found for the plaintiff 
 
£200 damages  
 
Schaw v Meredith  17 
July 1833
630 
£1,000  CJ Pedder and a civil jury of 12 
found for the plaintiff 
£50 damages  
 




No specific amount 
of damages sought 
Puisne Judge Montagu and 2 
assessors found for the plaintiff 
£20 damages  
 
Murray v Murray, 11 
December 1835
632 
Not disclosed   CJ Pedder and a civil jury  –
subsequently dismissed because CJ 
Pedder considered the pleas 
contained matter which would be 
improper to place on the Court record 
Case dismissed 
Figure (XXXVl): Summation of the content in the selected Supreme Court libel cases 
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13. Underlying values, and power and powerless polarities in the libel cases 
The following figure shows the underlying values and power and powerless polarities 











CJ Pedder  The law of evidence takes 
precedence over providing 
redress for individuals injured 
by libel: eg Secondary 
evidence of a document will 
not be received when the 
original document is in 
existence 
Powerlessness of the 
plaintiff whose reputation is  
attacked in writing and the  
libelling document remains 
in the possession of the 
Lieutenant Governor 
 






CJ Pedder  Fox’s Libel Act explained  Juries have power to judge 






CJ Pedder with 
assessors Captain Bell 
and Mr Beaumont 
 
Official duties, undertaken by 
public duties, are of greater 
value than the rights of 
private individuals  
Powerlessness of an 
insolvent debtor to  achieve 







CJ Pedder and a civil 
jury  of 12: Dr Ross, 
foreman, Messrs 
Mawle, Watchorn, 
Bunster, W Lewis, 
Guy, Hopkins, Mather, 
Wilson, Wise, Stokell 
and Walker. 
No public man is to have his 
conduct subjected to  public 
animadversion and reproach 
Powerlessness of the 
indigent debtor when debt 
collecting legal costs are 
added to the original debt;  
Powerlessness of the 
colonial indigent debtor 
when a new Act providing 
relief is not known in the 
colonies.  
Power, residing in the 
dominion of a few 
intimates, has a high 








CJ Pedder and 2 
assessors,  A. Moodie 
and J. Beaumont, Esqs. 
The ill of defamation is that it 
disturbs the peace and 
harmony of the community;  
The court’s time is too 
valuable to be wasted  
Power of court to make 
suppression orders to 
protect a party’s reputation;  
Vulnerability  of  
government officials who, 
in the  course of official 
duties, follow procedures 
which conflict with the 
desires of the public; 
Vulnerability of government 
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officials in conflict of 
interest matters if 
professional and personal 






CJ Pedder and 2 
assessors: William 
Wilson and Adam 
Turnbull MD, Esqs
639 
Procedural   Powerlessness of plaintiff   
to sustain an action without 
sufficient evidence:   
Power of the court to non-
suit the plaintiff if the 
defendant shows 
insufficient evidence to 







CJ Pedder with 2 
assessors,  Charles 




Negative value of writing and 
publishing a libel as a joke is 
denounced 
 
Power of the court to 
compensate, through 
damages, a public official 
who is libelled in the 
performance of his duties. 
A Government official’s 
vulnerability in the 
performance of his work to 







CJ Pedder and a civil 
jury of 12  
‘False, scandalous, 
defamatory, cruel  and 
malicious libel’, published in 
a newspaper is denounced by 
the court’s decision. 
Power of the court to 
ameliorate the damage 







Puisne Judge Montagu 
and 2 assessors 
Paying for the insertion of an 
advertisement and directing it 
to be inserted incurs liability; 
colonial court takes account 
of ‘rumours’ 
Powerlessness of the 
colonial plaintiff to protect 
his reputation from further 
assassination in court before 
an unhelpful and biased 
judiciary; 
Power  of a judge to cause 
further harm to a libelled 







CJ Pedder and a civil 
jury  –subsequently 
dismissed because CJ 
Pedder considered the 
pleas contained matter 
which would be 
improper to place on 
the Court record 
Legal practitioners are legal 
specialists and thus pleadings 
ought to be drafted by 
lawyers not laypersons 
Absolute power of the judge 
to dismiss a case to prevent 
matter being on court 
records; 
Powerlessness of the 
plaintiff to be heard in court 
if  the judge dismisses the 
case 
 
Figure (XXXVll): Values, power and powerless polarities identified in the selected libel cases 
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14. The species of defamation 
 
Of the ten libel cases selected from the Van Diemen’s Supreme Court, one case, that of 
Butler v Bent, 12 January 1830
645 was for direction about legislation, that is, Fox’s Libel 
Act. Of the nine remaining cases, one case, that of Cookney v Brodie, 17 December 
1833
646 is for the personal credit worthiness of a man in his private life, one is for the 
practice of a profession by a lawyer Butler v Bent, 10 May 1830
647 one is for personal 
background – in particular, male sexual impropriety Murray v Stephen 12 April 1826, 
648 
one is for personal dislike probably driven by jealousy  Meredith v Murray, 11 June 
1833,
649five were for the administration by government officials in their work, Kennedy v 
Bent  15-16 January 1830,
650 Fereday v O’Connor, 13-16 December, 1831,
651O’Connor v 
Meredith, 10 July 1833,
652 Schaw v Meredith 17 July 1833,




Thus the figures indicate that the more prevalent cause of court proceedings for libels was 
for an attack on a government official’s performance of his official duties. 
 
This is indicative of the fact that it was a penal colony. In that context, the administrators 
were developing regulations,   and government officials were required to implement the 
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regulations. A large proportion of members of the English community in Van Diemen’s 
Land did not want to be bound by regulations. For example, the preponderance of the 
colony’s English population had some convict connection, such as people who had been 
transported to the colony as convicts and subsequently been emancipated, as well as the 
relatives and descendants of current and former convicts. Such people could be expected 
to have an intense dislike of regulations and laws. As well, the population consisted of 
increasing numbers of free settlers, including ex-servicemen who had served with the 
British administration. Such people had entrepreneurial ambition and aims. In particular, 
they wanted the maintenance of societal order and sought it through the implementation 
of laws regulations.  
 
15. The values supported by the Supreme Court 
 
The values supported by the Supreme Court in the selected libel cases are depicted in the 




Figure (XXXVlll): Values supported in the Supreme Court libel cases 
 
There were ten cases selected for discussion. Of these ten Supreme Court cases, five 
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the performance of their official duties, one each for personal credit worthiness, sexual 
impropriety, the performance of a profession and one for an indistinguishable personal 
attack. These attacks are illustrated in the figure above. Keeping in mind that Butler v 
Bent, 12 January 1830
655 was for direction about legislation, that is Fox’s Libel Act, it can 
be broadly classified as  having the value of maintaining government procedures or 
government administration.  
 
In the nine cases which were decided by the court, there was only a finding for the 
defendant in one case, that is, the case of Murray v Stephens 12 April 1826. 
656In that 
case the Chief Justice allowed the plaintiff chose to have a decision for the defendant 
rather than a non-suit, in order to have an option of subsequently appealing the decision 
to the Privy Council. There were two non-suit decisions, these being Meredith v Murray, 
11 June 1833
657 and Murray v Murray, 11 December 1835.
658  The defendant in both of 
these cases was Mr R. L. Murray, the man who established freemasonry in the colony and 
whose wife’s family were said to have an intimate relationship with the Lieutenant 
Governor.    
 
The predominant value upheld by the court was the performance of government officers 
of their official administrative tasks. Other values which were upheld were:  
•  the personal credit worthiness of a private citizen, and  
•  the performance of a profession.   
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The figure below indicates the values:  
column 1 = the performance of government officers in their official administrative tasks,  
column 2 = the performance of a profession, and  
column 3 = a private citizen’s personal credit worthiness.  
 
 
Figure (XXXlX): A comparison of the values identified in the selected Supreme Court libel cases 
 
The figures support the conclusions that government officials performance of 
administrative tasks were: 
 
•  a vulnerable aspect of reputation,   
•  a likely aspect of a man’s reputation to be attacked, and 
•  a likely subject for libel actions,  




In each of the ten Supreme Court libel cases considered, and of those the nine which were 
trials, the plaintiff sought the assistance of the court to protect reputation. The case found 
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The court gave the plaintiff a choice of being non-suited or a finding for the defendant in 
one case, Murray v Stephen, and because the plaintiff wanted the option of appealing the 
decision to the Privy Council, he chose to have the finding for the defendant.  
 
In two cases  the plaintiff was non-suited,  Meredith v Murray, 11 June 1833,
659  and 
Murray v Murray, 11 December 1835.
660 In Meredith v Murray, 11 June 1833,
661 the 
plaintiff was non-suited because he could not provide sufficient proof of evidence, such 
as identity of the person nor presence at the meeting. In the other case, Murray v Murray, 
11 December 1835,
662  the  Chief Justice dismissed the jury because the pleadings 
contained matter His Honour deemed inappropriate to be included on court records. The 
plaintiff in that case was a government administrator - town surveyor - . In both of these 
non-suited cases, the defendant was Mr R. L. Murray, the initiator of Freemasonry in the 
colony and currently married to a woman whose family, it is implied by the biographer, 
was  on friendly terms with Lieutenant Governor Arthur.
663  
 
Damages were given in six  cases ranging from twenty pounds  for libelling a man’s 
creditworthiness in private life, while in the case where a man in the practice of his 
profession was attacked, damages were set at fifty pounds.  The three cases in which the 
highest damages were awarded - the amounts being one hundred pounds, two hundred 
pounds and four hundred pounds –  were for government officers libelled for the 
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performance of official duties. The awarding of highest damages for public officers 
indicates the court’s determination to send a very strong message to the community that 
criticism of government officers in the performance of their official duties would not be 
tolerated. Thus the power of the government was emphasized. 
 
The jurisprudence of these selected libel cases supports the conclusion that: 
 
•  the individual, alone, is powerless to protect his reputation, 
•  the individual is entitled to seek the court’s assistance to protect reputation,  
•  the court has power to act to protect the individual’s reputation through 
amelioration by awarding monetary damages, and 
•  the court may well have been motivated by arbitrary administrative considerations 
as distinct from the Rule of Law principle that all persons are to be treated equally 
before the law.  
Thus in the Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, the selected cases support the 
deductions that:  
 
•  a man’s performance of his official duty for the government in his role as a 
government officer was the most common attribute attacked in libel, and  
•  the Supreme Court would protect the reputation of a government official in the 









In this chapter, the facts of each case are provided  followed by a discussion of the case. 
An attempt is made to identify the values, power and powerlessness polarities of the 
plaintiff and defendant. The extent to which the Rule of Law endures in decisions is 
discussed.  
 
The following criminal libel cases are discussed:  
 
•  R v Bent(No 1), 26 July 1825
664 
•  R v Bent (No 2), 1 August 1825
665 
•  R v Bent, 15 April 1826
666 – the return to court of R v Bent (No 1) for a retrial 
•  R v Bent, 15 May 1827
667 
•  R v Montagu, 22 June 1829
668 
•  R v Gregson, 2-3 November and 8 November 1832
669  
•  R at the prosecution of J. T. Gellibrand v Gregson, 3 November 1832
670 
•  R v Browne (No 1), 14 August 1833
671 
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669 Tasmanian, 9 November 1832 
670 Tasmanian, 9 November 1832 
671 Tasmanian, 16 August 1833 223 
 
•  R v Browne (No 2), 14 August 1833
672 
•  R v Robertson(No 1), 9 March 1835
673   
•  R v Robertson(No 2), 7 April 1835
674 
•  R v Murray, 25 and 29 September 1835
675 
 
2. R v Bent (No. 1) 26 July 1825
676 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench  
 
The case of R v Bent (No. 1) came to the Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court for the first 
time on 26
 July 1825.
677 The colony’s Attorney General commenced this action because 
Andrew Bent printed defamatory comments about Lieutenant Governor Arthur. Hence it 
is known as an ex officio prosecution. 
 
The matters in this case are complex. On 8 October 1824 the Hobart Town Gazette 
published an article which labelled the colony’s Lieutenant Governor Arthur, the 
“Gideonite of tyranny.”  Then, on 11 February 1825 the Hobart Town Gazette published 
an article referring to two unflattering incidents in Lieutenant Governor Arthur’s previous 
administration in the Honduras.  
 
The first incident mentioned in the Hobart Town Gazette of 11 February 1825 relates to 
Lieutenant Governor Arthur’s investigation of Honduras missionaries’ cruelty to slaves. 
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This investigation was undertaken by Lieutenant Governor Arthur, then Colonel Arthur,  
before he came to Van Diemen’s Land. Colonel Arthur found the missionaries’ behaviour 
towards the slaves abhorrent and he wrote a Memorandum to England which was highly 
critical of the missionaries. The missionaries retaliated by publishing a pamphlet, 
Defence of the Settlers of the Honduras  (1825)
678in which they condemned Colonel 
Arthur’s findings as unjust and unfounded.
679 The Hobart Town Gazette actually printed 
extracts of the pamphlet which had been published in the London papers. 
 
The second incident mentioned in the Hobart Town Gazette of 11 February 1825 related 
to Lieutenant Governor Arthur’s disciplining of a British Army Officer, Colonel Bradley, 
in the Honduras. Again, this incident occurred before Lieutenant Governor Arthur came 
to Van Diemen’s Land.  Colonel Bradley took legal action against then Colonel Arthur 
when he returned to London. Colonel Bradley received a small amount of compensation 
for his claim but he was eventually dismissed from the service for writing offensive 
letters to the Duke of York’s Military Secretary. These two publications, then, were the 
basis for the case which came for trial on 26 July 1825.  
 
The report of the trial provides verbatim questions by counsel and the judge, together 
with the answers given by Crown witnesses. The result is a word picture of the 
proceedings before the court.  Long sections of counsel’s dialogue are reproduced. 
Commonly there are thirty lines of print with an average of twenty words in each line, 
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with very little punctuation. This imposes on the reader the discipline of concentrating on 
a stream of consciousness of the speaker during the trial.  
 
The report emphasises the court’s power in two ways. Firstly, it portrays the law as a 
specialist body of knowledge. For example the report reproduces citations of the legal 
sources on which counsel and the judge rely during the trial. Secondly, it reports the 
direct speech of the judge and counsel, emphasising judicial power. For example: “The 
Chief Justice Pedder acknowledges the right of the press to make fair and temperate 
comments of public measure”
680 but “insists it is libel to impute malicious or tyrannical 
motives to the Lieutenant Governor and to hold him up for obloquoy.”
681 
  
The jury found Mr Bent guilty but did not specify on which counts. Thus, the judge 
ordered a re-trial. This re-trial was R v Bent 15 April 1826,
682 a case which is discussed 
later in this chapter.  
 
The case can be said to reveal the powerlessness of the defendant. It identifies judicial 
reliance on, and adoption of, English legal principles and precedent. It identifies and 
denounces attempts to establish a defendant’s guilt on insufficient evidence as a negative 
value. The judicial insistence on the prosecution’s provision of adequate evidence is an 
indication that the Rule of Law was being applied in that the defendant was protected 
from arbitrary prosecution. Nevertheless, the apparent error of the jury in not specifying 
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the counts on which they found Mr Bent guilty, subjected him to a re-trial on the same 
facts. The principle of double jeopardy wherein a defendant can not be prosecuted twice 
on the same facts
683 ought to have protected Mr Bent.  
 
3. R v Bent (No. 2), Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 1 August 1825
684 Chief 
Justice  Pedder on the bench  
This trial for three different alleged libels was before a military jury consisting of Major 
Kirkwood, Captain Morrow, Captain Hibbert, Lieutenant Curtis, Ensign Moore, Major 
De Gillern, half pay, and Cornet Gage, J. P., half pay, all from the Fortieth Regiment. The 
Solicitor General, Alfred Stephen stated the Information filed by the Attorney General, 
for libels composed, printed and published by Mr Andrew Bent, the defendant, printer 
and publisher of the Hobart Town Gazette on 18 February 1825, 25 February 1825, and 
20 May 1825.  
The first alleged libel of 18 February is published in the report of the case. Essentially it 
exhorts:  
“Our official guardians to remember that public money and public confidence 
require a public display of grateful conduct; and although power, mere power 
unallied to virtue may strut and fret its hour on the stage, yet it must be followed 
by abasement and remorse for every action it has mal-performed.”
685  
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The second alleged libel published on 25 February is also published. It criticises the 
salaries paid to the administrators, for example, “a Naval Officer and a Treasurer at £700 
per year,” and comments that more official administrative positions have been created 
since the departure of Lieutenant Governor Sorell,  and with larger salaries, than 
considered necessary in New South Wales. It labels the Van Diemen’s Land positions 
“sinecures.”  
The third alleged libel printed on 20 May is also republished. It is prolonged criticism of 
administrators with ambiguous characters and names. For example, the article suggests 
that the officials are “men of office without either talent to discern or perseverance to 
achieve pubic benefit.” This alleged libel seems to be a sustained comparison between the 
previous administrators and the current administrators, with the current administrators 
painted most unflatteringly. There is a direct reference to Lieutenant Governor Arthur in 
the sentence: 
“Nevertheless, as our Monarch’s delegate may yet become popular if he will 
condescend to learn wisdom from experience and henceforth legitimately use his 
power for the welfare of all who are committed to his care.” 
His Honour Chief Justice Pedder asked the Attorney General how these matters could be 
shown applying to the Lieutenant Governor, to which the Attorney General replied it was 
the “obvious meaning of words” with the libels imputing corrupt motives to the 
Lieutenant Governor.  228 
 
In a written defence Mr Bent stated the articles were only “fair political discussion,” 
relying on English case law which held that the conduct of the administration of 
government is a fair subject of legitimate discussion. Mr Bent also contended that he was 
being charged with composing, printing and publishing matter when Mr Evan Henry 
Thomas was the editor and indeed, the writer.  Evan Henry Thomas, a free settler, had 
arrived in the colony on 19 August 1822,
686 a talented young man, whose literary skills 
included shorthand.
687 
In his summing up for the jury, Chief Justice Pedder conceded that every man has a right 
to express his sentiments upon the administration of the public affairs provided that it is 
done fairly and properly. Nevertheless, the judge pointed out that it was libel to import 
corrupt or tyrannical motives to any government or administrative officer. His Honour 
was not interested that the defendant offered to give up the name of the writer; the mere 
facts of publication and the meaning and intention of the matter were the real issues. 
His Honour left it to the jury to come to a conclusion as to whether the defendant was 
guilty. The jury deliberated for two hours and thirty minutes hours and returned with a 
finding that the defendant was guilty on all counts.
688 The defendant returned to court on 
29 March 1826 for sentencing.
689 In pronouncing the sentence, the judge observed that it 
cannot but be highly libellous to impute to any government a wilful system of mal-
administration – that its acts are wicked and corrupt. The judge relied on the current 
position in England, stating:  
                                                 
686 Hobart Town Gazette, 24  August 1822 
687 Tasmanian Almanack, 1825,  (Hobart: Andrew Bent, 1825) 
688 Hobart Town Gazette, 5 August 1825 
689 Colonial Times, 31 March 1826 229 
 
“If libels upon the government are considered highly criminal in England how 
much more so must all such libels be in a colony constituted as is this, at such 
distance from the parent state.”
690 
 
Such judicial comment is evidence that the difference of the unique penal colony context 
was apparently not realized.  The judge stated he was unable to see any difference 
between the writer of the libel and the publisher. The judge further stated he had 
discretion in sentencing, which can be taken as an indication of his desire to remind those 
in court of his power. Chief Justice Pedder sentenced Mr Bent to imprisonment for three 
months,  to  pay a fine of two hundred  pounds,  and  to give recognizances  of good 
behaviour of two hundred pounds as well as two sureties of one hundred pounds each. 
Recognisances are obligations or bonds, acknowledged before a court of record and 
afterwards enrolled on the court records. The object is to secure the performance of some 
act, for example to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour.
691 
 
This case clarifies the elements of criminal libel as they were identified by the Supreme 
Court of Van Diemen’s Land at that time: the intention and the actual publication of the 
material.  The individual’s right of freedom of speech was curtailed. The acceptable 
parameters set down by the judge were observations without criticism of those who held 
administrative positions.  This decision shows that the principle underpinning the Rule of 
Law, that of the individual’s right of freedom of speech, is severely curtailed. 
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4. R v Bent 15 April 1826
692 – the return to court of R v Bent (No. 1) for a retrial, 
Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
The facts grounding this case are stated previously in R v Bent (No. 1) 26 July 1825.
693  
The reason for the publication likening Lieutenant Governor Arthur to a “Gideonite of 
Tyranny” can be seen from a dispute over the ownership of the press. Mr Bent claimed he 
was entitled to ownership of the Hobart Town Gazette, based upon transactions he had 
made with former Lieutenant Governor Sorell. Despite documentary evidence of these 
transactions Lieutenant Governor Arthur claimed the newspaper belonged to the 
Government. Mr Bent thus sent Mr Evan Henry Thomas as his agent to Sydney to gain a 
decision from Governor Brisbane. Governor Brisbane agreed that the paper belonged to 
Mr Bent. In the article of 8 October Mr Bent announced Governor Brisbane’s decision to 
the public: Mr Bent owned the type and the only press on the island.  
 
The Crown’s case against Mr Bent was based upon the philosophy that a newspaper was 
entitled to discuss fairly and respectfully public men and public measures, however the 
offending articles, had caused the greatest injury and would detach the people from the 
government. 
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Figure (XL): Portrait of Lieutenant Governor Arthur
694 
The Attorney General considered the consequences of allowing such writings to go 
unpunished would be  that  the administration  would  lose control. Thus the Attorney 
General’s argument was based upon the fear that an example had to be set by the court to 
prevent an outbreak of libel – maybe promote civil unrest - in the community. His fear 
could have been grounded in a knowledge of the Van Diemen’s Land community which 
bred individual competition and harboured bitterness towards those who appeared to do 
well.  Mr Gellibrand for the defendant put all the blame upon Mr Thomas who wrote the 
article upon his return from visiting Governor Brisbane.  
In summing up for the jury Chief Justice Pedder insisted that there was not any direct 
evidence that Mr Bent instructed Mr Thomas to write the articles. The inference being, 
therefore, that Mr Bent was the writer. The two essential questions for the jury were 
whether the facts proven and the intention of the words. His Honour mentioned several 
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cases in which it was held that all publishers are liable for what they make public, even in 
cases where they do not actually know the content. According to the judge, the entire 
proof rested on Mr Thomas’ testamentary evidence. The judge exhorted the jury to give 
the words their plain and fair construction, not exactly from themselves alone, but from 
the whole context. This instruction in itself is somewhat ambiguous because words have a 
meaning independent of context, yet their meaning is altered by context. Finally, the 
judge told the jury that to accuse the Governor of tyranny is a libel.  
After such judicial comment it is little wonder that the jury within one hour found the 
defendant guilty of  printing and publishing the article  containing the expression 
“Gideonite of tyranny” and not guilty on the other counts. On 15 May 1826,
695 when Mr 
Bent was to be sentenced, Mr Gellibrand made representations for an arrest of judgment 
upon the ground that Mr Bent had been found guilty of printing and publishing  the 
article, whereas evidence had only been of publishing, and Chief Justice Pedder had ruled 
that printing was to include publishing. This can be seen as a valiant effort on the part of 
counsel to gain justice for the client. It had the effect of delaying the sentence while the 
judge apparently considered it.  
On 22 May 1826
696 before delivering the sentence, Chief Justice Pedder received further 
argument from Mr Gellibrand that printing and publishing were in law separate arts. The 
defence raised two points, these being that the judge had misdirected the jury and there 
was insufficient evidence for the matter to go to the jury. This was akin to an appeal, 
albeit that the judge at first instance was also the appeal judge.  
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Chief Justice Pedder responded energetically. Mr Gellibrand had argued that the fact of 
publishing includes printing  and  is established by the Appeal Case of Elphinstone v 
Baldwin, a case for libel, decided by two judges in 1771 and cited in Blackstone. Chief 
Justice Pedder gave an exposition of that case, citing that Lord C. J. de Grey had stated 
that the act of printing must include publication. Chief Justice  Pedder concluded his 
summation of his reading of Elphinstone v Baldwin with the comment: “So much for the 
objection that I mis-directed the jury.”
697 It is as if Chief Justice Pedder has validated his 
behaviour and is patting himself on the back.  
The Chief Justice then responded to Mr Gellibrand’s objection that there was insufficient 
evidence to go to the jury.  The judge expounded upon the English case of King v White, 
where a libel written on the Government by an Independent Whig, was considered a 
parallel with the present case. Chief Justice Pedder  relied upon the statement of the 
principal witness, Mr Thomas, that the paper was printed and published by Mr Bent, 
leaving the onus of proving he did not print and publish the paper with Mr Bent. The 
judge also cited the case of Duke of Athol v Pearse. In that case, despite there being no 
proof that the paper which was produced was published by the printer, Lord Kenyon held 
it was unnecessary to prove that the identical paper produced was actually published by 
the defendant. Thus the judge decided Mr Bent’s verdict must stand.
698 
This judicial reasoning is evidence of Chief Justice Pedder’s ability as a legal researcher, 
his determination to show that he knew the law and his ability in advocacy to develop the 
reasoning best suited to his purpose. It can also be seen as an effort to justify himself to 
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the  audience of the colonial court as being worthy of holding the position of Chief 
Justice. It would have been known in the colony that he had only been admitted to the 
English Bar in 1820, just six years before this case. Also, just one year before this case he 
had been directly involved in the plot which had Mr Gellibrand, the colony’s then 
Attorney General, dismissed from office.
699  
Mr Solicitor Ross provided an affidavit from Mr Bent in mitigation of punishment, the 
content of which being that Mr Thomas wrote the article, Mr Bent, upon understanding 
the writing was objectionable,  had dismissed Mr Thomas, and Mr Bent had a wife and 
five  dependent children.
700  Despite these factors, the judge sentenced Mr Bent to 
imprisonment for three months, to commence when his current sentence expired, to pay a 
further fine of one hundred pounds and to be imprisoned until the fine be paid. The 
judge’s final comment to Mr Bent was: “I hope that this will prevent your newspaper 
continuing to be the tool of a faction.”
701 
This judicial comment is unfortunate because it overlooks the reason why the article was 
written. That reason was that the man who had bought a newspaper press from the 
previous Lieutenant Governor, and had documentary evidence to prove the transaction, 
and the legitimacy of the transaction had been accepted by Governor Brisbane in New 
South Wales, was being  denied legitimacy of ownership of the press by the present 
Lieutenant Governor. Such a foundation hardly seems the fuel to motivate a faction into 
action. 
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The Colonial Times of 12 January 1827
702 published a comment upon this judgment 
pointing out that the only proof of printing and publishing was the production of a 
newspaper, without showing where it was printed or published or from whom it came. 
English case law, as provided by counsel for the defence, Mr Gellibrand, showed that the 
defendant ought to have been acquitted on the lack of proper evidence, instead of sole 
reliance upon the testimony of Mr Thomas, an employee who had been sacked. 
 
Mr Thomas’ invidious position, as the writer of the article and the chief witness against 
Mr Bent, the man who had employed him as editor, is canvassed by E. Morris Miller 
(1952).
703 The subsequent retirement of Mr Thomas from newspaper writing after this 
case is not surprising. Was it just coincidental, however, that Mr Thomas received a one 
thousand acre grant of land in northern Van Diemen’s Landon 11 January 1826?
704 It is 
not so difficult to rationalize that the land grant was a reward by the Lieutenant Governor 
to Mr Thomas for being a Crown witness against Mr Bent. However as E. Morris Miller 
points out, it was hardly a secret that Mr Thomas was the writer of the articles.
705 
 
However, there could well have been another motive for the grant. It is highly likely that 
Lieutenant Governor Arthur was aware of the talents of Mr Thomas as a writer and 
realized that his youthfulness made him a target for other less literary-gifted anti-
government thinkers, to hire him to write for them. Thus, the granting to Mr Thomas of 
one thousand acres of land in the north of the island, put the young writer out of easy 
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reach of such potential anti-government factions, and gave him something of immediate 
concern: the clearing and bringing into production of one thousand acres of land.  
 
As it turned out, Mr Thomas did not sustain an interest in the land he had been granted. E 
Morris Miller’s painstaking research reveals Mr Thomas’ grant was transferred to Robert 
Bostock on 13 October 1836,
706 just fourteen months before Mr Thomas died on 26 
December 1837 aged thirty-six years.
707 
 
The consequences of the decision for Mr Bent were severe. He was imprisoned for six 
months, fined three hundred pounds, together with costs amounting to almost six hundred 
pounds. The final sentence in the Colonial Times’ article reveals a serious problem 
confronting litigants in Van Diemen’s Land, that of difficulty of appeal. The article 
states: 
 
“The best of judges are liable to err; and it is clear to us that if we had been tried 




There could well have been a bitter-sweet note for Lieutenant Governor Arthur about 
Governor Brisbane’s determination that Mr Bent had proprietary rights over the Hobart 
Town Gazette and the printing equipment. The equipment sold to Mr Bent had been 
working for many years in the colony. With its ownership passing to Mr Bent, Lieutenant 
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Governor Arthur had a legitimate reason to the provision of a replacement printing press 
for the colony as soon as possible.  
 
E. Morris Miller (1952)
709discusses the role of Evan Henry Thomas in relation to Andrew 
Bent’s Hobart Town Gazette saga. Mr Thomas arrived as a free settler on the William 
Shand on 19 August 1822 at just twenty-one years of age
710 and married Sarah Wallis on 
May 23 1823.
711  In the two years following his arrival in Van Diemen’s Land he dabbled 
in various occupations, including real estate agent, inn-keeping, teaching, pastry-cooking 
and then became Mr Bent’s editor and agent.
712  His success in gaining Governor 
Brisbane’s concurrence, based upon the documentary evidence, that Mr Bent was the 
rightful owner of the Hobart Town Gazette and plant, no doubt would have boosted his 
self confidence. His first editorial published in the Hobart Town Gazette of 18 June 1824 
illustrates Mr Thomas’ lyrical and figurative style of writing as he espouses his aim for 
the Hobart Town Gazette:  
 
“We esteem ourselves as a Beacon placed by divine graciousness on the awfully 
perilous coast of human frailty, to warn the inexperienced, direct the benighted, 
and impress with confidence the vacillating. We view ourselves as a sacred 
sentinel bound by allegiance to our Country, our Sovereign and our God. We 
contemplate ourselves as winnowers for the public, to dispense the chaff of folly 
or the tares of depravity, and to refine the grain of reason or of virtue. And with a 
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deep conviction, that not alone the prostitution, but also the neglect of power, 
would be highly criminal in us and baneful to the community, we unite a most 
ardent wish to effect all we can in furtherance of ethics, literature and science.”
713 
 
The language of this editorial tells as much about the colonial society as it was at that 
time as it does about the literary skills of Mr Thomas. Firstly, the memory of the 
hazardous sea voyage to the island is conjured up in the first sentence: the sailing boats 
were in peril on the dark oceans, the fear of shipwreck never far away, the possibility of 
uncharted rocks and the absence of warning beacons on the coasts of a land as yet 
virtually unexplored. The second sentence plays upon the known stabilizing elements of 
the society of Britain: Country, Sovereign and God. These words are offered as stays in 
the uncertain and unknown colonial experience. In the third sentence, metaphors of 
agricultural harvest are introduced with the press portrayed as ‘winnowers’ separating 
‘grain’ from ‘chaff’, just as the punishment of convict life was expected to bring forth a 
better harvest in the populace of both Britain and the colonies. The final sentence cleverly 
mentions one of the of the colony’s banes: ‘prostitution,’  linking it with the word 
‘criminal’. In a community where the population of men far outweighed the women, this 
technique was couched to have universal appeal to readers, uniting those who decried 
prostitution, those who practiced it and those who just knew it existed.  
 
The editorial concludes with a mention of the three universal salves for society’s ills: 
ethics, literature and science. Mr Thomas thus reveals himself to be one with exceptional 
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literary talent. E. Morris Miller (1952), having fully examined the editorial work of Evan 
Thomas, concludes that: 
 
•  he employed the customary classical illusions of the time,  
•  was bi-partisan in his consideration of issues, and  
•  had  a style probably lacking appeal  to the more politically-action-oriented 
members of the community.
714 
It was the article of 20 May which E. Morris Miller (1952) posits: 
 
“settled Bent’s guilt as printer-publisher and proprietor according to the law of 





This case is strong evidence that Chief Justice Pedder applied the English statute and 
common law for libel currently in England in accordance with his interpretation of it. 
This interpretation was determined by the context of Van Diemen’s Land, where those in 
administrative positions were intent upon maintaining power  over a predominantly 
convict population. The individual’s freedom from arbitrary court decisions was 
jeopardized by the Crown’s reliance upon the testimony of one witness. The substantial 
grant of land to the Crown witness consequent upon the decision is strongly suggestive of 
the conclusion that the Rule of Law was not adhered to in this case. 
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5. R v Bent, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 15 May 1827
716Chief Justice 
Pedder on the bench 
 
The facts of the case are that Mr Andrew Bent was accused of printing and publishing 
two “scandalous and malicious” libels in the Colonial Times of 2 February 1827. The 
first alleged libel was an extract copied without comment from the Sydney published 
newspaper Australian. The article concerned a head-money fee, instituted by Governor 
Macquarie on 12 October 1811. The head-money fee required all free persons leaving the 
Port of Hobart Town to pay two shillings and sixpence.
717 In December 1826 the crew 
and passengers of the vessel Australia were required to pay the fee. The article imputed 
“improper motives” to Lieutenant Governor Arthur in exacting the fee from the vessel 
Australia.  
 
The second alleged libel was an article claiming that Lieutenant Governor Arthur paid Mr 
Thomas, the Colonial Secretary, six shillings and six pence per bushel for one thousand 
bushells of wheat when other settlers were only being paid five shillings per bushel.  
 
In court witnesses proved the wheat payment was incorrect; in particular, Mr Thomas 
proved that he tendered at five shillings and six pence per bushel. In response to the 
second libel, the Chief Clerk in the Colonial Secretary’s Office, Mr Emmett, gave 
evidence about the fate of the two shillings and six pence head money. Up until April 
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1826, one shilling of each two shillings and six pence had gone to the Chief Clerk’s use 
and one shilling and six pence had gone to the Colonial Secretary’s use.
718 
After April 1826 the Secretary’s portion went to the Public Fund, while the Chief Clerk, 
Mr Emmett, continued to receive his one shilling from every two shilling and six pence 
head-tax until 1 January 1827, when, by direction from the local government, the entire 
two shillings and six pence went to Colonial Revenue, on the basis that it was considered 
public money.
719 According to Mr Emmett, the head money was abolished completely six 
weeks ago. However, the vessel Australia left Hobart Town in December, prior to the tax 
being abolished.
720 
The revelation by Mr Emmett that free persons sailing  out of Hobart Town had 
apparently been funding the personal enrichment of the Chief Clerk and Colonial 
Secretary since the tax had been introduced in 1811, can be expected to have received a 
hostile response from the colonists. This issue, however, is not canvassed in the report of 
the case. 
Mr Bent represented himself. He read a short written defence, showing he had 
contradicted the statements about the wheat in his newspaper the following week.
721 Mr 
Bent was refused the right to read the apologies he had made in the newspaper on the 
ground that it was inadmissible in law, having been published in a different edition of the 
newspaper from that in which the offending articles were published. The judge did not 
provide authority for this ruling and was not challenged by the unrepresented defendant, 
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Mr Bent.
722 The judge, however, stated that the corrections Mr Bent had made in the 
newspaper could be offered in mitigation of judgment at a later stage in proceedings. 
The judge directed the jury to consider whether there was any malice on the part of the 
defendant in publishing the articles. They were to determine the issue of malice from the 
general tendency of the articles. If they  found the articles were published with the 
intention of bringing the Lieutenant Governor into contempt and hatred they were libels. 
However, if the jury had any doubt about the defendant’s “malicious intention” at the 
time of publication, acquittal was appropriate.
723 
The jury found Mr Bent guilty.
724  Mr Bent was thus required to enter into recognizances 
of one hundred pounds and two sureties of fifty pounds each, and to appear at a later date 
for sentencing.
725 
The  Colonial Times  adds the comment from the prosecutor, Solicitor General Mr 
Stephen,  that had Mr Bent disclosed the name of the person who gave the mis-
information about the wheat, Mr Bent would not have been brought to trial.
726 This may 
or may not have been correct. After all, in the prior cases of R v Bent, the Chief Justice 
appeared to be only interested in the publication of the article.  
This case highlights the corruption which was practiced by those entrusted with 
administrative positions of responsibility in Van Diemen’s Land. The original specified 
use to which Governor Macquarie’s head-money tax was to be applied is not mentioned. 
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Without legal representation Mr Bent was not in a position to seek access to official 
documentation for it, that is if any existed. The fact that the vessel Australia left port 
before the head-money tax was rescinded clouded the issue of misappropriation of 
government-derived funds. Clearly officials had ‘feathered their own nests’ with the 
head-money tax for sixteen years. It would seem that the tax had only been rescinded 
when Mr Bent’s article was published.  
The case also demonstrates the helplessness of an unrepresented defendant. For example, 
while Mr Thomas may well have tendered five shillings and six pence per bushel for the 
wheat, however that was not evidence that he had been paid five shillings and sixpence 
per bushel. Mr Bent had neither the means nor legal knowledge to call for appropriate 
documentary evidence to prove the actual amount of money paid to him and received by 
him.  
Certainly the case indicates that the Rule of Law was subverted by the arbitrary practice 
of  those entrusted with administrative roles  in Van Diemen’s Land. Mr Bent was 
punished for alerting the public to corrupt practices of those entrusted with 
administration.  
6.  R v Montagu, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 22 June 1829,
727Chief 
Justice  Pedder on the bench 
  
The facts of the case are that Mr Gellibrand sought a criminal information against Mr 
Montagu, for libel. Mr Montagu had written a letter to a solicitor apparently about Mr 
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Gellibrand’s private money matters. Mr Gellibrand apparently had seen the letter and 
considered it libellous. 
 
Chief Justice Pedder refused the motion and advised Mr Gellibrand to take civil action if 
he considered himself aggrieved. The case is important because Mr Gellibrand had been 
dismissed from his position as the Attorney General in 1825.
728 Mr Montagu, who would 
have been the defendant in this matter, was the Colonial Secretary and the nephew of 
Lieutenant Governor Arthur.
729 Chief Justice Pedder therefore protected the Lieutenant 
Governor’s nephew. The report in the Colonial Times states its abhorrence of  “ex officio 
and criminal prosecutions for civil offences”
730  and the experience of  “a Printer or 
Publisher” being “dragged upon such nice hair-drawn questions as supposed libels to a 




The Colonial Times uses the names of “Captains Bunn and Mackellar” as examples of the 
“learned and competent witnesses” who prove that the content of the “supposed libels” 
are actually libel.
732  Clearly the Colonial Times  is mocking the notion of Captains 
Mackellar and Bunn being “competent witnesses” but the identity of these fictitious 
personages is not easy to determine, as would have been the intention of the Colonial 
Times.  The newspaper’s fear of prosecution is evident in the words, “We cannot find 
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Nevertheless, the report of R v Bent (No. 1), 1 July 1825
734 in the Hobart Town Gazette, 
indicates it was Captain Cotton who testified that Lieutenant Governor Arthur was the 
“Gideonite of tyranny” and Major Lord who testified that Colonel Arthur and Lieutenant 
Governor Arthur were one and the same. When this case was re-tried on 15 April 1826, it 
was Mr Gilbert Robertson who testified that he thought the expression “Gideonite of 
tyranny” was a most offensive expression to be applied to the Lieutenant Governor.
735 
Thus, considering the names and their sounds, Captain Bunn could well have been 
Captain Cotton, because of the name link with cotton imports in round bunting bundles,  
and Captain Mackellar could have been Gilbert Robertson, because of the Scottish name 
connection. Another possibility is that Captain Mackellar could be the fictitious name for 
Major Lord, the other former soldier who testified that the Colonel Arthur and Lieutenant 
Governor Arthur were one and the same. 
 
The  Colonial Times  further states its hope that the improper use of the ex officio 
prosecution will be curtailed by the legislature. The newspaper accords Chief Justice 
Pedder respect and approbation, referring to his manner of judgment as having been 
performed “manfully and constitutionally.”
736  In the report the surnames of the parties – 
Montagu, Gellibrand and Pedder, are written in Capital letters, suggesting the writer’s 
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desire to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that this article is about particular people 
in power, people seen in the colony as the power-determiners in the  colony. It is 
interesting to remember that in an ex officio matter the cost of bringing the plaintiff’s side 
of the action would not have been met by the complainant personally – thus it would have 
been a cost- effective measure for him.  
 
The case reveals a  person in the colonial  administration  being protected from 
prosecution. The judicial reasoning is, on the surface, plausible, however, it could be a 
camouflage to protect the Lieutenant Governor’s nephew from prosecution. It could be 
said that the refusal to allow the prosecution was an arbitrary decision, aimed at 
protecting those who held administrative positions of power. As such, it is an example of 
a breach of the Rule of Law, as known in the twenty-first century. 
 
7.  R v Gregson,  Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land 2-3 November and 8 
November 1832
737 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
This case consists of two separate matters: the first, R on the prosecution of Roderic 
O’Connor v Thomas George Gregson was heard and decided in court on 2 November 
1832. 
 
In that matter Mr Gregson was charged with publishing and printing a false, scandalous 
and malicious libel entitled ‘Inquisition Again’ against Mr Roderic O’Connor, published 
in the Colonist of 27 July 1832.  The content of the article decried an attempt to sack a 
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public officer, Mr John Lee Archer, who worked from a home office. The article is 
critical of the general practice of obtaining evidence from convict clerks and employees 
to base charges against their masters, and in the present case, making specific secret 
enquiries of convict clerks in the Engineer’s Department, for the purpose of bringing 
charges against Mr Archer, Civil Engineer.
738 These enquiries were made in response to 
allegations about irregularity in contracts of the lumber yard, a facility under the control 
of Mr Archer, and in consequence of which a report had been called for by the Colonial 
Secretary, Mr Burnett, and issued under Government Order of 19 July 1832. 
 
At the commencement of the case, the Attorney General instructed the jury on the 
elements of libel, because they had not tried a libel case since arriving in the colony. The 
military jury was employed for criminal trials until 1840 and this was a criminal trial.
739 
Interestingly, the jury is not instructed that for criminal matters they must be sure beyond 
reasonable doubt. The critical elements of libel the Attorney General put to the jury 
were:  
 
•  words spoken are not libel unless and until they are put into writing immediately 
after they are spoken,   
•  the pen may not be used to prejudice others, a principle espoused  by Starkie in 
The Law of Libel, and  
•  when the pen becomes a medium of private rancour and malice that is intolerable 
and that is libel. 
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The common law as derived from the English case of  King v Editor and Proprietor of 
the Morning Chronicle 2 October 1809 was quoted to the jury, informing them that if 
they considered nothing bad or immoral was imputed they were to acquit the defendant, 
but if the words used imputed guilty motives there is libel. The final instruction the 
Attorney General left with the jury was that any language used to degrade or lessen a man 
in society, is libel, words are not to be taken by themselves, but what the writer intended 
to convey, must be considered, and finally, the person who publishes is as guilty as he 
who writes. The Attorney General attacked the press for its abuse and licentiousness and 
the imputation of improper motives for the base purpose of removing a public officer. He 




Mr Gregson, representing himself in defence, did not call any witnesses. He, like the 
Attorney General, relied on Starkie as authority, and used the same reference source to 
show that unless it can be proved that a person is actuated by malice in what he writes, it 
cannot be called libel.
741 Mr Gregson then set about showing that his own writing had not 
been motivated by malice towards an individual but towards a system wherein “convict 
clerks in the absence of their masters”
742 were examined for evidence. Mr Gregson also 
used the example and words provided by the Attorney General himself who, a few days 
previously, in the same court, had stated that “in a given number of hours, he would get 
plenty of witnesses who for a shilling each, would swear to any thing.”
743 Mr Gregson 
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concluded his defence by mentioning his bewilderment at the law of libel and noted that 
even with judges there was the “greatest discrepancy on the subject.”
744 Mr Gregson’s 
own definition of libel was whether or not the writing was likely to constitute a breach of 
the peace.
745 This was the question he asked the jury to decide.  
 
Chief Justice Pedder, in summing up for the jury, advised them to consider the intent of 
the words. This was a nebulous and difficult criterion and can be expected to result in 
questionable decisions. The judge advised the jury not to judge words by themselves 
alone, but to take them in conjunction with what followed.
746  His Honour further stated 
to the jury that “Whatever a man holds up in contempt as acting in a dishonourable 
manner, is clearly a matter of libel.”
747 His Honour then suggests the appropriate decision 
to the jury:  
 
“I am obliged to tell you my opinion, that it would be a libel: it goes very near to 
be an indictable offence to all those gentlemen, as it looks like a conspiracy to put 
Mr Archer out of his office.”
748 
 
It is a matter of conjecture and quite immaterial whether or not the jury could 
comprehend the advice given by the judge and the Attorney General. Upon deliberation, 
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the jury found the defendant not guilty. The Tasmanian notes this decision was “warmly 
received by Mr Gregson’s friends.”
749 
 
This is a surprising and very interesting decision in that the jury does not follow the 
advice of the judge. A reason for their independence could be that they had not been long 
in the colony. As virtual newcomers they had not come become subject to the influence 
of the colony’s distinctive characteristic of favouring the administration over the non-
administration. Thus this decision reveals an independent-minded jury, deciding free 
from arbitrariness and with the defendant enjoying the principle of the Rule of Law.  
 
 
8. R at the prosecution of J. T. Gellibrand v Gregson, 3 November 1832, Chief Justice  
Pedder on the bench
750 
 
In this matter Mr Gregson was charged with printing and publishing two false, 
scandalous and malicious libels against the plaintiff in the Colonist newspaper on 31 
August and 5 October 1832. 
 
The jury sworn to try the previous case was also sworn to try this case, albeit for a 
different cause.
751 Having the same jury to make a determination of two separate matters 
strongly suggests the potential for a faulty and biased decision, yet Chief Justice Pedder 
did not concede this. 
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The facts of the case became clear when the prosecutor began with a description of the 
background leading up to the publications. A meeting was held in Hobart Town court on 
24  August to compose  a petition to the King calling for the creation of a domestic 
legislature. At the meeting, Mr Gellibrand and Mr Gregson had taken opposite sides. 
Each had written letters on the subject. Mr Gellibrand had a letter published in the 
Colonist of 24 August explaining the view he espoused in the meeting. Mr Gregson 
replied to this letter in the Colonist of 31 August, charging Mr Gellibrand with a “gross 
and deliberate violation of truth and integrity.” It was this comment which was the basis 
for the libel allegation.  
 
On 5 October Mr Gregson published a letter signed “Hampden.” In the Tasmanian’s 
report of the case only excerpts from the letters are published, thereby ensuring it avoids 
charges of libel publication itself.  One of the excerpts from 5 October is:  
 
 “Colonel Archer can always strike without shewing (sic) his hand or weapon, 
when it suits him to conceal them. And he can always find an O’Connor or a 
Gellibrand to deal the blow.”
752 
 
Thus, this publication can be seen as a criticism of named administrators who are seen to 
behave corruptly and connive together to conceal their improper behaviour. In court, the 
prosecutor referred to libel as “the greatest pest which could creep into a community.”
753 
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The prosecutor further stated that in a criminal prosecution truth is no justification. This 
comment is noteworthy because it introduced truth into libel. The aim in bringing the 
action was to curb the licentiousness of the press so that the interests of society would be 
promoted.
754 It can be inferred, however, that the interests to be promoted were those 
preferred by the members of the colony’s administration, as distinct from competing and 
different interests. Underlying such a notion is the philosophy that there is only one 
acceptable view. Counsel uses an impressive allegory of the sun to describe the moral 
influence of the press, stating: 
 
“Similar to the genial warmth of the sun, which renovated us by its benign rays: 
but when once the channels of the press become polluted, for the base unworthy 
purpose of gratifying private malice, instead of warming us by its influence, 
society becomes disorganised; it hunts down and paralyzes its victim; it destroys 
his peace at home and his reputation abroad.”
755 
 
Counsel uses a similar allegory in the comment that libel is “the greatest pest which could 
creep into a community.”
756 The notion of an underlying animal waiting to attack may 
have been a linguistic tactic. On the other hand, it could have its origin in the frontier 
nature of the colonial society, a paradigm adopted for Van Diemen’s Land by Castles 
(2007).
757 There were native animals in Van Diemen’s Land which were unknown to the 
English. The experience of the English in Van Diemen’s Land was an exercise in pitting 
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themselves against the forces of nature, native animals, the banditti and indigenous 
people. Thus the press is relegated to the same category.  
 
Mr Gellibrand’s stated reason for bringing the action as a criminal prosecution as distinct 
from a civil action was to protect himself from charges that he was greedy for 
compensation.
758 It cannot be overlooked, however, that a military jury was required to 
try criminal matters in Van Diemen’s Land until 1840, whereas a civil jury could try civil 
matters from 1830. Thus it may have been that Mr Gellibrand did not want to risk a civil 
jury, suspecting that Mr Gregson’s views, as expressed in the published letters, were 
generally held in the community.  
 
The jury issue in Van Diemen’s Land is worthy of comment. As Castles (1982) points 
out, from 1830, civilian juries of twelve could try issues of fact under Jury Act, 1830, 11 
Geo. lV, No. 5, however trial by jury could be refused by the presiding judge.
759 When a 
jury was not empanelled, the judge continued to sit with two assessors.  The Jury Act 
1834, 5 Will. lV, No. 11, abolished assessors in the Supreme Court and section 1 of this 
Act allowed juries of four on a special list to be empanelled in civil cases.
760 These four 
people were ‘special jurors’ selected from amongst ‘reputable citizens of good, solid 
standing in the community.’
761 Nevertheless, section 2 of the Act continued to allow a  
jury of twelve to be called on the application of one of the parties.
762 If jurists could not 
reach a decision after six hours, a verdict could be entered by three-quarters of them 
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under section 4,
763  thereby assisting the efficiency of the court. In criminal matters, 
section 6 of the Act stated that where Government or Executive or Legislative Council 
members were involved, civilian juries of twelve were to replace military juries to try 
both fact and law,
764 a move which can be seen to be an effort to boost confidence in the 
transparency and fairness of justice in the colony. Military juries were abolished under 
the Jury Act 1840 4 Vict., No. 33 but Castles (1982) informs that military juries actually 
continued in Van Diemen’s Land until 1841.
765 
 
Mr Gregson was a self-represented litigant of necessity because there were no counsel 
available in the colony at that time to assist him.
766 Chief Justice Pedder refused to put 
off the trial until the next week because the jury had been sworn to try both matters. In 
the light of the irregularity of having the same jury determine two different matters in two 
different trials, it can not be underestimated that the refusal to delay the trial may have 
been motivated by the desire to deny the defendant access to legal representation.  
 
Mr Gregson’s own witnesses were Captain Glover, Reverend Mr Connolly and Mr 
Robertson, editor of the Colonist. Captain Glover bordered on being of the ilk of a hostile 
witness in his testimony that the letter signed ‘Hampden’ meant that Mr O’Connor and 
Mr Gellibrand would use their influence to do what they could to put down the Colonist 
newspaper. Reverend Mr Connolly stated he had no intimation that he would be called 
upon to give evidence, however, he consented to be examined and showed he was a 
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match for the rude prosecutor, responding to prosecuting Counsel’s, “I must have a direct 
answer to my question else I will keep you here all morning,” with the reply, “If you keep 




Reverend Mr Connolly also revealed himself to be a wily linguist stating that in an 
anonymous publication such as the letter under discussion, he considered the words “Mr 
O’Connor and Mr Gellibrand” as “figurative expressions.” Mr Robertson, editor of the 
Colonist, stated that he considered it was because Mr Gellibrand had a “friendly feeling” 
towards Mr Robertson that he, himself, was not prosecuted. This comment indicates that 
Mr Gellibrand’s prosecution of Mr Gregson may have been more against Mr Gregson 
personally than the actual content of the publication. Mr Robertson testified that Mr 
Gellibrand had seen the offending letter when it was printed but before it was published 
and had not stated it was a libel but had laughed about it. Therein is an interesting 
technicality about the printing and publishing of the libel. Chief Justice Pedder insisted 
that the paper was published to all intents and purposes  when it was shown to Mr 
Gellibrand. However, Mr Gellibrand was the person allegedly libelled: thus the 
publication of a libel could not occur until somebody other than the person allegedly 
defamed was shown the writing. As only fifty copies had been struck off the press at that 
time, Mr Robertson stated that had Mr Gellibrand identified the content as a libel, the 
paper would not have been published. Indeed, the publication  was stopped when Mr 
Robertson realised something was wrong. It would seem, therefore, that by not voicing an 




objection when shown the writing, Mr Gellibrand was contriving to set a bait to catch Mr 
Gregson.  
 
The judge summed up by charging the jury with making up their own minds, but 
nevertheless, giving them the benefit of his opinion that a gross libel had been published. 
The fact that the judge gave the jury his opinion can be taken as an indication of pressure 
upon them to concur. The importance of Mr Gregson’s reminder to Chief Justice Pedder, 
at the conclusion of His Honour’s summing up to the jury, that Mr Gellibrand was the 
standing Counsel for the Colonist newspaper and had seen the article charged as libellous 
before its publication, was deemed by the judge to be of no consequence. It would seem 
that Mr Gellibrand allowed the article to be published and then later decided he had been 
libelled by it. This seems to be an example of malevolence by Mr Gellibrand towards Mr 
Gregson. 
 
The jury gave a verdict of guilty on the fifth  count, that is, of the publication on 5 
October of the letter signed “Hampden.” Mr Gregson was given bail for two hundred 
pounds, with Mr Meredith and Captain  Glover providing one hundred pounds  each. 
Public interest in the case was demonstrated by the court being crowded at nine o’clock 
at night when the trial ended.
768 
 
On Thursday 8 November the day set down for sentencing, Mr Gregson argued that the 
judge had misdirected the jury and the ‘Mr Gellibrand’ mentioned in the information was 
not the same ‘Joseph Tice Gellibrand’ mentioned in evidence. On the strength of Mr 
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Gregson’s argument, the sentencing date was delayed until Saturday, however the judge 
refused to delay the matter further because he had to attend a Council meeting later in the 
week.  
 
This is evidence of a remarkable conflict of powers, with the judge being a member of 
the Executive Council as well as the judiciary. It flies in the face of the long-established 
Westminster doctrine of the separation of powers. Clearly, at this time in Van Diemen’s 
Land, the separation of powers doctrine was not observed in Van Diemen’s Land. Chief 
Justice Pedder was the colony’s chief judicial officer as well as being a member of the 
Executive and Legislative Councils. Be that as it may, in the sentencing on Saturday Mr 
Gregson was fined eighty pounds. This fine was paid by public subscription
769an 
acknowledgment of the public’s gratitude to him for having begun the Colonist 
newspaper in July 1832 as ‘The Journal of the People’ and providing a strident voice 
against Lieutenant Governor Arthur’s incestuous administration. 
 
 
This case is evidence of the potential for corruption where the Chief Justice is a member 
of  both  the Legislative and Executive Councils as well as being the colony’s chief 
judicial officer. It is also an example of the inherent corruption that occurred when 
administrators had unfettered power in consequence of the tyranny of distance. From the 
point of view of the law of libel the case is evidence of the settlers’ battle against corrupt 
administrative practice and the personal sacrifice they made in the pursuit of their goal. 
From the perspective of the Rule of Law, it is an example of the battle waged by 
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members of the administration to stifle opposing  members of the populace through 
arbitrary tactics. 
 
9. R v Browne (No. 1) 1833, Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 14 August 1833, 
Puisne Judge Montagu on the bench
770 
 
This criminal libel case was brought by the Attorney General for libel published by Mr 
Browne in the Colonist newspaper in April 1833. The libel referred to the flogging to 
death of a man at the Hobart Town Prisoners’ Barracks. The libel was not published in 
this particular report of the case. 
 
The Attorney General opened the case by indicating that it was about the authorship of 
the libel.
771 Witness Mr Bent acknowledged that the Colonist is published at his office, 
but denied any knowledge of the author of the articles because he did not have control 
over the manuscripts.
772 Witness Mr Gellard acknowledged that although he was the 
publisher he was not the editor in April 1833. He agreed that Mr Browne had read the 
offending article to him but Mr Gellard did not see the hand-written article, he only saw it 
in print.
773 The four compositors were examined were Mr Matthew Hopwood, Mr Robert 
Fergie, Mr Robert Wilson and Mr Hugh Green. None of these men could recollect ever 
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having seen the article in manuscript form.
774Thus, because Mr Browne’s authorship of 
the article could not be proved, he was acquitted.
775  
 
If this had been a civil case, it would have been a non-suit based upon defence counsel’s 
submission to the judge that: “This is no case at all.”
776 However, as it was a criminal 
prosecution, the defendant had to be acquitted. 
 
The report states that the case “rested merely upon legal technicalities which were fully 
admitted by the court.”
777 However these legal technicalities are not identified. Thus, it is 
open to inference that because Mr Browne could not be proven to be the writer of the 
article, the Crown’s case was doomed. The defendant was acquitted because the writer of 
the libel could not be identified. 
 
10. R v Browne (No. 2), Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 14 August 1833, 
Puisne Judge Montagu on the bench
778 
 
Extraordinarily, on the same day, Mr Browne was prosecuted in the same court for 
writing and publishing an article in the Colonist  newspaper of 16 April 1833. The 
Attorney General prosecuted and Mr Browne, the defendant, was represented by Messrs 
Cartright and Allport.
779 
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At  this hearing, the article was read in court. It is as follows: 
 
“Our blood chills in our veins as we write the disgraceful truth, that on Friday last 
a human being – a Colonial subject – an Englishman, expired under the tortures of 
the lash! This, in the nineteenth century, in a Christian land, and under a religious 
administration, is what few will give credence to, but such is the lamentable and 
disgraceful fact. We have heard that the influence of a bribe was in operation on 
this occasion; but as the Colonial Authorities, of course, for their own credit’s 
sake, cause a full investigation of the circumstances to take place, we shall wait a 
reasonable time before we drag the parties before the light of the day; in the hope 
that they will meet the reward due to their barbarity.”
780 
 
The article is ambiguous, in that the reader can infer either that the convict’s alleged 
misdeed was bribery or the severity of the lashing was due to a bribe. Whichever 
meaning is correct, the third sentence in the article indicates prevalence in the colonial 
Van Diemen’s Land society to act upon rumour. For example, “We have heard that the 
influence of a bribe was in operation in this occasion.”
781 The Attorney General did not 
offer any witnesses, insisting to the jury that they must draw their own inference of the 
tendency
782 of the article.   
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Mr Andrew Bent testified that while the Colonist newspaper was published at his printing 
office,  he had no knowledge of the specific manuscript.
783Mr G.  H.  B.  Gellard, the 
publisher of the Colonist, testified that he had not seen the article but Mr Browne had 
read it aloud to him; from hearing Mr Browne read it he considered it would have been in 
Mr Browne’s hand-writing.
784  The compositor, Mr Matthew Hopped testified that he had 
never seen the manuscript of the particular article, as did Mr Bent’s printers Mr Robert 
Fragile, Mr Robert Wilson and Mr Hugh Green.
785  
 
Counsel  for the defendant submitted  that there was no case to go to the jury. The 
particular article had not been read and indeed, as only a copy of it in printed newspaper 
form was in the court, there was no original manuscript of the libel to be read. Thus, 
counsel submitted there was nothing to go to the jury. 
 
His Honour Judge Montagu concurred with defence counsel.  His Honour instructed the 
jury that there was nothing to put before them and the foreman instantly returned a 
verdict of not guilty.
786 The Colonist’s report of the case concludes:  
 
“The result of this trial appeared to give evident satisfaction to the whole court, 
except the Attorney General, who intimated that he should put another bill upon 
the file against Mr Meredith for the same article!”
787 
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This concluding statement is a deplorable example of court reporting. It is unclear 
whether or not the Attorney General actually did make the comment because of the verb 
‘intimated.’ It would have been a most unwise comment for Counsel to have made and it 
seems unlikely that such a senior lawyer would have done so in court.  
 
It could well be that this is an example of the Colonist’s reporting which was criticised by 
others in 1833. For example, lawyer Mr Thomas Young testified in the case of O’Connor 
v Meredith
788that  he had given up The Colonist  some months previously, being 
apprehensive that what was contained therein may make an inroad on his morality, while 
George Henry Melville (1835) commented: 
 
“The editor and proprietor of the Colonist became obnoxious to the ruling powers 
- that journal had been since its establishment conducted with a spirit too violent 
for a government constituted as it is in this colony.”
789 
 
The indices of powerlessness and the identification of values for R v Browne (No. 1 ) and 
R v Browne (No. 2) remain the same.  
 
This case is an example of a defendant being prosecuted and tried on the same facts. This 
breaches  the rule against double jeopardy, the fact of being prosecuted twice for 
substantially the same offence
790. Clearly the Rule of Law which protects the individual 
from arbitrary prosecution was ignored. From the perspective of the jurisprudence of 
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defamation, this case demonstrates that unless the prosecution can produce the original 
libellous document in court, the court will not convict. In this instance, the original 
document was not produced nor read in court; only a copy of it in printed newspaper 
form was in the court. 
 
 
11. R v Robertson (No. 1) Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land,  9 March 1835, 
791 
Chief Justice Pedder on the bench  
 
The facts of the case are complicated probably because there were three charges in this 
case. The Attorney General and Solicitor General were the prosecutors. They alleged that 
the defendant, Mr Gilbert Robertson, proprietor of the True Colonist newspaper, falsely 
and maliciously published  two  libels  tending to bring into contempt the Lieutenant 
Governor of Van Diemen’s Land, and also published a libel on Hobart Town lawyer, Mr 
Rowlands.   
 
On the first day set down for the trial, the defendant objected to being tried by a military 
jury of seven men from the Twenty-First Foot Regiment. On that day, when the jury was 
about to be sworn, the defendant, Mr Robertson challenged the array because officers of 
the Twenty-First Foot Regiment had united to incite and persuade John Thomas Leahy, 
their colonel, to institute a criminal prosecution against Mr Robertson in Leahy’s name. 
Chief Justice Pedder over-ruled Mr Robertson’s objection, advising him to challenge 
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each individual.
792 Mr Robertson accepted the advice of the judge. He did not object to 
the first juryman, Lt Arthur Corbett, but did challenge the next man called, Paymaster 
Jean. Mr Robertson and Mr Gellibrand, Counsel for the prosecution, then argued.
793 This 
indicates the defendant’s confidence in public speaking and preparation for the case. As a 
result of the defendant’s challenge, the jury was dismissed and the matter adjourned. 
Chief Justice Pedder required the defendant to promise not to publish the name of the 
libelled lawyer, who was, in fact, Mr Thomas Wood Rowlands. However, the lawyer’s 
name had already been published on 23 January 1835 in an editorial in the True Colonist, 




Thus, after the first adjournment in consequence of Mr Robertson’s successful challenge 
to the military jury, the three libel charges were brought for hearing by a civil jury. 
 
The jurymen were W. W.  Barrow, Esq., retired officer,    H.  J.  Emmett,  sen. Esq., 
Government officer, Arthur Davis, Esq., half-pay R. N., Andrew Crombie, Esq., J. P., 
merchant; John Boyes, Esq., merchant,  George Bilton, Esq., merchant, John Bell, Esq., J. 
P.,  George Watson,  Esq.,  J.  P., merchant,  George Gatehouse, Esq., merchant,  H.  J. 
Emmett,  jun.  Esq.,  Government officer,  John Lee Archer,  Esq., Government officer,  
Michael Vicary, Esq., retired officer. Thus, for this case it was a civil jury that was 
empanelled, apparently the first time a civil jury had ever tried a criminal case in Van 
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Diemen’s Land.
795  The array of men, however, can be seen as having a decidedly 
‘service’ and ‘administrative’ predominance. For example, W. H. Barrow and Michael 
Vicary were ‘retired officers,’ while Arthur Davies was a half-pay Royal Navy officer. H. 
J. Emmett, sen., H. J. Emmett jun., and John Lee Archer, were termed ‘Government 
officers.’ John Bell, Andrew Crombie, George Watson, were Justices of the Peace and 
consequently would have been appointed by the Lieutenant Governor. Thus, it can fairly 
be concluded that the only three jurymen who could be regarded as ‘civil’ in that they did 
not have obvious links with the colony’s administration were John Boyes, George Bilton 
and George Gatehouse, who were termed ‘merchants.’ 
 
It can be inferred, therefore, that the chances of Mr Robertson’s case receiving 
consideration by a jury free from bias towards the Lieutenant Governor remained slim. 
The  True Colonist  of 14 March 1835 made a similar observation of the jury
796  and 
attributed the root of the problem to the Jury Act, of whom the architect was Mr Alfred 
Stephen. Under the Act, for a man to be eligible as a juror, he had to be an ‘esquire.’  
 
The use of the term ‘esquire’ after each juryman’s name is set in its English historical 
context by Alex Castles (2007).
797 In England, the term ‘esquire’ was used to refer to 
men who were socially placed between ordinary gentlemen and knights. In the colony of 
Van Diemen’s Land the term ‘esquire’ was used to include former service officer, 
lawyers, Church of England clerics and those without a convict background who had 
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considerable wealth, provided Lieutenant Governor Arthur approved of them.
798 Thus the 
term of ‘esquire’ introduced a particular division or class within Van Diemen’s Land 
society. 
 
Captain Forster and the Chief District Constables had power under the Jury Act to create 
esquires for the jury service. The True Colonist states that in this case, of the eighteen 
men from whom the twelve jurymen were selected, the defendant was not allowed the 
right to challenge.
799 This comment is somewhat confusing because the report further 




In this case, the coupling of the matters of the prosecution of Gilbert Robertson for the 
alleged criminal libel of Mr Rowlands with that of the Lieutenant Governor appeared 
incongruous to Chief Justice  Pedder, who commented: “I think it is to be regretted that 
the case was brought forward at the same time with the others, which are infinitely more 
important.”
801 This judicial comment is important in that it can be taken to indicate that in 
the mind of the judge, the libelling of the Lieutenant Governor was more serious than the 
libelling of a private citizen in the exercise of a profession.  
 
The defendant, Mr Gilbert Robertson, had arrived in Hobart Town in 1822 with his wife 
and family. Mr Robertson was employed as Superintendent of the Government Farm at 
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New Town from 1825 to 1827 and obtained his own grant of land in 1828, continuing as 
a farmer and official
802 and lecturing in agriculture and colonization at the Hobart Town 
Mechanics’ Institute.
803  He was the  first editor of the newspaper The  True  Colonist, 
founded in 1832, with the aim of being a voice for the people
804 as distinct from a voice 
of the administrators. It was this aim of voicing concerns of the people that resulted in 
this libel action being taken against Mr Robertson. 
  
The first matter: The alleged libel on Mr Rowlands for charging excessively high  
legal fees 
 
The summons for the matter of libelling Mr Rowlands was served on Mr Robertson while 
he was incarcerated awaiting trial for charges of alleged libel on the Lieutenant Governor. 
On 3 February 1835 he was liberated on the bail of James Gordon and Hugh Murray to 
answer the alleged libel on Thomas Wood Rowlands.
805  
 
This alleged libel charge derived from an article that Gilbert Robertson had published an 
account of the impact of legal costs made by Mr Rowlands upon a poor man with a large 
family. The man’s possessions were sold and he was imprisoned for his debt to Mr 
Rowlands. He was only released from prison when he mortgaged the land he had worked 
for two years
806 to defray costs. Mr Robertson published his continuing concern at the 
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price of legal action in the colony in an article in The True Colonist of 15 January 1835, 
when he wrote:  
 
“The ruinous price of justice whereby not only the lawful debtor is ruined but the 
just creditor loses his right by appealing to the law for its recovery, for the effects 
of the debtor are swallowed up with court fees and lawyers’ costs so that too often 
there is nothing left for the creditor.”
807 
 
Mr Robertson had previously published general criticism of the professional practice of 
the colony’s law and justice. For example, in The True Colonist of 9 January 1835, he 
wrote: 
“It is true that in England many of the justices are arrant asses. But in England the 




Clearly, the Crown considered specific criticism of Mr Rowland’s professional fees, as 
distinct from the fees demanded by the legal profession in general, amounted to criminal 
libel. Hence, these criminal proceedings had been initiated against Mr Robertson.  
 
Mr Robertson asserted in The True Colonist of 4 February 1835 that this should have 
been a civil matter but a choice was made to prosecute criminally to prevent him from 
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answering with a plea of plea of justification.
809  The  Summons delivered to Mr 
Robertson for this matter was defective in that it failed to identify the nature of the 
Information and Complaint on which he had been summoned.  
 
The second matter: The alleged libel of Lieutenant Governor  Arthur for using 
government hay to feed his own cattle, the hay matter 
 
The delivery  of the Summons, however, was not the first indication Mr Robertson 
received of the impending action against him. The initial intimation had come on 19 
January 1835 while Mr Robertson was attending the Police Office to report on police 
matters for publication in the True Colonist.
810  During an adjournment in court 
proceedings the Solicitor General, Mr McDowell, applied for a Summons against Mr 
Robertson for having libelled the Lieutenant Governor. The Assistant Police Magistrate, 
Mr Mason, reminded the Solicitor General that an application at the Police Office was the 
inappropriate procedure for a Crown Prosecution. The Solicitor General’s reply was that 
he wanted “to give Mr Robertson no surprise.”
811 
 
Mr Robertson considered  the Solicitor General’s application to the Assistant Police 
Magistrate inappropriate procedure, being, a new system of libel prosecution and an Irish 
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sort of trial.
812 Such comment no doubt created tension in Hobart Town, denigrating, as it 
did, the place of origin of some of the colony’s free immigrants and convicts. 
Nevertheless it can be seen to have stemmed from Mr Robertson’s dismay at the apparent 
abandonment of English legal procedure.  In the passage of time, Mr Robertson 
subsequently aired his dissatisfaction with the colony’s legal procedures and system to 
His Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies in London and published this in an 
Open Letter in The True Colonist of 5 February 1835.
813 
 
The True Colonist’s ‘Editorial’ of 20 January 1835 republishes the stories which gave 
rise to the charges of the two libels on the Lieutenant Governor. In essence they were that 
the Lieutenant Governor used the Crown supply of hay to feed his own cattle and altered 
the date on a Deed of Land grant.
814 
  
The delivery of the Summons to Mr Robertson meant that from noon 23 January 1835 he 
was imprisoned until 3 February, when his two friends, James Gordon and Hugh Murray, 
bailed him to answer the alleged libel on Thomas Wood Rowlands.
815 From 3 February 
until 3 March 1835, The True Colonist published several editorials on the Law of Libel. 
These articles appear to be the basis of Mr Robertson’s defence to the charges. The 
Assistant Police Magistrate had power to investigate the complaints in a Summons prior 
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to sending it to trial in the Supreme Court, as evidenced by The True Colonist’s Report of 
3 March 1835.
816 This investigation was conducted over five days at the Police Office, 
which was crowded
817 due to the public interest in the matter.  
 
Important information given during the examinations at the Police Office included that 
from the Government farm overseer, Mr Fitzpatrick, who had informed Mr Robertson 
that approximately three tons of hay were transferred from the Government farm to the 
Lieutenant Governor’s farm by Mr Compton, the Lieutenant Governor’s farm overseer. 
The hay was later replaced. Mr Davidson stated that he knew that three or four loads of 
hay were sent to the Government Gardens from the Domain Farm to feed the stabled 
bullock belonging to the Lieutenant Governor.
818 Following examination, the Assistant 
Police Magistrate concluded that as the hay had been taken by authority, the farm 
overseers were not at fault.
819 No doubt this would have been of immense relief to Mr 
Compton and Mr Fitzpatrick, who could have suffered severe punishment had they been 
found to have stolen Government property. 
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The Police Magistrate’s refusal to allow questions regarding the identity of the person 
who authorised the removal of the hay
821  can be seen as an attempt to protect the 
Lieutenant Governor. Clearly the Police Magistrate concluded after five days of 
examination that the matters would need to be taken to the forum of the Supreme Court 
of Van Diemen’s Land.  
 
The third matter: The alleged libel of Lieutenant Governor Arthur for alteration of 
Mr O’Connor’s Deed of Land grant, the deed matter 
 
Mr Robertson published an article in which he stated that Lieutenant Governor Arthur 
altered the  date on a Deed of land  grant after it had been enrolled.
822The Attorney 
General admitted in court that this allegation was true.
823 The Attorney General defended 
the action, insisting, “It is no crime to alter an enrolled deed: it may be altered for the best 
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of motives, to do justice.”
824 Thus the content of the publication was true. The True 
Colonist defended its publication on 12 February 1835, stating: 
 
“No punishment whatever should attach to a public writer for stating the truth in 
any terms, where Government as a whole, or where a public functionary as part of 
such whole, is guilty of acts inimical to the public weal.”
825  
 
It was this philosophy, then, which probably motivated Mr Robertson to write about the 
Lieutenant Governor’s alteration of the date on the enrolled Deed. 
 
In court, Mr Robertson told the jury that it was his duty as the conductor of a public 
newspaper to publish to the world such actions of public officers and others which were 
either oppressive, unjust or otherwise injurious to the interests of society.
826 Further, he 
contended that the alteration of a Deed after enrolment was an act injurious to the 
interests of society because it tended to destroy people’s confidence in the instruments by 
which they held land.  It seems that Mr Robertson was  not in trouble for merely 
publishing that the Lieutenant Governor had altered the date on the Deed after its 
enrolment: it was because Mr Robertson was alleged to have attributed “unfair purposes” 
to the Lieutenant Governor in altering the date of the Deed. This was the offending aspect 
of the publication, according to the prosecution. 
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The Attorney General pointed out that he had instituted the prosecution of Mr Robertson 
himself as Attorney General of His Majesty, whose commission he held, and not by the 
Lieutenant Governor, who, indeed, had no knowledge of the prosecution. The Attorney 
General stated he had prosecuted Mr Robertson because it was his duty to protect the 
servants of His Majesty.  
 
The background to the alteration of the date of the Deed arose in a dispute over the 
ownership of a parcel of land.
827 In 1835, Attorney General of Van Diemen’s Land, Mr 
Alfred Stephen, demonstrated the invalidity of the early land grants. The New South 
Wales Governors Macquarie, Brisbane and Darling, had granted land in their own names 
instead of in the name of His Majesty the King. Van Diemen’s Land was not independent 
of New South Wales until 3 December 1825, thus all Van Diemen’s Land real estate 
grants prior to that date, having been made in the names of the successive New South 
Wales Governors instead of the English monarch, were shown by Mr  Stephen to be 
invalid. Grantees who had acquired land under the old grant system were competing with 
new would-be land proprietors for their land. The Van Diemen’s Land Caveat Board was 
established in 1835 to adjudicate in regard to these disputed land titles.
828 While those 
who had been granted land under the old system were entitled to use the land during their 
lifetime, upon decease, their widow, heirs and descendants would have no claim to the 
land. This inequitable consequence was repeated with many old land grants and caused 
enormous hardship and anguish for widows and children after the decease of a husband 
and father, in whose name land had been granted.  
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Be that as it may, by publishing the articles which stated that the Lieutenant Governor 
had altered the date of a Deed of land grant and fed the government hay to his own cattle, 
and that Mr Rowlands’ legal fees were excessive, Mr Robertson was found guilty by the 
jury in less than fifteen minutes. The strength of Mr Robertson’s conviction that the 
articles for which he had been found guilty of criminal libel were properly written, is 
apparent in his comment:  
 
“The trial is over. We stand convicted wanting sentence of the Court. Thank God 
for no dishonourable offence, not for anything we or our children will ever have 
to blush or regret.”
829 
 
Despite being found guilty - but before receiving a severe sentence from the Bench - Mr 
Robertson wrote of his respect for the personage of Chief  Justice  Pedder, albeit 
disagreeing with His Honour’s view of the law of libel.
830 It is a matter of conjecture 
whether Mr Robertson would have had the same degree of respect for the personage of 
Chief Justice Pedder upon discovering the severity of the sentence the judge inflicted 
upon him.  Mr Robertson received a fine of twenty pounds fine and imprisonment for one 
month for libelling lawyer Mr Rowlands,
831 a fine of one hundred and twenty pounds, 
and imprisonment for eight months after the expiration of the first sentence, and further 
imprisonment until the fine be paid,  for accusing the Lieutenant  Governor  of using 
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property belonging to the Crown for his own private purposes,
832 and a fine of sixty 
pounds  and imprisonment for four months and continuing imprisonment until the fine be 
paid, for accusing the Lieutenant Governor of “dishonourable and unworthy conduct”  in 
regard to the  alteration of the date of the Deed of land grants.
833 
 
This case is an example of how the Rule of Law was subverted in Van Diemen’s Land. 
Those in positions of power were determined to prevent criticism of their administration. 
The evidence showed that government property was appropriated for personal use by 
those in administrative positions of responsibility. Evidence also showed that those in 
positions of administrative responsibility exercised their power to circumvent the rules 
which members of the general populace were required to follow. Evidence also showed 
that a member of a revered service profession, the law, was behaving unconscionably to 
those requiring his professional service. Despite this evidence, a civil jury found that 
ordinary members of the populace, who published true accounts of such inequitable 
behaviour being perpetrated, were guilty of criminal libel. 
 
This case reveals that the people in power were protected by a jury system which ensured 
jurors were selected  from their own ranks. Far from being fair, the jury system was 
manipulated to ensure that the practice of justice remained arbitrary and power was 
retained by those in the administrative hierarchy.   
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12. R v Robertson (No. 2) Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 7 April 1835,
834 
Chief Justice and Puisne Judge Montagu on the bench 
 
In this case Mr Gilbert Robertson was charged with criminally libelling Captain Montagu 
on three occasions. These being: 
 
•  on the 23 January 1835 he published an article in The True Colonist that Captain 
Montagu used the Crown’s building material to build his own private home, in 
particular loose quarried ironstone,  and  
•  on 23 February and 26 February 1835 he published articles in The True Colonist 
stating  that Captain Montagu  was embezzling Crown property,
835 in particular 
using Crown labourers and Crown materials in the building of his private home.  
For this case, Chief Justice Pedder sat with Puisne Judge Algernon Montagu. Algernon 
Montagu had been appointed Attorney General of Van Diemen’s Land in 1826, just two 
years after being called to the English bar.
836 Thus he had very little experience in the 
practice of the law. In 1833 he was appointed Puisne Judge of Van Diemen’s Land.
837 
The defendant, Captain John Montagu, was the Colonial Secretary and it is important to 
note that he was the nephew of Lieutenant Governor Arthur.
838  
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The True Colonist’s report of the case on 15 May 1835 published the affidavit of Captain 
John Montagu in which the Captain admits to having used about fifty or sixty cartloads of 
iron stone used in the wall enclosing a small space adjoining the house. He also states 
that this stone was obtained from Government  excavations near the Wharf, and he 
believed he was entitled to it because he was the proprietor of the land from which the 
stone had been quarried.
839 John Anderson Brown, Building Superintendent for Captain 
Montagu’s house, stated in his affidavit that while it was his task to pay for all the 
materials used in the building, he did not pay for the ironstone which was on the ground 






Figure (XLll): Prisoners quarrying stone and wharf-building
841 
 
Mr Roderic O’Connor, Inspector of Roads, stated in his affidavit that the proprietors of 
land by the river had agreed with the Government some years previously to give up part 
of their land for public purposes. The Government gangs had levelled the land, leaving 
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ironstone on the ground.  This stone was taken by the original private land-owners.
842 
The original owner of Captain Montagu’s land was Mr W. H. Hamilton and the Inspector 
of Roads considered Captain Montagu’s right to take the ironstone on the ground derived 
from the original owner.
843The Inspector of Main Roads further stated in his affidavit that 
several other proprietors of the land had taken stone by permission.
844 
 
Mr Robertson, in his affidavit, states that ironstone had been refused to another proprietor 
of the land, Mr Askin Morrison.
845In consequence of this apparent unfair and differential 
treatment of landowners, Mr Robertson, in company with Mr Henry Melville, visited 
New Wharf to view the situation for themselves.
846 
 
A lack of procedural fairness accorded Mr Robertson in this  matter is obvious. For 
example: 
  
•  He was served with a Writ while confined in  prison;
847   
•  The Writ was based on affidavits, copies of which were not provided to Mr 
Robertson,
848 
•  Being imprisoned he could not appear before the court to show cause why a 
Criminal Information should not be exhibited against him, thus he provided the 
court with a petition to that end, which the court would not allow to be read;
849 
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•  The court ordered that the Rule of a Criminal Information against Mr Robertson 
be made absolute without hearing Mr Robertson;  
•  On 5 May Mr Robertson was assaulted by the keeper of the prison and dragged 
into court without a Writ of Habeus Corpus  and ordered to plead to the 
Information without having received a copy of it;   
•  While imprisoned he was visited by a Frederick Manning and shown an affidavit 
by Mr Pendleberry, Superintendent of Government Brickmakers. Mr 
Pendleberry’s affidavit indicated that Mr Pendleberry and Captain Montagu had a 
contract,  the content of which was that Mr Pendleberry would provide bricks to 
Captain Montagu in consideration for brickmakers being lent to Mr Pendleberry 
by Captain Montagu;
850  
•  Mr Robertson was given an opportunity to retract his alleged libel on the basis of 
seeing just one affidavit, Mr Pendleberry’s affidavit, acknowledging that on the 
basis of its content, Mr Robertson had been “misinformed,”
851 and 
•  Mr Pendleberry’s affidavit was not produced nor read in court.
852 
This catalogue of inequities leaves no doubt about the procedural unfairness accorded Mr 
Robertson. 
 
Be that as it may, Mr Robertson was found guilty. 
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The sentencing address by Chief Justice Pedder is extraordinary in its content, which 
includes a personal attack upon Mr Robertson, the judge’s views about the press and the 
judge’s self-justification.
853 The judge proposes a motive for Mr Robertson’s writing, 
considering that Mr Robertson is not acting alone, stating:  
 
“I believe you have become the tool of a faction. I have no doubt Mr Robertson 
but that you are goaded on by these agitators who are disaffected to the 
government. I consider you are the tool of a miserable party of agitated disturbers 
by whose directions you have been acting and sorry I am to see you prostrating 
your intellects in so debased detestable and abominable a service.”
854 
  
E. Morris Miller (1952)
855 notes that Lieutenant Governor Arthur frequently used the 
terms “faction” or “factious party” to describe opponents of the government. He also used 
it to identify the “licentious press”  in his reply to the Memorialists on 
bushranging.
856This use of the term by Chief Justice Pedder in sentencing Mr Robertson 
suggests the judge was id idem with the Lieutenant Governor, a point made by Alex 
Castles (2007) who notes that Lieutenant Governor Arthur and Chief Justice Pedder were 
close in political temperaments, and the judge was an ally of the Lieutenant Governor.
857 
The Lieutenant Governor and Chief Justice had ample opportunity to develop proximate 
political temperaments considering that the Chief Justice had a seat on both the Executive 
and Legislative Councils until 1835. It was in that year that Chief Justice Pedder resigned 
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his seat on the Executive Council in light of the Secretary of State’s declaration in 
Parliament that the legislative and executive offices were incompatible with the proper 
functions of a judge.
858 
 
Chief  Justice Pedder states  his views on the Van Diemen’s  Land press, labelling it 
“licentious” and “degrade”’ and one of the worst features in the colony.
859 Nevertheless, 
the judge denies being anti-press insisting that he would support a free and independent 
press.
860 The judge probably meant a press which was not critical of the government. 
 
Mr Robertson was sentenced to imprisonment for twelve  months,
861  to begin at the 
expiration of the current sentences, together with a fine of fifty pounds, and to be further 
imprisoned until the fine be paid.
862 The sentence and sentencing tirade can be seen as a 
sad example of misuse and abuse of power by those with power. 
 
This matter in this case exemplifies how people in positions of administrative power 
appropriated government materials for their own use. The decision reveals the power of 
the administration to justify this use. Those with administrative power, through 
manipulation of the law, ensured they retained power. It could well be termed the Rule of 
the Van Diemen’s Land Administration, as distinct from the Rule of Law. 
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13.  R v Murray,  Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, 25 and 29 September 
1835,
863 Chief Justice Pedder and Puisne Judge Montagu on the bench 
 
This was an application to the court by the Solicitor General to show why a Criminal 
Information should not be filed against Mr Robert Lathrop Murray for publishing a gross, 
scandalous and malicious libel in the Tasmanian of 18 September 1835. The alleged libel 
is  contained in a letter, dated 14 September 1835, purportedly written by Mr Sly, a 
bootmaker. Mr Sly states that between six and eight months ago, he put in a tender to 
make boots for six employees of the Town Surveyor at the price of two pounds per pair 
of boots. At the time, the Town Surveyor owed Mr Sly money. The Town Surveyor 
offered to pay Mr Sly two pounds and ten shillings per pair two pounds and ten shillings 
per pair because, “They have always charged me two pounds and ten shillings per pair 
and I see no reason why you should not have that sum, as well as anybody else.” 
 
The letter is introduced with a remark upon the appropriate standard of behaviour 
expected of those holding public office, that is:  
 
“Every public functionary is bound to do his utmost, for the protection of the 
public property, especially for that portion of it which comes within his own 
cognisance. Has the Town Surveyor done this? We could mention some instances 
of a rather equivocal nature. One will suffice. The individual with whom it 
occurred, shall speak for himself.”
864 
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The inference is that the Town Surveyor is not sufficiently careful with public funds. Mr 
Sly confirms the inference with his statement that while his asking price for the boots was 
two pounds per pair, the Town Surveyor insisted he be paid two pounds and ten shillings 
per pair. This additional expenditure which the Town Surveyor required to be paid by the 
Government for the boots, supports the inference that the Surveyor is needlessly 
incurring unnecessary expenditure for the government. That, in itself, suggests an 
appalling misuse of Government funds. However, that is not the end of the inference. Mr 
Sly’s letter continues:  
 
“The Town Surveyor was at this time, in my debt, and I had sent in my bill. He 
asked me, “Would two pounds pay me for the boots.” I said “Yes”. He said, “I 
may as well put something in your pocket, as not; they have always charged me 
two pounds, ten shillings, and I see no reason why you should not have that sum, 
as well as any body else.” I thanked him kindly.”
865 
 
This confirms the inference that the Town Surveyor increased the price of the boots in 
order to offset the money he, himself, owed to Mr Sly. Thus, as well as inferring that the 
Town Surveyor is squandering public money by increasing the price of the boots, it is 
open to the reader to surmise  that the Town Surveyor is inappropriately using 
Government funds to pay his own debts. The Solicitor General’s application to show 
cause why a gross, scandalous and malicious libel should not be filed against Mr R. L. 
Murray can well be understood.  In court on 25 September 1835, Mr Sly’s letter was 
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read, together with affidavits of Mr Sly and Mr A. Murray. This article which appeared in 
the Tasmanian of 18 September 1835 is then published in the report of the case in the 
Tasmanian of 2 October 1835 – thus the content is repeated to the public. This technique 
is a clever way of legally republishing an alleged libel.  
  
The Chief Justice’s comments are revealing in regard to the bench’s notion of the 
elements of criminal libel.  The Chief Justice stated that for a matter to be considered 
appropriate for prosecution as a criminal libel, the sole question to be determined was 
whether or not the publication was done with a malicious intent. However, in his 
determination of this sole issue, the judge showed that there were actually three criteria 
which had to be decided. For example, His Honour concludes that the publisher had:  
 
•  merely fulfilled his duty as a public writer,  
•  the affidavits were evidence indicating that Mr R. L. Murray had endeavoured to 
determine the real truth before publication, and  
•  the publication had not been made with any malicious intent.  
Puisne Judge Montagu concurred with the Chief Justice.  
 
On 29 September 29 1835, their Honours gave their considered decision that the facts did 
not support a criminal prosecution for libel.  From this judicial determination, then, it can 
be inferred that the essential elements to ground a prosecution for criminal libel were: 
 
•  publication for a reason other than public duty, 286 
 
•  no evidence to show that the publisher had investigated the truth of the content 
before publication, and 
•  the publication was made with malicious intent. 
In this  case, Chief Justice Pedder considered whether there was any evidence of the 
publisher’s investigation of the truth of the content prior to publication. When evidence 
was tendered to show there had been investigation of the  truth  of the content, this 
established to the bench’s satisfaction that the publication was not of malicious intent. 
The fact that the bench considered whether the publisher had investigated the truth of the 
content introduces a question about an underlying criterion: is the publication of truthful 
content, with evidence to show there had been proper investigation of its truth, sufficient 
to negate any suspicion of malicious intent in publication?  Further, the Solicitor 
General’s application was for a rule to show cause why a gross, scandalous and malicious 
libel should not be prosecuted against Mr Murray. The Court, however, chose to ignore 
the “gross and scandalous” elements.  
 
In piecing together the underlying components for this change of heart by the bench 
about the elements of libel, it is worthwhile considering the backgrounds of the people 
involved in the case. Mr Alexander Murray was Town Surveyor and Mr  R. L. Murray 
was the editor who published the letter from Mr Sly. Mr Murray, the editor, was at this 
time  married to a woman who was the daughter of people with whom Lieutenant 
Governor Arthur appeared to have a friendly relationship.    A further point  to be 
remembered is that Lieutenant Governor Arthur and Chief Justice Pedder had a close 287 
 
friendship, as revealed in continuing correspondence over many years.
866 They were also 
both being members of the Legislative and Executive Councils.
867 Mr R. L. Murray had 
ceased his attacks on Lieutenant Governor Arthur and was now deeply immersed in 
bringing freemasonry to Hobart Town.  
 
It is, therefore, plausible, taking into consideration the colonial community where power 
rested in a few who were known to each other, that the court manipulated the criteria in 
order to protect Mr R. L. Murray. The final sentence in the Tasmanian’s report of the 
case is difficult to reconcile with the court’s finding there was no malice in publication. 
For example, 
 
“Deep as have been the injuries we have received at the hands of Mr A. Murray, 
we should scorn, maliciously, to present them.”
868 
That concluding sentence strongly suggests that the Tasmanian’s publisher, Mr R. L. 
Murray, did have a motive for malice against Mr A. Murray, the Town Surveyor.  The 
Tasmanian’s use of italics for the word “maliciously” could well be seen as rubbing salt 
into the wound of Mr A. Murray. It also emphasises the sole criterion which the court 
apparently held, in this case, as essential to be met to ground a criminal prosecution for 
libel, that is, publication with ‘malicious intent.
869  
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The decision in this case demonstrates how the court manipulated decisions in order to 
protect those who were in favour with the administrative hierarchy. In previous criminal 
libel matters, intention, truth and research before publication were considered irrelevant 
in determining whether a case had been made out. In previous cases the act of publication 
was the sole criterion for the defendant to be found guilty of criminal libel. In this 
instance, however, because the defendant had an association with those who held 
positions of administrative power in the colony, the judges stage-managed the criteria in 
order to decide in his favour. This case exemplifies an arbitrary practice of justice where 
the Rule of Law succumbed to the Rule of the Administration. 
 
14. Summation of the data from the selected Supreme Court criminal libel cases 
 
The summation of the data from the selected Supreme Court criminal libel cases is shown 
in the following figure:  
 
CASE NAME   LIBEL CONTENT  OUTCOME  AWARD 





Labeled LG Arthur ‘Gideonite of 
tyrrany’ & referred to punishment 
of Colonel Bradley in the 
Honduras & LG Arthur’s criticism 
of the missionaries ill treatment of 
& the missionaries’ response 
The jury found 
the defendant 
guilty but did 
not specify 
counts 
Retrial because the jury 
failed to identify the 
counts 
R v Bent (No 2), 1 
August 1825
871 
Administrators misuse public 
money, receive excessive salaries 
& men in public office have no 
talent 
The jury found 
the defendant 
guilty on all 
counts 
Imprisoned for 3 
months, pay a fine of 
£200 and recognizances 
of good behavior of 
£200 and two sureties in 
£100 each. 
 
R v Bent  15 April 
1826
872  –  the return to 
court of RvBent (No 1) 
Labelled LG Arthur ‘Gideonite of 
tyrrany’ & referred to punishment 
of Colonel Bradley in the 
The jury found 
the defendant 
guilty on all 
Imprisonment for 3 
months, to commence 
when his current 
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for a retrial 
 
Honduras & & LG Arthur’s 
criticism of the missionaries’ ill 
treatment of & the missionaries’ 
response 
counts  sentence expired, to pay 
a further fine of £100 
and to be imprisoned 
until the fine be paid. 
R v Bent, 15 May 
1827
873 
Imputed improper motives to  LG 
Arthur in charging Australia 
passengers Head money tax & 
stated LG Arthur paid Col Sec 
Thomas 6/6 more for wheat &   
other farmers5/0 
The jury found 
the defendant 
guilty on both 
counts 
Recognizances of £100 
and two sureties of £50 
each to appear at a later 
date for sentencing
874. 









R v Gregson (1832) 2-3 





convicts/employees against their 
masters 
Not guilty  Not guilty 
R at the prosecution of 
J.T.Gellibrand v 




Corrupt behaviour of named 
government officers; “Colonel 
Archer can always strike without 
shewing  his hand or weapon, 
when it suits him to conceal them. 
And he can always find an 




Guilty on the 
5
th  count, that 
is, of the 
publication on 





Mr Gregson was 
required to bail himself 
for £200, with Mr 
Meredith and Captain 
Glover providing £100 
each. 
Subsequently fined £80 
-paid by public 
subscription
879  
R v Browne (No 1) 




The libel referred to the criminal 
flogging to death of a man at the 
Prisoners’ Barracks  
 
Not guilty  Not guilty 




The same article as above, 
criticised the Colonial Authorities, 
in a Christian country, for 
allowing a man  to be flogged to 
death AND 
The article mentioned a ‘rumour’ 
that a bribe had been in operation 
Not guilty  Not guilty 
R v Robertson (No 1),   
9 March 1835
882   
   
 
The coupling of three libels:  
*the high price of justice, in 
particular Mr Rowland’s fees;  
*  Lieutenant Governor’s using 
government hay to feed his own 
cattle; 
Guilty   *£20 fine and 
imprisonment for 1 
month for libelling 
lawyer Rowlands
883 
*£120 fine and 
imprisonment for 8 
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* Lieutenant Governor’s 
“dishonourable and unworthy 
conduct” in inappropriately 
altering the date on a Deed of land 
months after the 
expiration of the first 
sentence and further 
imprisonment until the 
fine be paid for accusing 
the Lieutenant Governor  
of feeding his own 
animals with Crown 
hay
884 and  
*£60 fine and 
imprisonment for 4 
months and continuing 
imprisonment until the 
fine be paid for accusing 
the Lieutenant Governor 
of “dishonourable and 
unworthy conduct”  in 
altering the date of the 
land grant Deed
885. 




Captain Montagu used Crown 
materials  and labourers to build 
his own house 
Guilty  12 months’ gaol
887  to 
begin at the expiration 
of the current sentences, 
together with a fine of 
50 pounds, and to be 
further imprisoned until 
the fine be paid
888. 




A letter stating the Town Surveyor 
paid off his personal debts by 
using Government money through 
the increase of tender prices 
Not guilty  Not guilty 
 
Figure (XLlll): Summation of data from the selected Supreme Court criminal libel cases 
 
15. Underlying values, and power and powerless polarities 
 
The following figure shows the values, power and powerless polarities identified in the 
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CASE NAME  ARBITER  VALUE  POWER & 
POWERLESSNESS 





CJ Pedder and a military 
jury 
LG’s harsh treatment of 
subordinates;  
 
misuse of position 
Judicial reliance upon 
English legal precedent  
R v Bent (No 2), 1 August 
1825
891 
CJ Pedder on the Bench 
and military jury of 7 men 
 
Misuse of public money 
by unnamed officials –  
 
credit worthiness   
Powerlessness of the 
incarcerated defendant 
R v Bent 15 April 1826
892 
–  the return to court of 
RvBent (No 1) for a retrial 
 
CJ Pedder on the Bench 
and military jury of 7 men 
 
LG’s harsh treatment of 
subordinates;  
 
misuse of position 
 
Power of the judge to 
influence the jury by his 
advocacy in summing up; 
powerlessness of the 
dissatisfied VDL litigant 
subjected to a seemingly 
totalitarian legal system  
R v Bent, 15 May 1827
893, 
CJ Pedder on the bench 
 
CJ Pedder on the bench 
 
LG’s credit worthiness eg 
improper use of Head Tax; 
 
misuse of position  
 
Powerlessness of an 
unrepresented defendant 
 
The evidence disclosed the 
power of unsupervised 
officials to abuse a system 
designed to raise state 
funds 
R v Montagu, , CJ Pedder 








Wrong forum  The court will not 
entertain actions in the 
inappropriate jurisdiction 
Powerlessness of the 
plaintiff to bring an action 
in an inappropriate forum 
 
R v Gregson (1832) 2-3 
November and 8 
November 1832
896  before 
CJ Pedder and a jury 
 
CJ Pedder and a jury 
 
Secret evidence gathering; 
 
misuse of position 
Power of those with money 
to pervert the course of   
justice; 
 
Powerlessness of a convict 





Vulnerability of an 
overseer of convicts to 
fabricated corrupt charges 
against him based upon 
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evidence obtained through 
bribery 
 
R at the prosecution of 
J.T.Gellibrand v Gregson, 
Supreme 3 November 
1832, CJ Pedder on the 
bench
897 and a sworn jury 
 
CJ Pedder on the bench
898 
and the same jury sworn 
for the preceding case 
 
Corrupt behaviour of 
named officials, officials;  
 
misuse of position 
Powerlessness of self-
represented litigants in a 
criminal prosecution in a 
colony where there were 
few legal practitioners; 
Power of the legal 
fraternity to diminish a 
defendant’s case by ‘not 
being available’ to provide 
legal assistance 
R v Browne (No 1) 1833, 
14 August 1833, Judge 
Montagu on the bench
899 
 




Harsh punishment of 
convicts by unnamed 
officials;  
 
abuse of power 
The court will not 
entertain a criminal 
prosecution against an 
unidentified writer; 
R v Browne (No 2), 
Supreme Court of Van 
Diemen’s Land, 14 August 








Harsh punishment of 
convicts motivated by 
bribery by unnamed 
officials;  
 
misuse of position 
Powerlessness of criminal 
prosecutor to prosecute an 
individual for writing a 
libel without disclosing the 
original manuscript; a 
copy is not sufficient for a 
criminal prosecution. 
 
R v Robertson (No 1),  9 
March 1835
903   
 
CJ Pedder on the bench 
and a civil jury.  The 
names of the jurymen are 
published: W.W.Barrow, 
Esq., retired officer: 
H.J.Emmett, sen. Esq., 
Government officer; 
Arthur Davis, Esq. Half-
pay RN; Andrew Crombie, 
Esq. JP, merchant; John 
Boyes, Esq. merchant; 
George Bilton, Esq, 
merchant; John Bell, Esq., 
JP; George Watson Esq 
JP, merchant; George 
Gatehouse, Esq. merchant; 
H.J.Emmett, Esq., jun., 
Government officer; John 
Lee Archer, Esq., 
Government  officer;  
Michael Vicary, Esq., 
Unfairness of high costs of 
justice; corrupt behaviour 
of LG in using government 
property for personal ends 
eg using government hay 
to feed his own cattle;  
 
misuse of position  
The power of the court to 
punish harshly –  by fine 
and imprisonment until 
fine is paid; 
 
Powerlessness of the press 
to write critical sentiments 
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retired officer.  
 
R v Robertson  (No 2) 7 
April 1835
904  
CJ Pedder and J Montagu   Named officials using 
government property for 
own ends eg Montagu 
using government stone & 
government labour to 
build his own house; 
  
misuse of position 
 Powerlessness of the 
indigent, imprisoned and 
unrepresented defendant to 
take appropriate defensive 
legal action: 
 
Power of the court to put a 
defendant in a position of 
powerlessness by refusing 
legal assistance and by 
disregarding procedural 
fairness 




CJ Pedder and Montagu J 
906 
 
Unnamed officials using 
government money;  
 
credit worthiness  
Powerlessness of a 
plaintiff to gain the 
Crown’s assistance to 
protect his reputation from 
libeling by the press when 
the court applies the 
subjective criterion of 
malicious intent  to the 
alleged libel: “… 
 
The court’s potential 
power for corrupt 
decision-making is 
enhanced by the   
introduction of the 
subjective element 
‘malicious intent’ as the 
indicia for criminal libel  
Figure (XLlV): Values, power, powerlessness identified in the selected Supreme Court criminal libel 
cases 
 
16. The species of defamation 
 
Of the twelve selected cases considered from the Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court for 
criminal libel, the case of R v Bent (No.1) 26
 July 1825
907 returned to court as R v Bent, 
15 April 1826
908 for a retrial, because the first jury did not specify the counts for which 
                                                 
904 The True Colonist, 17 April 1835 and 15 May 1835 
905 Tasmanian, 2 October 1835 
906 ibid 
907 Hobart Town Gazette, 29 July 1825 
908 Colonial Times, 15 April 1826 294 
 
the defendant was found guilty.  The case of R v Montagu, 22 June 1829
909 was brought 
in the wrong forum and subsequently dismissed.  
 
Thus, the data from ten cases are considered. Some of these cases had multiple causes. Of 
these ten cases, there were three which defamed the Lieutenant Governor. These three 
cases are: R v Bent (No. 1) 26 July 1825
910 returned to court as R v Bent, 15 April 1826
911 
for retrial; R v Bent, 15 May 1827;
912R v Robertson(No. 1), 9 March 1835.
913 In each of 
these three cases that name and attack the Lieutenant Governor, the defendant is found 
guilty. 
 
Aside from the direct and named attacks upon the Lieutenant Governor, three of the total 
selected criminal libel cases name and attack a government official. These three cases 
are: R v Robertson (No. 1), 9 March 1835,
914  R v Robertson (No. 2), 7 April 1835,
915 and 
R at the prosecution of J. T. Gellibrand v Gregson, 3 November 1832.
916 In each of the 
three cases which name the public official attacked, the defendant is found guilty. 
 
Of the total selected criminal libel cases, four attack unnamed government officials, these 
cases attack men who hold particular administrative roles, without identifying the specific 
person by name.  These four cases are: R v Bent (No. 2), 1 August 1825,
917 R v Browne 
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(No. 1), 14 August 1833,
918 R v Browne (No. 2), 14 August 1833,
919 and  R v Murray, 25 
and 29 September 1835.
920  
 
In three of these cases which attack an unnamed government official, the defendant is 
found not guilty. The exception is R v Bent (No. 2), 1 August 1825
921, where, although 
the officials attacked are not specifically identified by name, they are nevertheless 
identifiable from description, one being the Lieutenant Governor himself, for example, 
“our sovereign’s representative.” Thus, in R v Bent (No. 2), 1 August 1825, the defendant 
is found guilty. 
 





Figure (XLV): Illustration of the attacks on officials, including Lieutenant Governor   
 
If the Lieutenant Governor is included in the number of cases in which the government 
official who was attacked is named, there are six cases in which a government official 
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was attacked for the performance of his public duties. In each of those instances, the 




Figure (XLVl): Comparison of the number of attacks on named government officials, including the 
Lieutenant Governor and unnamed government officials 
 
 
Thus the  data  generated by the selected cases indicate that in court proceedings for 
criminal libels: 
 
•  it  was more likely that the defendant attacked a government official’s 
performance of his official duties than his personal qualities.  
The data also indicates that: 
 
•  when the identity of the public official being criticized was withheld in the 















•  when the identity of the government official being criticized was disclosed in the 
publication, the court found the defendant guilty.  
This finding is shown in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure (XLVll): Comparison of the number of not guilty decisions and guilty decisions cases, with 
cases on specific but unnamed government officials, and named government officials, including the 
Lieutenant Governor 
 
This finding is indicative of the fact that in the penal colony of Van Diemen’s Land, 
administrators were developing regulations, which the government officials were 
required to implement. Also, many of the English community in the colony resented the 
regulations and the actions of those who were implementing them. As well, the potential 
for corruption through connivance of government officials, where the power was in the 
hands of an intimate few, opened the way for improper practice.  
 
It can be further inferred from the figures that it is the disclosure of the identity of the 
public official which influenced the court to make a finding of guilt, as distinct from the 
















17. The values supported by the court 
 
As  mentioned previously, of the eleven  selected cases considered from the Supreme 
Court for criminal libel, the case of R v Bent (No. 1) 26 July 1825
922 returned to court as 
R v Bent, 15 April 1826
923for a retrial, because the first jury did not specify the counts for 
which the defendant was found guilty, while he case of  R v Montagu, 22 June 1829
924 
was brought in the wrong forum and subsequently dismissed. Consequently, the 
withdrawal of these two cases from the eleven, results in the generation of data from 9 
cases. Some of those nine cases have multiple causes, and these are identified in the 
figure below:  
 
 
CASE NAME  SPECIFIC ATTACKS  VALUES  




3 attacks: unnamed but so 
clearly described as to be 
recognizable government 
officers: 
*misused money and 




2 credit worthiness,  
1 misuse of position 
R v Bent, 15 April 1826
926 
– the return to court of R 
v Bent (No. 1) for a retrial 
 
3 attacks: on LG Arthur  
*labeled a Gideonite  of 
tyranny; 
* his harsh treatment of 
Colonel Bradley; 
*and the reply by the 
missionaries to LG Arthur’s 
criticism of missionaries 
treatment of slaves;  
3 misuse of position 
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R v Bent, 15 May 1827
927 
 
2 attacks: on LG Arthur 
*the misuse of the Head tax  
*the  arbitrary payment of 
wheat; 
2 credit worthiness  
R v Gregson, 2-3 






*gathering  evidence in 
secret from convicts:  
1 misuse of position; 
 
R at the prosecution of J. 








1 misuse of position 




1 attack:  
*convict flogged to death 
 
1misuse of position  




2 attacks: unnamed 
government officials 
*convict flogged to death 
and  
*rumours of bribery 
 
1misuse of position 1credit 
worthiness  
R v Robertson  (No.  1), 9 
March 1835
932   
 
3 attacks:  
*named lawyer’s 
exhorbitant legal fees,   
*LG Arthur’s use of 
government hay for private 
purposes,  
*LG Arthur’s improper 
changing of a deed date  
2 credit worthiness 
1 misuse of position 




1 attack: named 
Government official  
*use of government 
labourers and building 
materials to construct  a 
private residence 
 
1 misuse of position 
R v Murray, 25 and 29 
September 1835
934 
1 attack: named government 
officer,  
1 credit worthiness 
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  *use of government funds to 
pay for a private debt 
 
 
Figure (XLVlll): Values supported by the Supreme Court in the selected criminal libel cases 
 
The values attacked in the nine cases can be located within two clusters:  
 
•  credit worthiness, when the value attacked involved misuse of government money 
or government goods,  and 
•  misuse  of  official administrative position, that is,  when the official attacked 
seemed to exercise his official authority for purposes outside the jurisdiction for 
which it had been granted, or failed to exercise his official authority for the 
purposes for which it had been granted. 
In all, there were eighteen attacks in the selected cases. Of these, ten attacks were upon 
credit worthiness and eight were upon misuse of official administrative position. Thus the 
predominant value attacked was credit worthiness. 
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The decisions reveal that when the Crown alleged the values under attack in the libel 
were:  
 
•  credit worthiness, and 
•  performance of official tasks by a government administrator, 
the court protected the government administrator.   
 
 
The court consistently rejected hostility to the government and criticism of named 
government officers. 
 
The figures support the conclusion that a government official’s performance of his 
administrative tasks were: 
 
•  a vulnerable aspect of reputation,   
•  a likely quality of a government official to be attacked, and 
•  a likely subject for criminal libel actions,  




In each of the ten selected criminal libel cases which went to trial, the Crown sought the 
assistance of the court to protect reputation. The court found for the Crown in six of the 302 
 
ten cases. In four cases the court found for the defendant. In two of those cases, the 
government officer was not named and not identifiable, that is in R v Browne (No. 1), 14 
August 1833
935 and R v Browne (No. 2), 14 August 1833.
936 In these two cases, both on 
the same facts, the defendant had written about the flogging of a convict which had 
resulted in the convict’s death. It was the practice in Van Diemen’s Land to have convicts 
officially appointed as convict flagellators, and it was their task to inflict the whipping 
penalties. Thus it would have been a convict who was actually inflicting the punishment 
which killed his fellow convict. Castles (2007)
937 informs that: 
 
“Top officials normally stood by to ensure the knotted cat o’nine tails was applied 
with diligence by those appointed to ply the brutal craft.” 
 
Thus, it can be inferred that it would have been of little concern to the administrators that 
a convict flagellator had misused his position and a convict had subsequently died. 
 
In the case where the official was not named yet the court found for the defendant, was 
the case of R v Gregson (1832) 2-3 November and 8 November 1832.
938  In that case the 
defendant criticized the practice of secret evidence gathering from convicts by 
government officials and employers.  It could have been to the advantage of the 
administration to agree that secret evidence-gathering was improper in that it created a 
façade to the colony that the administration was honest. 
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In the other case where the official was named yet the court found for the defendant, was 
the case of R v Murray, 25 and 29 September 1835.
939 In that case the court developed 
the criterion of proper investigation of the truth of the matter before publication to prove 
that there had not been an intentional malicious publication by the defendant. This 
decision, however, has the shadow of the possible relationship of the family of the 
publisher’s wife with Lieutenant Governor Arthur, and the possible influence of that 
relationship upon the court. This finding is depicted in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure (L): Comparison of findings for the Crown defendants in the selected criminal libel cases 
 
Punishments in six cases consisted of considerable fines ranging from twenty pounds to 
two hundred pounds, together with periods of imprisonment set between one month and 
one year. The serious consequence of the fines, however, was that the court insisted that 
the defendant remain in prison until the fines be paid. Also, the terms of imprisonment 
inflicted for each charge were to be served separately, as distinct from concurrently. Thus 
the effect was that a convicted defendant could be incarcerated indefinitely. The 
                                                 














advantage of this consequence for the administration was that the person was prevented 
from publicly criticizing the government, being imprisoned.  
 
The highest fines were awarded for libels on named government officers, in particular 
libels of the Lieutenant Governor. These high fines were one hundred and two hundred 
pounds, and cumulatively up to four hundred pounds. Doubtless the strong message sent 
to the community was that criticism of government officers in the performance of their 
official duties would not be tolerated. They also emphasize the power of the 
administrative officers, in particular, the judiciary. 
 
 
The jurisprudence of these sampled cases supports the premise that: 
•  the court exercised its  power to protect the reputation of a government officer in 
the performance of his public and official duties through punitive measures such 
as fines and imprisonment, and 
•  the court developed  subjective criteria for the determination of criminal liability 
in defamation.  
 
The subjectivity revealed in the decisions for the selected criminal libel cases provides a 
foundation for the conclusion that the Rule of Law was not adhered to in the Supreme 
Court of Van Diemen’s Land. The decisions reveal a strong bias towards the protection 
of the government administrators. The judiciary supported the administrative officers and 
punished those who were bold enough to publicly offer criticism. The judiciary’s support 305 
 
of the government administrators resulted in their arbitrary implementation of established 
legal principles, English legislation and time-honoured precedent from English common 
law. It seems appropriate to label the practice of justice at that time and in the selected 





































CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter considers aspects of jurisprudence from the theorists and attempts to locate 
the findings of the discussion of the Van Diemen’s Land cases within the values, power 
and powerlessness paradigm. 
 
Based upon the decisions in the selected cases discussed and the harsh punishments 
inflicted on defendants convicted of defamation counts from the Bench of Magistrates at 
Port Dalrymple to the Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land, between 1805 and 1835, it 
could be said that Jeremy Bentham’s
940 (1748-1832) view of the way judges make law 
operated in Van Diemen’s Land between the years 1805 and 1835. For example, 
Bentham acknowledges that judges make the common law and then proceeds to state 
how, in his opinion, judges actually do make common law. He writes: 
 
“Do you know how they make it? Just as a man makes law for his dog. When 
your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and 
then beat him for it. This is the way you make laws for your dog: and this is the 
way judges make laws for you and me.”
941  
 
Surely the defendant editor in several of the above cases, Mr Robertson, would have 
agreed with Bentham’s sentiments:  incarcerated, denied access to legal assistance and 
powerless to appropriately address the charges against him for publishing information 
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about  named  public officials  which revealed such officials as having misused their 
positions.
942 The determinations of the Bench of Magistrates and the Van Diemen’s Land 
Supreme Court in the selected cases discussed, reveal that so far as the legal rights of the 
public and press alike, criticism of named government officials in the course of their 
official duties, would not be tolerated.  
 
While that was the seemingly blanket view, nevertheless, the court showed a willingness 
to make an exception when it chose so to do. For example, the Supreme Court introduced 
the subjective element of ‘malicious intent’  as the essential criterion to ground a 
prosecution for criminal libel in R v Murray, 25 and 29 September 1835.
943  As the 
criterion could not be satisfied, the defendant was acquitted.  Comment in the case reports 
reveals that this criterion could capriciously be abandoned in Van Diemen’s Land. For 
example, the requirement that the defamed government official be identified by name 
before a criminal libel prosecution could succeed, is not followed in R v Murray, 25 and 
29 September 1835,
944  thereby revealing an inconsistency. In that case although the 
official was identified by name the prosecution did not succeed because a new criterion 
was added: ‘malicious intention’. 
 
It could be argued that such apparent capriciousness is similar to the ‘free law’ movement 
freirechtsbewegung, established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in 
Germany and France.
945 The courts in those two European countries, as in Van Diemen’s 
                                                 
942 R v Robertson  (No. 1), Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land,  9 March 1835 
943 Tasmanian, 2 October 1835 
944 ibid 
945 J. M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 359-363  308 
 
Land in the early nineteenth century, used local contextual knowledge of society, together 
with social consciousness, to fill in the apparent gaps in the law. In Van Diemen’s Land 
the skeleton of English common law and applicable statute law formed the frame upon 
which the colony’s law of defamation would be established. However, the Van Diemen’s 
Land decisions in the selected cases indicate that the court wanted security and stability. 
The administrators had to contend with the ebb and flow oscillations of a colony which 
barely knew itself. On an island, thousands of ocean miles away from the ‘mother’ 
country, the administrators in the ‘infant’ colony were likely to bend the law to discipline 
the ‘child.’ This resulted in arbitrary decision-making, with the court frequently entering 
into disparaging and derogatory denigration of  the parties who came before it. Such 
arbitrariness resulted in animosity towards those in administrative positions of power in 
the colony. The decisions reveal that those who dispensed the law ensured they protected 
their own reputations by defaming and vilifying those who dared to criticised them.   
 
Thus, it can be suggested that the reason for the decisions of Deputy Judge Advocate 
Edward Abbott in the Lieutenant Governor’s Court being accepted by the community is 
that they were based upon the constant premise that a person’s reputation was not to be 
damaged by slanderous words. The plaintiffs in the selected cases who took their plight 
to the Lieutenant Governor’s Court were confident that this long-established doctrine 
would be adhered to by the court. They were not disappointed. Regardless of the 
pressures of the context of Van Diemen’s Land, Deputy Judge Advocate Abbott’s 
decisions reflected the established premise that a person’s reputation  was not to be 
damaged by the slanderous words of another. Similarly, it can be said that the Rule of 309 
 
Law was applied in the Lieutenant Governor’s Court, with the reputations of all plaintiffs 
being respected equally, regardless of whether they were male or female, private citizens 
or business men, or public officials in the exercise of their administrative functions.   
 
On the other hand, when Judge Baron Field visited Van Diemen’s Land from Sydney for 
the first sitting of the Supreme Court in its civil jurisdiction in the island, His Honour had 
a different perspective. The judge reprobated against bringing complaints of slander to 
court. His Honour seemed to assume that slandering was normal and expected in a small 
community, and while he deprecated this behaviour, he also warned citizens not to bring 
cases to court based upon mere verbal insults. It is as if Judge Baron Field accepts the 
inevitability of verbal denigration. However, this judicial attitude is inconsistent with  the 
Rule of Law, where all persons are deemed equal before the law, whether holding 
administrative positions in the colony or not.  
 
The  selected decisions  from the Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land consistently 
identify the harm caused by defamation, be it slander or libel, in that it brings discredit to 
the reputation of an individual and society’s peace of mind is disturbed. However, the 
decisions also show that the court’s sympathy was more readily extended to individuals 
who were defamed in the exercise of their official administrative roles, and the peace of 
mind which was disturbed was that of the administration, rather than the peace of the 
ordinary private community. Thus, it may well have been from such a perspective that 
contemporary rules in operation in England were regarded by the English administrators 
on the ground in colonial Van Diemen’s Land, as being relevant and operational in the 310 
 
island.  Certainly the obligations to obey and consent to obey are revealed in the 
consequences of the administrative decisions of the Dalrymple Bench of Magistrates. 
However, the Supreme Court decisions reveal that the court manipulated the obligations 
differently for different people in the colony. Such manipulation was contrary to the Rule 
of Law which requires that rules and obligations are constant and framed for the whole 
community of men, as distinct from some and not others.
946  
 
Jonathon Crowe  (2009) identifies  law as a set of social rules, normally accepted as 
binding, whose purpose is to promote the common good.
947 In colonial Van Diemen’s 
Land the evolution of legal standards can be seen as the determination of what was ‘right’ 
as distinct from what was ‘wrong’ for the administration and the administrators. Those 
with official positions of power sought to maintain their power and control over the 
populace. Thus, the Rule of Law was replaced by a regime which can be identified as the 
Rule of the Administration.  
 
The impact of the practice of arbitrary justice meant that people who were not from the 
administration were subject to heavy fines, imprisonment and physical punishment. There 
was social injustice. For example, the cases where the defamed plaintiffs had their 
financial affairs made public in court, did little to implement social justice for them. Not 
all people in Van Diemen’s Land were similarly powerful or powerless. For example, in 
Van Diemen’s Land between  1805-1835 absolute power rested with the Lieutenant 
Governor, whose penultimate power over human beings  extended to signing death 
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warrants. As the selected libel and slander cases show, the Lieutenant Governor was 
especially vulnerable to accusations of tyranny because in order to administer the colonial 
experiment he had virtually absolute power.
948 
  
The judges and magistrates, who determined penalties, be they fines, imprisonment or 
physical torture, also were at the apex of the power structure. Such people had the power 
to alter the state of a person’s life by their decisions. Men holding administrative 
decisions determined where others would work and the type of work they would do. Men 
who had received land grants were provided with convict labourers, over whom they 
wielded enormous power, including the provision of food and bedding. Although under 
the convict assignment system farmers were not permitted to punish convicts personally, 
the magistrates were given such power. By 1825 they could order unspecified lashes 
providing life and limb were not endangered.
949 
 
Traders, too, were in a very strong position. They could pursue economic self-interest and 
had no hesitation in pressuring London to achieve their own ends.
950 However, as an 
individual’s power, prestige and wealth increased,  so too did their vulnerability to 
defamation attacks increase. Thus they were criticised in action and words. For example, 
six armed bushrangers, including the infamous Michael Howe, fired the harvest of the 
government mineralogist and severe magistrate A.W.H. Humphrey, in May 1815. They 
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The selected Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court libel and criminal libel cases reveal that 
power and disparity became increasingly polarised.
952Manning Clark (1993) posits this 
alienation of the powerless from those with power in his comment that “the governor, 
military, civil officers, chaplains, magistrates, superintendents, overseers believed, one 
and all, that physical terror was the effective restraint.”
953 Certainly the decisions in the 
defamation cases selected for discussion in this study support the identification of that 
polarity. It was the government officers ‘on the ground’ in the island who had the power. 
The powerless were, more often than not, the  vanquished respondents who suffered 
severe penalties of whippings, incarceration and fines imposed by those in power with a 
mandate to restrain.   
 
The following chart summarises and compares the qualities protected by the various 
courts and tribunals in the cases selected and discussed in this study. The vertical axis of 
the chart contrasts the areas in which the slander, libel and criminal libel cases attacked 
individuals: personal, officials of the government in their administrative duties, 
creditworthiness, sexual propriety, and the practice of a profession. The horizontal base 
identifies the courts/tribunals and specific case causes. Left to right these are: Port 
Dalrymple Bench of Magistrates, First Supreme Court civil matter heard by Judge Baron 
                                                 
951ibid, 160, 166 
952 Jonathon Crowe,(2009),  op. cit., 90 
953 Manning Clark,  History of Australia, Michael Cathcart, (ed.), (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1993), 47 313 
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Figure (Ll): Comparison of the qualities protected by the various courts and tribunals in the cases 
selected and discussed in this study. 
 
In  libel cases,  people  holding administrative positions in Van Diemen’s Land were 
frequently libelled and defamed. In the colony such people had power of control over the 
distribution of limited essential resources, including currency, animals and food. Thus 
they had power through the positions they occupied. Their misuse of their position 

















An underlying reason for libel attacks upon the administrators could have been that such 
people were seen, by those who had been rejected by England, as representatives of that 
country. For example, the administrators were: 
 
•  appointed by the English Government,  
•  formulated and implemented rules,  
•  the rules reduced freedom of choice and 
•  the rules abridged freedom. 
On the other hand, the slander cases were predominantly attacks upon a private person’s 
credit-worthiness. This may have been fuelled by: 
 
•    the colony’s shortage of currency and  
•    the personal value held by ordinary people of being able to  pay their  
debts as they fell due.  
Some slander cases revealed attacks upon a woman’s sexual propriety. These may have 
been fuelled by: 
 
•  the predominance of men in the colony,   
•  the value of marriage to soothe the tempestuous human male, and  
•  the problem of unwanted children resulting from sexual impropriety. 315 
 
The colony’s prevailing ideology between 1805 and 1835 came from the people who held 
the highest administrative power. Their ideology emerges from the measures of 
satisfaction identifiable in the judgments, for example:  
 
•  respect for authority,  
•  credit worthiness, 
•  marriage, child-rearing, chastity  and family life, and 
•  the fruit of education.  
 
Identifiable measures of dissatisfaction revealed in the judgments and the reports of 
judgments include: 
 
•  lack of respect for authority, 
•  financial ineptness, 
•  over-indulgence in intoxicating liquor, 
•  idleness, and 
•  sexual promiscuity. 
 
The tandem application of both quantitative and qualitative methodology is this project’s 
response to the challenge of ethnographic investigation of the development of law and 
jurisprudence in the English penal colony of Van Diemen’s Land.  
 316 
 
The specific tools developed to investigate the question required originality, creativity 
and subjectivity. However, the rigorous and uniform application of the tools encouraged a 
more objective and uniform focus. The resulting data and its documentation provide the 
objective foundation required to achieve credibility for the research in both the academic 
and wider communities. The interpretation of this data provides freedom for qualitative 
dissemination of meaning, including that of visual association.  
 
Throughout the project, the aim to show the theory emerging from the data as grounded 
theory has been maintained by: 
•  the discussion of reports from newspapers and other available materials,  
•  the identification of values, power and powerlessness polarities, and  
•  the development of figures to represent the identified values, power and 
powerless polarities.  
The data results in the following identifiable values exhorted in the judgments:  
•  respect for authority, 
•  credit worthiness,  
•  marriage, child-rearing, chastity  and family life, 
•  education.  
 
The following qualities are deplored in the judgments: 
 
•  lack of respect for authority, 
•  over-indulgence in intoxicating liquor, 317 
 
•  promiscuity, and  
•  financial ineptness and credit unworthiness. 
 
The discussion of the cases supports the premise underlying the research that the context 
of the English penal colony of Van Diemen’s Land between 1805 and 1835 encouraged 
vigorous competition between the various elements of society - soldiers, convicts, free 
settlers, administrators, professionals, indigenous people and merchants. This competition 
led to an environment which fostered the desire to destroy others who were considered 
competitors, through defamation. Those who had sufficient power instituted legal action 
against their detractors in libel and slander suites. In particular, those in administrative 
positions took legal action to maintain their positions of power, authority and dominance. 
 
The decisions indicate that the Rule of Law as known in the twenty-first century was in 
eclipse in Van Diemen’s Land by the determination of those with power to maintain their 
supremacy and dominance. Individuals who were not in administrative positions were 
denied access to justice through the shrewd practices of those in positions of 
administrative power. Those in administrative positions wielded power so that they 
received special privileges or exemptions which they subsequently denied to those 
without such powers. The cases indicate that the fundamental rights of the person, 
freedom of speech and association, integral to the Rule of Law, were not equally 
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APPENDIX: DATA GENERATED FROM INVESTIGATION OF THE CASES  
 
CHAPTER THREE: PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE BENCH OF MAGISTRATES, YORKTOWN, PORT 
DALRYMPLE 
 
Proceedings of the Bench of Magistrates, Yorktown, Port Dalrymple, 9 March 1805, to investigate the conduct of 
Charles Barrington alias Hacket, on the bench Magistrates Mr Riley, J.P., and Captain A. F. Kemp, J.P.
1  
 
Samples of language basing deductions from the Proceedings against Charles Barrington 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
A former convict, in a position of authority, 
is vulnerable to improper demands made 
upon him by persons with no convict attaint 
in positions of power: “Have you, 
Barrington, any witnesses to bring forward 
any witnesses to substantiate any of the 
charges contained in the letter respecting Mr 
Mountgarrett?” “None, but I says everything 
in the letter is true”, Bench to Mr Barrington 
and his reply, 9
th March 1805 
 
An unrepresented defendant is powerless 
when confronted by collaborative testimony, 
including hearsay: “Have you heard Chas 
Barrington make use of disrespectful words 
reflecting on any officer in this colony?” 
“Yes I have heard him call…”Witness 
questioned by the bench at the request of Mr 
Mountgarrett, 9
th March 1805 
Magistrates, by the very nature of their appointment, are 
bound to punish those who publish libels reflecting upon 
the character of magistrates and those who speak 
disrespectfully of magistrates, inferred from charge sheet, 
9
th March 1805   
 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the unrepresented convict 
attaint defendant, when persons with 
administrative power act on and believe a 
free person in a position of  power  
Predominant values: 
 
Negative values of defamatory comment about free persons 
holding positions of power is identified and denounced by 
the Bench’s decision to harshly punish Charles Barrington 
 
 
Principles identified in the Proceedings against Charles Barrington 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of the unrepresented 
defendant before an inquiry which 
grounds its decisions upon 
collaborative testimony and hearsay.  
Power of bench of magistrates, with 
a conflict of interest, to make 
decisions on the guilt of an accused: 
Bench of magistrates found against 
the defendant  
 
 
Defamatory comment about free 
persons holding positions of power 
is identified and denounced without 
investigating the truth or otherwise 
of the comment: The magistrates 
sentenced the defendant to: 
*300 lashes 
*3 year’s servitude 
*an additional 2 year’s servitude 
*Lieutenant Governor removed him 
from position of Convict Overseer 
                                                 
1 Supreme Court of Van Diemen’s Land Papers, 1805-1810, 5/1160, COD, 281A, Proceedings of the Bench of 
Magistrates, Yorktown, Port Dalrymple, 9 March 1805, State Records Office, New South Wales, 21 - 28 326 
 
The Proceedings of the Bench of Magistrates, Yorktown, Port Dalrymple, 12 November 1805 to investigate the 
conduct of James Page, on the bench Magistrates Anthony Fenn Kemp, J. P., Jacob Mountgarrett, J. P., and 




Samples of language basing deductions from the Proceedings against James Page 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
An unrepresented defendant is powerless 
before a Bench of magistrates, one of whom 
is the complainant: “Proceedings before 
magistrates Kemp, Riley & Mountgarrett 
…investigating Captain Simmons offloading 
government biscuit at Mr Mountgarrett’s 
wharf”, Proceedings, 12
th November 1805 
Magistrates, by the very nature of their appointment, are 
bound to prevent dissention and trouble, thus peace in the 
community is highly valued: “…think it their duty to take 
the most decisive steps to put a stop to those proceedings 
which create dissention in the colony…”Bench decision, 
12
th November 1805  
 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the defendant when 
persons in administrative positions of power 
act on rumour and collaborative testimony:  
“…having no friends to call upon I leave 
myself entirely to the mercy of the Bench”, 





Negative values of defamatory comment about free persons 
holding administrative positions of power is identified and 
denounced by the bench’s decision to punish James Page: 
“…referring to the Minutes they see that the contemptuous 
and outrageous conduct of the prisoner before them…” 
Bench decision, 12





Principles identified in the Proceedings against James Page 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of the unrepresented 
defendant before an inquiry which 
grounds its decisions upon 
collaborative testimony and 
hearsay.  
Power of bench of magistrates, 
with a conflict of interest, to 
make decisions on the guilt of 
an accused: Bench of 




Defamatory comment about free 
persons holding positions of 
power is identified and 
denounced without investigating 
the truth or otherwise of the 
comment:  The magistrates 
sentenced the defendant to: 
*100 lashes 
*An extra year’s servitude 











                                                 
2 Supreme Court, Van Diemen’s Land Papers 1805 -1810, Bench of Magistrates, Yorktown, Port Dalrymple, 12 
November 1805, NRS 16024, 1805 -1814,  Location 5/1160, Reel 1932, COD281A&B, State Records Office, New 









Rowland Walpole Loane v William Butcher
3 
 
Samples of language of the report of Rowland Walpole Loane v William Butcher  
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Respondent refused plaintiff’s requests to 
make reparation…or to pay damages 
 
The court awarded the plaintiff £5 damages  
 
Derogatory verbal labelling in a public street 
 




Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the plaintiff when another 
person publicly attacks  his character and the 
power of the court to right a wrong 
Predominant values: 
 
Negative values of derogatory name calling in a public place 
are identified and denounced by the court’s decision to 
award £5 damages 
 
 
Principles identified in Rowland Walpole Loane v William Butcher 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of the plaintiff when 
another person publicly attacks his 
character 
Power of the court to right a 
wrong  
Derogatory verbal labelling of a 
person is unacceptable. 
 
James Doharty v Thomas Mason and Eleanor his wife
4 
 
Samples of language in the report of James Doharty v Thomas Mason and Eleanor his wife 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
There is no indication that the Defendant 
offered to make reparation or showed 
remorse to the plaintiff. 
 
The court awarded the plaintiff £16 damages  
 
Derogatory verbal labelling  - associating the  wife with a 
‘whore’   
 




Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of a person when two other 
persons physically assault and  
verbally defame the person and the power of 
the court to right a wrong 
Predominant values: 
 
Negative values of derogatory name calling in a public place 
are identified and denounced by the court’s decision to 
award sixteen pounds damages 
 
                                                 
3 Archives Office of Tasmania, Box of Lieutenant Governor’s Court of Van Diemen’s Land papers, 17 January 1820 
4 James Doharty v Thomas Mason and Eleanor his wife, Lieutenant Governor’s Court, Van Diemen’s Land, 21 
January 1820 328 
 
 
Principles identified in James Doharty v Thomas Mason and Eleanor his wife 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of a person when 
other persons verbally defame him 
or her 
The court’s power to right a 
wrong  
Derogatory name calling in a 
public place is unacceptable 
 
Charles McDonald v William Presnell 
5 
 
Samples of language of the report of Charles MacDonald v William Presnell 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
 Plaintiff’s powerlessness in the face of 
someone’s false publication of his credit 
worthiness 
 
The court awarded the complainant one 
shilling damages and costs of one shilling 
 
Disapproval for false publication that a promissory note was 
a forgery 
 





Predominant indices:  
 
Power of the court to right a wrong 
Predominant values: 
 
Negative values of false publication and failing to honour a 
promissory note are identified and denounced by the court’s 




Principles identified in Charles MacDonald v William Presnell 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of the plaintiff in the 
face of a false publication of his 
creditworthiness  
Power of the court to right a 
wrong  
False publication, in particular 
in regard to credit worthiness, is 
disapproved 
 
John McCarron v William Cook
6 
 
Samples of language of the report of John McCarron v William Cook 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Defendant is unable to prevent a public 




Approval of the proper performance of public duties by 
public officers 
 
Disapproval for verbally injuring a person’s reputation  
Predominant indices:  
 
Power of the court to uphold the reputation of 
a public officer in the proper performance of 
Predominant values: 
 
Negative value of defamation of a public officer for properly 
performing his duties are identified and denounced by the 
                                                 
5 Charles McDonald v William Presnell, 5 July 1820, Lieutenant Governor’s Court, Van Diemen’s Land, Archives 
Office of Tasmania 
6 John McCarron v William Cook, Lieutenant Governor’s Court, Van Diemen’s Land, 5 July 1820 329 
his public duties  court’s decision to award £1/0/0 damages.  
 
 
Principles identified in John McCarron v William Cook 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of a public officer 
who is verbally publicly attacked in 
the course of undertaking his public 
duties  
Power, of the court to right a 
wrong  
It was unacceptable to make 
public defamatory comments of 
a public officer in the 
undertaking of his public duties  
 
William Jennett v Richard Barker
7 
 
Samples of language of the report of William Jennett v Richard Barker 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Respondent refused complainant’s plaintiff’s 
requests to pay damages 
 
The court awarded the complainant £3/-/- 
damages and costs of a maximum £3/-/- 
 
Disapproval for false publication that Bills of Exchange 
were taken from or converted from a dead person 
 




Predominant indices:  
 
Power of the court to right a wrong 
Predominant values: 
 
Negative values of unjust and malicious publication are 
denounced by the court’s decision to award £3/-/- damages 
and costs of a maximum £3/-/- 
 
 
Principles identified in William Jennett v Richard Barker 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of person who is 
defamed by another and refuses to 
make a settlement in reparation 
outside  of court   
Power of the court to right a 
wrong 
Disapproval of maling a false 
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Samples of language of the report of the case Barker v Jennett 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Powerlessness of the plaintiff when another 
person publicly attacks  his character and the 
court believes the defendant 
 
The reporting of derogatory verbal labelling in public, is 
censured – as being liable to upset a small community: “The 
learned judge reprobated in strong terms the idea that a 
clerk or servant deserved praise for carrying to his employer 
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tails(sic) and reports of every incidental expression which he 
might hear spoken against him in moments of irritation”. 
 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
The power of the court to determine values of 




Negative values of bringing to court cases based upon tale-
telling is emphasised: “The learned judge emphatically 
counselled the people of the settlement, in such dissentions 
as small societies are most peculiarly liable to, to avoid 
bringing into a court of law suits founded like the present 
upon tale bearing”.  
 
 
Principles identified in Barker v Jennett 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of the plaintiff  
 
Court determines what is 
sufficient justification on the 
part of the defendant to excuse 
the defendant for defaming the 
plaintiff  
Servants  and employees must 
not report to their employers 
defamatory comments they 





SUPREME COURT SLANDER CASES 
 
Thomson v Clark, March 1825,
9 Chief Justice  Pedder on the bench 
 
Samples of language of the report of Thomson v Clark   
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
 
Hard-working, school-teacher  plaintiff is 
powerless against the slander of a person of 
wealth and prestige, with a hidden agenda;   
‘The court non-suited the plaintiff’.  
 
Negative values identified in the slander are: Leaving Great 
Britain in disgrace, stowing away in a vessel, intoxication, 
inability to pay debts 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
The determination of powerful colonials to 
succeed in business ventures motivates 
unprincipled behaviour towards competitors, 
per  
the plaintiff’s pleadings:  
“Mr Clark was well aware of the happy state 
and premises of Mr Thomson’s school and his 
good standing in the community in Hobart 
Town.”
10 AND  
“In 1825, Mrs Clark moved her school to a 
new  premises built as a school, by her 
husband George Carr Clark
11”.   
Predominant values: 
 
Positive values identified in Mr Thomson’s  Affidavit are: 
‘good, true, honest, just and faithful servant of Great 
Britain’ 
12 
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Principles identified in Thomson v Clark, March 1825
13 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
      James Thomson was non-suited
14 on 
the submission of the powerful 
defendant  
 
A powerful, wealthy man with an 
introduction to the colony from 
Downing Street, London, has power 
to influence others with his 
slanderous words and power to 
persuade the court 
 
 
The commercial enterprise of a 
powerful, wealthy, prestigious man 
is more valuable than that of a 
‘good, true, honest, just and faithful 




 Lucas v Copperwaith, 8 May 1833
16 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
Samples of language of the report of Lucas v Copperwaith 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
A minor is unable to take legal action to 
protect his or her reputation thus legal action 
must be taken by a parent or next friend: 
“This was an action for slander brought by 
the plaintiff to recover damages for 
slander…the plaintiff, Mr Lucas, put his son, 
a youth between 15 and 16 years of age, as 
apprentice about 6 months ago…”  
Per Tasmanian, 10 May 1833 
 
The publication of an apprenticed lad’s decision to leave an 
apprenticeship as if it were an assigned convict’s absconding 
will not be tolerated: “..the assessors under the direction of 
His Honour, found for the plaintiff,” per Tasmanian, 10 May 
1833 
 
An apprenticeship is not a  prison servitude and a free 
apprentice is entitled to leave an apprenticeship:  “..the 
assessor under the direction of His Honour, found for the 
plaintiff,” per Tasmanian, 10 May 1833 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the minor male plaintiff to 
protect his reputation when another person 
slanders him: “This was an action for slander 
brought by the plaintiff to recover damages 
for slander…the plaintiff, Mr Lucas, put his 
son, a youth between 15 and 16 years of age, 
as apprentice about 6 months ago…”  




The court will act to protect a minor who is slandered by an 
employer in the course of an apprenticeship: “…the assessor 
under the direction of His Honour, found for the plaintiff,” 
per Tasmanian, 10 May 1833 
  
The court, by its decision, is shown to distinguish between 
the rights of a free individual to leave employment and the 
liability of a convict assigned to a master as punishment 
 
Principles identified in Lucas v Copperwaith 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
A minor is powerless to take legal 
action to protect his reputation, 
hence his parent or next friend 
takes action for him.  
Court will protect the 
reputation of a minor 
apprentice. 
Apprenticeship is not servitude 
and an apprentice is entitled to  
choose to leave an 
apprenticeship 
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Benjamin v Griffiths, 9 July 1834,
17 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
Samples of language in the report of Benjamin v Griffiths 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
The business person who assists a drunk 
person is vulnerable and his actions of 
assistance can jeopardise his reputation: “It 
was cruelty in the extreme, after being 
allowed to enter the house of the plaintiff in a 
beastly state…to turn around and accuse him 
of robbery…to charge him with basely 
violating all the laws of hospitality,”per Mr 
Horne, for the plaintiff, in court 9 July 1835, 
published in  Colonial Times 15 July 1834 
Slandering of a business person in the proper exercise of his 
commercial activity is actionable in the Supreme Court. 
 
Court requires appropriate professional standards from legal 
practitioners in the exercise of their professional duties:“The 
Chief Justice said he was satisfied it was Mr Sutton’s own 
fault for taking a verbal statement from the clerk,” per CJ 
Pedder, VDL Supreme Court 5 September 1834 published in 
Colonial Times, 9 September 1834 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the business person to 
protect his reputation when a drunk person 
attacks  his character: “The effect of such 
scandalous proceedings was that a man had 
his character secretly and silently destroyed, 
with almost no possibility of a remedy,” Mr 
Horne, for the plaintiff, VDL Supreme Court 






Positive value of the court as protector of the business 
person in the exercise of his commercial activity: “His 
Honour then addressed the jury, pointing out to them the 
necessity of their being convinced that the defendant 
charged the plaintiff without any reasonable or probable 
cause; and also that he was injured in his name and business 
by the reports circulated by the defendant,” per CJ Pedder 
VDL Supreme Court 9 July 1834 published in Colonial 
Times 15 July 1834 
 
Positive value of the court to provide relief to the slandered 
plaintiff by allowing a general verdict, thereby providing 
costs relief 
 
Principles identified in Benjamin v Griffiths 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Vulnerability of a business man 
who assists an intoxicated person  
The court will provide relief to 
a slandered plaintiff by 
allowing a general verdict, 
thereby providing costs relief 
The  court will protect the 
reputation of a business man 





Houghton v Reid, 22 August 1834
18 Puisne Judge Montagu on the bench  
 
Samples of language in the report of Houghton v Reid 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
A minor is unable to take legal action to 
protect his or her reputation thus legal action 
must be taken by a parent or next friend: 
“This was an action for slander brought by 
The publication of a woman’s jilting and unexpected 
pregnancy is inappropriate, regardless of such publication 
occurring in a private house: “His Honour allowed the case 
to go to the jury…: per Court Report,  Launceston 
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Mr James Houghton, on behalf of his 
daughter, Emma Houghton, a minor…”  per 
Launceston Advertiser, 28 August 1834 
 
The plaintiff who takes legal action against 
slander is further injured by the subsequent 
publication of the action in the media. 
Independent, 23 August 1834. 
  
Contemporaneous documentary evidence of an alleged 
slander is sufficient to quash a non-suit application by the 
defence: “Mr Gavin Ralston, one of the witnesses, declared, 
that he had made a memorandum of the conversation soon 
after it had taken place…” per Court Report,  Launceston 
Independent, 23 August 1834 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the minor female plaintiff to 
protect her reputation when another person 
slanders her: 
 
 “This was an action for slander brought by 
Mr James Houghton, on behalf of his 
daughter, Emma Houghton, a minor…”  per 
Launceston Advertiser, 28 August 1834 
Predominant values: 
 
The court will act to seek redress for a minor female who is 
slandered by a male: “…His Honour allowed the case to go 
to the jury…” per Launceston Independent, 23 August 1834 
  
 
Principles identified in Houghton v Reid 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of a minor to bring 
legal action to protect her 
reputation, hence her parent or next 
friend can take action on her behalf 
 
The plaintiff who takes legal action 
to protect her reputation from 
slander, is further injured by 
publication of the law report in the 
media. 
Court will seek to redress the 
destruction of  a minor’s   
reputation with an award of 
damages 
The publication of a woman’s 
jilting and unexpected pregnancy 
is inappropriate, regardless of 
such publication occurring in a 
private house 
 
A contemporaneous documentary 




Jennett v Baudinet, 15 January 15 1835,
19 before Assistant Police Magistrate Mr Thomas Mason 
 
Samples of language in the report of  Jennett v Baudinet 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Without money to meet legal costs, a plaintiff 
is unable to take legal action to protect his or 
her reputation. 
 
Plaintiff is personally responsible for 
payment of legal costs in a civil defamation 
suit  
 
Derogatory verballing of a public officer in private in the 
exercise of his/her official duties -  on its own -  is not 




Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the indigent plaintiff to take 
legal action when another person privately 




Positive value of the elements of defamation to be met 
before the court will accept an action for defamation – ie the 
publication of the alleged slander by the slanderer. 
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An official is vulnerable to verbal abuse in the 
exercise of his duties   
 
Principles identified in Jennett v Baudinet 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
An official is likely to receive 
verbal abuse in the exercise of his 
duties and is vulnerable to such 
verbal abuse.   
Court will not protect the 
reputation of officials who, in 
the course of their duties, say 
they are verbally abused, 
without further evidence 
Derogatory verbal abuse to an 
official in private, without a 
witness, is not actionable as 
defamation, nor, on its own, is 
it actionable in a Police court 
 
Wise v Kemp, 17 October 1835
20Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
Samples of language in the report of Wise v Kemp 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
A businessman taking action to protect his 
business reputation, is in jeopardy of having 
his financial health made public:  “C. 
Swanston, recollects a negotiation being 
carried on between Mr Wise and the Derwent 
Bank …it eventually failed…it was for a 
loan…witness was not satisfied with the 
securities offered,” per Tasmanian  23 
October 1835. 
The jury is liable to confuse its role of deciding the facts, 
that is, whether a comment is or is not slanderous and the 
law, that is, whether or not the comment is justifiable: 
“…the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on each of the 
four counts, on the second special plea of justification – 
found for the defendant on the first and third special pleas of 
justification,” per Tasmanian 23 October 1835. 
 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerless of a client to retain confidentiality 
of his financial business when his bank gives 
evidence in court: “C. Swanston, recollects a 
negotiation being carried on between Mr 
Wise and the Derwent Bank …it eventually 
failed…it was for a loan…witness was not 
satisfied with the securities offered,” per 




The court, by the direction of CJPedder, distinguishes 
between the personal and commercial activities of an 
individual: “…it is not actionable to call a man a swindler 
who is not in business, or unless it is respecting his 




Principles identified in Wise v Kemp 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
A businessman, taking action to 
protect his business reputation, is 
powerless to maintain 
confidentiality of his finances.  
Court will only protect a person 
being called a ‘swindler’ if he is 
so called in respect to his 
business.  
The court distinguishes between 
the personal and commercial 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SUPREME COURT LIBEL CASES 
 
Murray v Stephen 12 April 1826,
21 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
Samples of language in the report of  Murray v Stephen 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Plaintiff’s powerlessness to bring an action 
for libel if the Lieutenant Governor refuses to 
produce a key document:  CJ Pedder ruled 
that secondary evidence of the existence of 
the letter could not be received while the 
original document was in existence, Colonial 
Times 14 April 1826 AND 
The court recorded a decision for the 
defendant 
Secondary evidence of a document will not be received 
when the original document is in existence: CJ Pedder ruled 
that secondary evidence of the existence of the letter could 
not be received while the original document was in 




Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the plaintiff when another 
person attacks his character in writing and   
the libelling document remains in the 
possession of the Lieutenant Governor: CJ 
Pedder ruled that secondary evidence of the 
existence of the letter could not be received 
while the original document was in existence, 
Colonial Times 14 April 1826 
Predominant values: 
 
The age-old doctrines enshrined in the law of evidence take 
precedence in court over providing redress for individuals 
injured by libels: CJ Pedder ruled that secondary evidence 
of the existence of the letter could not be received while the 





Principles identified in Murray v Stephen 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
      The powerlessness of a libelled 
plaintiff to obtain the original 
document from the Lieutenant 
Governor 
The Lieutenant Governor displayed 
absolute power in refusing to 
produce a document for litigation 
and the court acceded;  
Secondary evidence of an original 
document will not be received while 
the original document is in 
existence 
  The hazardous consequences of an 
interlocked judicial and executive 
head of government 
 
 
Butler v Bent, 12 January 1830,
22 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
Kennedy v Bent, 15-16 January 1830,
23 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench, Captain Bell and Mr Beaumont, 
Assessors 
 
Samples of language in the report of  Kennedy v Bent  
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Powerlessness of an insolvent debtor to   
achieve fairness in forced creditor sales: “I 
waited for the plaintiff’s solicitor who came 
specifically to bid for the property”  : per 
evidence of Sheriff Mr Fereday in Court 15-
“It is utterly impossible in cases of libel, slander, seduction 
or others similar, to establish any given principle upon 
which to estimate the amount of injury sustained”: per CJ 
Pedder in Court 15-16 January 1830 in Tasmanian and 
Austral-Asiatic Review, 22 January 1830 
                                                 
21 Colonial Times, 14 April 1826 
22 Tasmanian and Austral-Asiatic Review, 15 January 1830 
23 Tasmanian and Austral-Asiatic Review, 22 January 1830 336 
16 January 1830 in Tasmanian and Austral-
Asiatic Review, 22 January 1830 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
The finding that the Sheriff plaintiff did not 
wait a reasonable time for persons expected to 
come to bid at the sale and 2 lots were sold 
for considerably less than their value, resulted 
in the Sheriff plaintiff being awarded 
damages of £100! 
 
The decision supports the inference that the 
court upholds officials in the course of their 




The real question is: “What is the nature of the libel and the 
situation of the party libelled” per CJ Pedder in Court  6 
February 1830 in Tasmanian and Austral-Asiatic Review, 
12February 1830 
 
Principles identified in Kennedy v Bent  
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
      Powerlessness of an insolvent to 
attain fairness in a Sherriff’s sale 
Power of the court to protect 
officers acting in the course of 
their duties, even if those duties are 
improperly undertaken 
The court will uphold government 
officials undertaking their official 
duties even when the officials 
improperly perform those duties 
 
Butler v Bent, 10 May 1830
24 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
Samples of language in the report of Butler v Bent 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Powerlessness of the indigent colonial debtor 
to avoid imprisonment for debt:  
Mr Weston’s Act  was passed in 1827 
requiring the amount of the debt to be £20 
before the debtor could be arrested and came 
into operation in Van Diemen’s Land in 
March 1829
25. Mr Wilson was imprisoned on 
8 April for non-payment of his debt of 
£12/10/0. 
 
Vulnerability of the indigent debtor when 
debt collecting legal costs are added to the 
original debt: Mr Wilson’s original debt of 
£12/10/0 is added Mr Butler’s legal costs of 
£17/14/7,  per p13 of web report. 
 
Sanctity of the individual’s personal and home life: “…the 
domestic scene is neither invaded nor any of the relations of 
private life”: per Mr Gellibrand, defending in Court, 10 May 
1830, p6 of web report. 
 
“In civil libel the defendant can use justification, that is, 
prove that what is written is justified,” per Mr Gellibrand, 
defending in Court, 10 May 1830, p7 of web report. 
 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
The vulnerability of the practice of the law 
when court sittings extend beyond tolerable 
hours: “I have endeavoured to explain to you 
the real questions in this case. If I have failed 
in so doing I should despair at this hour of 
Predominant values: 
 
The court protects an individual’s professional reputation: 
“… no public man is to have his conduct subjected to public 
animadversion and reproach,” per CJ Pedder, addressing the 
jury, in Court, 10 May 1830, p13 of web report. 
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night, of more fully informing you,” per CJ 
Pedder summing up after a hearing of 9 ½ 
hours, near midnight, 10 May 1830, p14 of 
web report. 
 
Principles identified in Butler v Bent 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of the indigent 
colonial debtor to avoid 
imprisonment for debt 
Power, residing in the province of a 
few intimates, has a high potential 
for corruption  
No public man is to have his 
conduct subjected to public 
animadversion and reproach 
 
Fereday v O’Connor, 13-16 December, 1831,
26 CJ Pedder on the bench 
Samples of language in the report of  Fereday v O’Connor 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
A colonial party is disadvantaged by the use 
of terms in formal documents which have 
different meanings according to the locale of 
their origin:”…some stress is laid upon the 
term “paid away” used by Mr Fereday…the 
expression originally inserted…was “passed 
away”…considering that expression to be a 
Scotticism, I myself struck it out and inserted 
the words “paid away” in its room” per 
Solicitor General Mr Stephen to the Court 13 
December 1831 in Tasmanian 17 December 
1831, site transcription p5 
The reputation of an individual is worthy of protection hence 
the court will act to protect reputation by making 
Suppression Orders: (re libel content): “I shall be  forced to 
abandon in consequence of an Order of this Court, that the 
proceedings at the Police Office shall only be produced in 
reference to the malicious prosecution,”  per Solicitor 
General, Mr Stephen, Opening Address to Court, 13 
December 1831, in Tasmanian, 17 December 1831 
 
Predominant indices:  
Vulnerability of a government official who, in 
the course and furtherance of his official 
duties, follows appropriate procedures which 
conflict with the desires of others: “Mr 
O’Connor (privately contracted to purchase 
property for £300...Mr Fereday considered it 
necessary to the proper discharge of his 
official duty to sell it by public auction...for 
£430...to the great disappointment of Mr 
O’Connor. Hence that deadly enmity which 
vented itself”, per Solicitor General Mr 
Stephen in Court 13 December 1831 in 
Tasmanian 17 December 1831 p3 
Vulnerability of government officials to 
become ensnared in conflict of interest 
matters if they mix their professional and 
personal activities: “In the month of October 
1828 Mr Fereday discounted a bill of 
Predominant values: 
 
The ill of defamation is identified as disturbing the peace 
and harmony of the community: “I ask by your verdict to 
prevent the peace and comfort of the community from being 
disturbed by such malicious proceedings – to protect others 
from being subjected to such base and cruel attacks.” per 
Solicitor General Mr Stephen, Tasmanian, 17 December 
1831 
 
The court is critical of time wasting by parties: “In 
consequence of affidavits up comes a 3
rd person in no way 
concerned in the matter and charges Mr Fereday with 
perjury…We found nothing to justify a 3
rd  party wholly 
unconcerned in the affair  standing forth to institute a 
proceeding,” per His Honour CJ Pedder giving judgment 
and referring to Mr O’Connor, as reported in Tasmanian 14 
April 1832 AND 
“If there were a new trial the whole case would be thrown 
into confusion utterly unnecessarily, except for 2 counts for 
slander enough cause to show why a verdict should not be 
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exchange for a man named …a few days’ 
before the bill became due Mr Fereday paid it 
away to Mr Young…He did not  receive any 
money for it but he did receive consideration 
for it He took what is called an IOU. Mr 
Young paid it into the Derwent Bank and it 
was dishonoured” per Solicitor General Mr 
Stephen, in court, 13 December 1831, in 
Tasmanian, 17 December 1831, p2  
for the defendant,” per His Honour CJ Pedder giving 
judgment and referring to Mr O’Connor, as reported in 
Tasmanian 14 April 1832, p119 
 
The court is critical of litigants who litigate without 
appropriate cause, such as Mr O’Connor’s charges against 
Mr Fereday, eg “Assigning so many charges of perjury 
without as the jury considered, any probable cause,” per His 
Honour CJ Pedder giving judgment and referring to Mr 
O’Connor, as reported in Tasmanian 14 April 1832 
 
 
Principles identified in Fereday v O’Connor 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Parties are disadvantaged by the use 
of unfamiliar terms: ‘paid away’ 
Court will protect the reputation of 
individuals 
Defamation disturbs the peace of the 
community 
Vulnerability  of government 
officials undertaking official duties  
  Court does not want its time wasted 
by 3




Meredith v Murray, 11 June 1833




Samples of language in the report of  Meredith v Murray 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
 
Plaintiff is powerless to sustain an action 
without sufficient evidence:  The court non-
suited the plaintiff 
 
 
The assessors alone were to determine the case; the judge 
could assist them with his opinion but the assessors are the 
judges of the whole matter, per the Attorney General in court 
Tasmanian, 12 July 1833, web p2. 
 
The court accepted that grounds for non-suiting include: that 
the allegations could not be maintained, no proof that the 
plaintiff attended the meeting, no proof of nomination of 
persons to the committee, no proof Mr Murray was the 
author of the offending article.  
 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
A plaintiff requires sufficient evidence to 
ground charges  
Predominant values: 
 
Positive value: The court will uphold a defendant’s call for 
non-suit if the defendant can show sufficient evidence to 
ground the action has not been provided to the court.  
 
Principles identified in Meredith v Murray 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of plaintiff with 
insufficient evidence 
 The court will uphold a defendant’s 
call for non-suit if there is 
Assessors alone determine the 
whole case 
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insufficient evidence from the 
plaintiff 
 
O’Connor v Meredith, 10 July 1833, Chief Justice Pedder on the Bench




Samples of language in the report of  O’Connor v Meredith 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
A Government official’s vulnerability in the 
performance of his work to claims of 
partiality: per the court, awarding the plaintiff 
£200 damages  
 
The whole of the article must be considered, rather than 
taking passages singly: per CJ Pedder, summing up in court 
10 July 1833, Hobart Town Courier, 12 July 1833, web p13. 
 
The publisher of a journal is liable for its contents 
regardless of where he is residing when the journal is 
published:  per CJ Pedder, summing up in court 10 July 
1833, in Hobart Town Courier, 12 July 1833, web p13. 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the plaintiff when another 
person publicly attacks  character and the 




Negative value of composing a libel as a joke: His Honour 
CJ Pedder, commented “very forcibly” upon “the convivial 
origin of the libel” stating it “filled him with horror” per CJ 
Pedder, in Court, Tasmanian, 12 July 1833, web p6 
 
 
Principles identified in O’Connor v Meredith 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
A Government official’s vulnerability 
to claims of partiality in the 
performance of his work  
Power of the court to protect a 
government official in the 
performance of his work  from the 
wrong of a libel 
A libel must not be composed as a 
joke 
 
 Schaw  v Meredith, 17 July 1833,
31 Chief Justice  Pedder on the bench 
 
Samples of language of the report of Schaw v Meredith 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Respondent refused plaintiff’s requests to 
make private reparation. 
 
The court awarded the plaintiff £50 damages  
 
“False, scandalous, defamatory, cruel and malicious libel 
reported in the Colonist newspaper”, per the claim of the 
plaintiff 
 
The publication “caused deep and irreparable injury to the 
plaintiff” per the Attorney General reported in Tasmanian, 
19 July 1833 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the plaintiff when another 
person publicly attacks  character and the 
power of the court to right a wrong 
Predominant values: 
 
Negative values of “False, scandalous, defamatory, cruel 
and malicious libel” comments  in a newspaper are 
identified and denounced by the court’s decision to award 
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£50 damages 
 
“It is immaterial that the publisher did not write the libel 
and was not present when  the libel was written and had 
written the libel by report”: per CJ Pedder to the jury per 




Principles identified in Schaw v Meredith 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of a person who has 
his reputation defamed to undo the 
damage  without the assistance of 
the court 
Court will seek to ameliorate the 
damage caused to an individuals 
reputation through the 
publication of a libel by an award 
of money  
The publication of “False, 
scandalous, defamatory, cruel and 
malicious libel” by the press is 
denounced by the court 
 
 Cookney v Brodie,  17 December 1833
32 Puisne Judge Montagu on the bench 
 
Samples of language of the report of Cookney v Brodie 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
The plaintiff’s powerlessness when Counsel 
fails to object to the admission of evidence 
which is prejudicial, biased or obvious 
hearsay: “Mr Tremlett testified, “There were 
rumours …”in court, 17 December 1833, 
Tasmanian 20 December 1833 
Liability ensues by paying for the insertion of an 
advertisement and directing it to be inserted, per Judge 
Montagu, in court  17 December 1833, Tasmanian  20 
December 1833 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the colonial plaintiff to 
protect his reputation from further 
assassination in court before an unhelpful and 
biased judiciary  
Predominant values: 
 
“It certainly appears to me that Mr Brodie’s conduct, 
although not proper, is still not particularly bad, for it might 
have happened that the advertisement had never been read 
by him”, per Judge Montagu in court 17 December 1833, 
Tasmanian 20 December 1833 
 
Principles identified in Cookney v Brodie 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
      Powerlessness of the plaintiff to 
prevent a biased judiciary from 
attacking his reputation 
Power of a judge to cause further 
harm to a libelled plaintiff  
The colonial court takes account of 
‘rumours’ when published by 
witnesses in court 
 
Murray v Murray, 11 December 1835
33Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
Samples of language of the report of  Murray v Murray 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
The Plaintiff is powerless, on the day, to 
challenge the court’s discretionary decision 
that the content of the pleadings is improper: 
The court has power to frustrate a plaintiff’s civil 
prosecution for libel by exercising its discretion to dismiss a 
jury: “His Honour the Chief Justice dismissed the jury on 
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“His Honour the Chief Justice dismissed the 
jury on account of the pleas of the defendant 
containing matter which His Honour  thought 
would be improper to place amongst the 
records of the court,” per   Hobart Town 
Courier, 18 December 1835 
 
account of the pleas of the defendant containing matter 
which His Honour  thought would be improper to place 
amongst the records of the court,” per  Hobart Town 
Courier, 18 December 1835 
 
The court has power to make a determination  upon the 
appropriateness of pleadings: “His Honour the Chief Justice 
dismissed the jury on account of the pleas of the defendant 
containing matter which His Honour  thought would be 
improper to place amongst the records of the court,” per 
Hobart Town Courier, 18 December 1835 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of a plaintiff to bring a civil 
action for libel if the bench determines to 
frustrate it on the day in court: “His Honour 
the Chief Justice dismissed the jury on 
account of the pleas of the defendant 
containing matter which His Honour  thought 
would be improper to place amongst the 
records of the court,” per   Hobart Town 
Courier, 18 December 1835 
Predominant values: 
 
The Chief Justice of wielded absolute power over the 
content of matters brought in the civil court: “His Honour 
the Chief Justice dismissed the jury on account of the pleas 
of the defendant containing matter which His Honour   
thought would be improper to place amongst the records of 
the court,” per   Hobart Town Courier, 18 December 1835 
 
 
Principles identified in Murray v Murray 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Party is powerless to bring a libel 
action if the court refuses to receive 
pleadings.  
Court will protect the reputation of 
individuals by banning pleadings 
from being on court records 
Pleadings are a specialist skill of 
lawyers and ought not to be drafted 
by laypersons 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: VAN DIEMEN’S LAND CRIMINAL LIBEL CASES 
 
 R v Bent (No. 1) 26 July 1825
34, Chief Justice Pedder on the bench  
 
  Samples of language of the report of  R v Bent(No. 1) 
 
Indices of power  Identification of values 
I am a plain man
35per defendant in 
court 
 
I never had the remotest intention of 
printing a libel
36 per defendant in court 
 
 
I have earnestly to entreat that Your 
Honour  and you gentlemen of the jury 
will afford me your favourable 
consideration
37 per defendant in court 
The difficulty with this case is...upon which 
species of evidence to rely
38per CJ Pedder in 
court 
 
What is the defendant legally found guilty of
39 
per CJ Pedder in court 
 
 
I have no precedent shewn to me
40  per CJ 
Pedder in court 
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Lord Mansfield (in the English Woodfall libel 
case) chose to give the benefit of the doubt to 
the defendant: I shall adopt the same principle
41 




Powerlessness  of the defendant  
Predominant values: 
 
The negative value of attempting to ground a 
decision of guilt on insufficient evidence is 
identified and denounced  
 
Principles identified in R v Bent (No. 1) 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of the defendant: “I 
am a plain man”
42the defendant in 
court 
 
Court will give the defendant 
the benefit of the doubt , Lord 
Mansfield (in the English 
Woodfall libel case) chose to 
give the benefit of the doubt to 
the defendant: I shall adopt the 
same principle
43 per CJ Pedder 
in court 
 
A finding of guilt can not be 
grounded on insufficient 
evidence, What is the defendant 
legally found guilty of
44 per CJ 
Pedder in court 
 
 
 R v Bent (No. 2), 1 August 1825
45 Chief Justice  Pedder on the bench  
 
Samples of language of the report of  R v Bent  (No. 2) 
 
 
Indices of power  Identification of values 
 
“I am again here called upon to 
answer for the writing of others” per 
Mr Bent’s written address to the court 
in Hobart Town Gazette 5 August 1825 
 
“…the great weight and influence of 
the name of His Honour the Lieutenant 
Governor, is besides brought forward 
against me, by the conversion of what 
appeared in the plainness of my 
comprehension to be only fair political 
discussion”  per Mr Bent’s written 
address to the court in Hobart Town 
Gazette 5 August 1825 
 
An incarcerated defendant is at a 
“…a man may express things which are 
disagreeable to hear…resulting in unpleasant 
constructions drawn by the public, but if 
motives and constructions are left untouched, 
observations are confined to mere measures 
whether they are beneficial or otherwise to the 
community …the doing so is the fair right of 
every public writer”.per CJ Pedder  summing up 
for the jury in Hobart Town Gazette 5 August 
1825 
“It is impossible that the government of any 
country can be charged with acting tyrranically 
and oppressively without such charge being a 
libel.” per CJ Pedder, summing up for the jury, 
in Hobart Town Gazette 5 August 1825 
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disadvantage when attempting a 
written defence: “It is totally out of my 
power to attempt to defend the articles 
which form the subject matter of the 
present information” per Mr Bent’s 
written address to the court in Hobart 
Town Gazette 5 August 1825 
 
Responsibility for content of articles is 
imputed to the proprietor of a 
newspaper eg “I cannot understand 
why it is inserted here that Mr Evan 
Henry Thomas was the Editor, while I 
am charged with composing…I am not 
the composer” per Mr Bent’s written 
address to the court in Hobart Town 




: “…the best way is for me to state the law and 
leave you (the jury) to come to your 
conclusion”. per CJ Pedder summing up for the 
jury in Hobart Town Gazette 5 August 1825 
“The dry matter of fact of publication and the 
meaning and intention of the matter so 
published, is the real question” per CJ Pedder 
summing up for the jury in Hobart Town 
Gazette 5 August 1825. 
“If the intention was to impute to the Lieutenant 
Governor he acts corruptly and tyrannically 
and treats the complaints of people with 
derision…it is libellous…but if it is meant as 
mere supposition, hypothetical argument, a 
mere possible case, it is  not libellous”. per CJ 
Pedder summing up for the jury in Hobart Town 
Gazette 5 August 1825 
“Every man has a right to express his 
sentiments upon the administration of the public 
affairs provided he does so fairly and properly. 
But if he imports corrupt or tyrannical motives 
to any Government it is certainly a libel…it is 
impossible for any govt to exist if the governors 
are to be charged to be actuated by corrupt and 
tyrannical motives,” per CJ Pedder summing up 








Regarding the distinction between composing 
and publishing libellous materials: “I recollect 
that you urged in your defence that you did not 
compose any of these libels.   I confess I can 
discover but a very slight difference between the 
person who composes the poison, and he who 
disseminates it”. – per CJ Pedder sentencing Mr 
Bent, 29 March 1826 in Colonial Times  31 
March 1826 
 
The negative value of libelling the Government 
is identified and denounced by the court: “If 
libels upon the government are considered 
highly criminal in England how much more so 
must all such be in a colony constituted as is 
this, at such distance form the parent state”. per 
CJ Pedder, sentencing Mr Bent, 29 March 1826 




Principles identified in R v Bent (No. 2) 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
      An incarcerated defendant denied 
legal representation is powerless. 
Court has the power of 
discretion in sentencing 
The press has a right to make 
observations and fair and 
proper comment on public 
affairs of government : nobody 
has a right to import corrupt 
or tyrannical motives to the 
government  
 
 R v Bent 15 April 1826
46 – the return to court of R v Bent (No 1) for a retrial, Chief Justice Pedder on the 
bench 
 
Samples of language of the report of  R v Bent  
 
Indices of power  Identification of values 
 
“The article upon which he had been 
found guilty was wholly written by Mr. 
E. H. Thomas; that upon understanding 
his writings were objectionable, he had 
dismissed him from the situation of 
Editor”  ; affidavit in mitigation from 
Mr Bent, read in court 22 April 1826 in 
Colonial Time 26 April 1826 
 
“I saw the article of the 8th of October 
before it was published.  I assisted to 
correct the press, I believe I did.  The 
manuscript is in my hand-writing; the 
manuscript produced is i[t];” per Mr 
Thomas under cross-examination, in 
court 15 April 1826, in Colonial Times 
21 April 1826 
 
“Mr. Bent was Printer and Publisher.  
Mr.  Bent claimed to be Proprietor 
during the time I was Editor. I penned 
nearly all the articles for that Paper.  
The articles I wrote were uniformly by 
his direction, and by his control.  I was 
subservient to him.   He uniformly 
exercised the privileges of rejecting or 
altering any article I wrote”,  per Mr 
Thomas giving evidence , in court 15 
April 1826, in Colonial Times 21 April 
1826.  
 
“The circumstance of having a wife and 
children …(together with) current 
imprisonment… and a considerable fine” are 
legitimate circumstances for mitigation of a 
penalty;  per CJ Pedder, in sentencing, in court 
22 April 1826 Colonial Times 22 April 1826  
 
In determining whether a publication is 
libellous, the questions are: “whether the facts 
are proved, and secondly, what is the intent;” 
per CJ Pedder addressing the jury in court 15 
April 1826 reported in Colonial Times 21 April 
1826. 
 
“Printing and publishing are one and the 
same” per Duke of Athol v Pearse, relied upon 
by  CJ Pedder, in sentencing, in Court 22 April 
1826 Colonial Times 26 April 1826 
Predominant indices: 
 
Powerlessness  of an incarcerated 
defendant 
“…We find Mr. Thomas, the author, 
Predominant values: 
 
English statute and common law for libel 
prevails in Van Diemen’s Land eg  the case, 
Elphinstone  v.  Baldwin, for a Libel  per CJ 
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brought here as a witness, or, to use 
his own expression, puts Mr. Bent upon 
a pinnacle to plunge him into the gulph 
of danger!” per Mr Gellibrand, 
Counsel for defendant in Court 15 
April 1826 in Colonial Times 21 April 
1826   
Pedder,  in sentencing, 22 April 1826 in 







Principles identified in R v Bent  
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
      Powerlessness of dissatisfied Van 
Diemen’s Land litigants subjected 
to what seemed to them to be an 
absolute and totalitarian judiciary 
Power of the judge to influence 
the court through advocacy in 
summing up 
Being married, having children, 
current imprisonment and a 
considerable fine are viewed as 
legitimate responsibilities 
deserving of circumstances for 
mitigation of a penalty 
 
R v Bent, 15 May 1827
47Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
Samples of language of the report of R v Bent 15 May 1827
48 
 
Indices of power  Identification of values 
 
The defendant, who was not attended 
by any Counsel, said, were he to 
attempt to defend, by a lengthened 
discussion, the charges exhibited 
against him, it would perhaps be only 
to occupy more time than was 
necessary, per Mr Bent in court 15 
May 1827 per Colonial Times 18 May 
1827  
 
An article is libellous if there was any malice 
displayed in the articles in question, on the part 
of the defendant, per CJ Pedder in Court 
directing jury, 15 May 1827 per Colonial Times 
18 May 1827 
 
Malice is determined from the general tendency 
of the articles; Per CJ Pedder in Court directing 
jury, 15 May 1827 per Colonial Times 18 May 
1827 
 
If the publication was made with  intent to bring 
(a person) into contempt and hatred, there is   
libel; Per CJ Pedder in Court directing jury, 15 




Powerlessness  of an unrepresented 
defendant: The defendant, who was not 
attended by any Counsel, said, were he 
to attempt to defend, by a lengthened 
discussion, the charges exhibited 
against him, it would perhaps be only 
to occupy more time than was 
necessary, per Mr Bent in court 15 
Predominant values: 
 
The elements of libel are the general tendency 
of writing to show malice and intent to bring a 
person into contempt and hatred per    Per CJ 
Pedder in Court directing jury, 15 May 1827 per 
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Principles identified in R v Bent 15 May 1827
49 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
      Powerlessness of an unrepresented 
defendant 
Power of unsupervised officials 
to abuse a system designed to 
raise state funds  
Pre-occupation with the 
elements of a law can inhibit 
the ability to see the underlying 
ethics 
 
 R v Montagu, 22 June 1829,
50Chief Justice  Pedder on the bench 
 
Samples of language of the report of  R v Montagu  
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Personal legal action for a private matter must 
be taken in the civil jurisdiction:  “If he 
thought himself aggrieved…commence a civil 
action for the alleged injury” per CJ Pedder 
in court 22 June 1829 in Colonial Times 26 
June 1829  
Negative value of attempting to bring a personal civil action 
in the inappropriate proceeding and forum of the criminal 
jurisdiction: “The Attorney General could not file a criminal 
information against himself, nor could any other person do 
so;” per CJ Pedder in court 22 June 1829 in Colonial Times 
26 June 1829  
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the plaintiff to bring an 
action in an inappropriate forum 
Predominant values: 
 
The court will not entertain actions in the inappropriate 
jurisdiction 
 
Principles identified in R v Montagu 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
      Powerlessness of ex-officials to use 
official proceedings to their own 
ends 
Power attaches to an official 
position as distinct from the 
person holding the official 
position 
Official power is for official use   
    Personal and official matters are 
separated 
 
 R v Gregson, 2-3 November and 8 November 1832
51 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench 
 
Samples of language of the report of  R v Gregson 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
 
Inherent corruption of a system of justice 
which relies upon the payment of convict 
witnesses for evidence against their masters: 
“…in a given number of hours, he would get 
plenty of witnesses who for a shilling each, 
would swear to any thing”  Mr Gregson in 
 
Control of the press is essential: “If the licentiousness of the 
press prevails there is an end to all society,” per AG in court 
2 November 1832. 
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court 2 November 1832 quoting comments by 
AG Gellibrand  
Predominant indices:  
 
Vulnerability of an overseer of convicts: “ 
…heard there was a secret inquiry going on 
at the police-office relative to his department: 
Thomson told him so; he is a prisoner and 
has been long looking for indulgences, not 
right to examine witness in private , whereby 
the interests of masters may be affected,” per 
John Lee Archer, Colonial Architect being 
examined in court, 2 November 1832 
Vulnerability of a convict worker to a corrupt 
master: “…he is a prisoner and has been long 
looking for indulgences, it is not right to 
examine witness in private , whereby the 
interests of masters may be affected” per John 
Lee Archer, Colonial Architect being 
examined in court, 2 November 1832 
Predominant values: 
 
For libel, “Whatever a man holds up in contempt as acting 
in a dishonourable manner, is clearly a matter of libel” per 
CJ Pedder, directing the jury 2 November 1832 
 
It is not libel if: “The mere purpose of the writing …is for the 




Principles identified in R v Gregson 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
      Vulnerability of government 
officials working with convicts to  
Power of those who have money to 
pervert the course of justice 
Focus is maintained on the 
technicalities of the law, for 
example the elements of libel, thus 
preventing perception of inherent 
ills of the justice system 
Vulnerability of convicts to accept 
offers of money in return for 
providing evidence 
   
 
 R at the prosecution of J. T. Gellibrand v Gregson, 3 November 1832, Chief Justice  Pedder on the bench
52 
 
Samples of language of the report of  J. T. Gellibrand v Gregson 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
 
The defendant’s vulnerability when the judge 
does not mention to the jury evidence of 
potential bias: eg, Mr Gregson asked CJ 
Pedder,  at the conclusion of His Honour’s 
summing up to the jury, to inform the jury 
that Mr Gellibrand was the standing Counsel 
for the Colonist newspaper and had seen the 
article charged as libellous before its 
publication, the judge, replying that he 
“…did not know that it was of any 
consequence”, Tasmanian, 9 November 1832 
 
Vulnerability of a witness in the court forum: 
eg Counsel Mr Horne’s threat:  “I must have 
 
Denigration of the press and its publication of libels: 
“…when once the channels of the press become polluted, for 
the base unworthy purpose of gratifying private malice, 
instead of warming us by its influence, society becomes 
disorganised; it hunts down and paralyzes its victim; it 
destroys his peace at home and his reputation abroad” … 
libel is “the greatest pest which could creep into a 
community”, per Mr Horne, prosecuting in court, 
Tasmanian, 9 November 1832 
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a direct answer to my question else I will keep 
you here all morning” per Counsel Mr Horne 
to witness Reverend Mr Conolly in court, 
Tasmanian, 9 November 1832 
 
 
Powerlessness of self-represented litigants in 
a colony where there were few legal 
practitioners:  “Mr Gregson was a self-
represented litigant of necessity because no 
counsel was available in the  colony at that 
time to assist him,” Tasmanian, 9 November 
1832 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of an unrepresented  Van 
Diemen’s Land defendant in a criminal 
prosecution where, until 1840, the trial was 
before a military jury instead of a civil jury: 
“Mr Gellibrand’s stated reason for bringing 
the action as a criminal prosecution as 
distinct from a civil action was to protect 
himself from charges that he was greedy for 





The paramount value was the maintenance of “the peace of 




The control of the press was essential: “…curb its 
licentiousness” and return the press to “that wholesome 
state whereby the interests of society would be promoted”, 
per Mr Horne in court, enunciating Mr Gellibrand’s wish for 
the press, 
Tasmanian, 9 November 1832 
 
 
Principles identified in J. T. Gellibrand v Gregson 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of an unrepresented 
defendant in a criminal 
proseuction 
Power of the legal fraternity to 
diminish a defendant’s case by 
‘not being available’ to provide 
legal assistance 
The press must be prevented 
from disturbing the peace of 
the community 
 
 R v Browne (No. 1) 1833, 14 August 1833, Judge Montagu on the bench
53 
 
Samples of language of the report of R v Browne (No. 1) 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Witnesses were unable to testify to the identify 
of the writer of the offending article  
 
The court acquitted the defendant.  
 
The identity of the writer of a libel must be proven for a 





Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of criminal prosecutor to 
prosecute an individual for writing a libel 
without proving that the individual was the 
Predominant values: 
 
Negative value of issuing a criminal prosecution against an 
individual for writing a criminal libel without proving that 
the individual prosecuted was the actual writer is identified 
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writer of the libel.   in the court’s acquittal of the defendant 
 
 
Principles identified in R v Browne (No. 1) 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of Crown 
prosecutor to prosecute an 
unknown writer of libel 
The court will not entertain a 
criminal prosecution against an 
unidentified writer 
The identity of the writer of a 
libel must be proven for a valid 




R v Browne (No. 2), 14 August 1833,
54 Judge Montagu on the bench 
 
Samples of language of the report of  R v Browne (No. 2) 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
The original manuscript of the libel must be 
produced in court; to prove it was a libel: a 
copy is not sufficient 
The court acquitted the defendant.  
Merely owning the premises where a newspaper is published 
does not incur liability for content of a publication 
 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of criminal prosecutor to 
prosecute an individual for writing a libel 
without disclosing the original manuscript; a 




Negative value of issuing a criminal prosecution against an 
individual for writing a criminal libel without proving that 
the individual prosecuted was the actual writer is identified 
in the court’s acquittal of the defendant 
 
 
Principles identified in R v Browne (No. 2) 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of criminal 
prosecutor to prosecute an 
individual for writing a libel 
without disclosing the original 
manuscript;  
Power of court to reject a 
prosecution when the identity of 
the writer is unknown 
Ownership of publishing 
premises does not incur liability 
for content of a publication 
 
 
R v Robertson(No. 1), 9 March 1835
55 Chief Justice Pedder on the bench  
 
Samples  of  language in the report of R v Robertson (No. 1) 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
Defendant’s powerlessness to write or speak 
critical sentiments about public measures and 
practices.  
 
The court punished the defendant with fines 
and imprisonment, and continuing 
imprisonment until the fines be fully paid
56. 
Disapproval of adverse comment of the conduct of public officers: 
“You set yourself up as a self-elected commentator upon the 
conduct of public officers” and “Your paper is a guillotine…(by 
which)…you endeavour to rob men of their characters”, per CJ 
Pedder in court 
 
Disapproval  of knowingly and intentionally disturbing society’s 
peace of mind and happiness:“(Mr Robertson)contemplated his 
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writings would disturb and destroy the peace and happiness of 
society and it was with that intention they were written,” per CJ 
Pedder in court 
 
Approval of a well-regulated press, “…the advantages that might 
result to a community through the medium of a well regulated 
press” per Attorney General in court 
Predominant indices:  
 
Power of the court to attempt to alter the 
defendant’s view of and practice of the role of 
newspaper reporters and publishers through 




Positive value of the court to regulate and modify the  behaviour of 
individuals through punishment: eg “I most sincerely trust that at 
the expiration of the sentence of imprisonment which I shall pass 
upon you, you will entertain far different views of a public writer 




Negative values of adverse comment upon the conduct of  public 
officers, disturbing unjust and malicious publication are denounced 
by the court’s decision to   punish the defendant with fines and 
imprisonment, eg: 
 
(a)  £60 fine and imprisonment for 4 months and continuing 
imprisonment until the fine be paid  for accusing the LG 
of “dishonourable and unworthy conduct”  in regard to 
alteration of the date of the land grant Deed  
(b)  £120 fine and imprisonment for 8 months after the 
expiration of the first sentence and further imprisonment 
until the fine be paid for accusing the LG of using 
property belonging to the Crown for his own private 
purposes, viz feeding his own animals with Crown hay 
(c)  £20 fine and imprisonment for 1 month for libelling 
lawyer Mr Rowlands, viz writing about the consequences 




Principles identified in R v Robertson (No. 1) 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Powerlessness of press to write 
critically of public measures and 
practices  
The court has power to punish 
harshly  –  by fine and 
imprisonment until fine is paid 
Society’s peace of mind and 
happiness are paramount 
    The press must be well 
regulated 
 
 R v Robertson (No. 2) 7 April 1835,
59 Chief Justice and Puisne Judge Montagu on the bench 
 
Samples of language in the report of  R v Robertson (No. 2) 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
A defendant in prison –without legal representation -  is 
powerless to adequately respond to criminal charges: 
Publication of defamatory material about a 
public officer in the exercise of his/her 
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“We wrote a note to Mr Gellibrand, requesting him to call, 
that we might make a motion for our being allowed to come 
into Court to shew cause. We waited until 10 o’clock on 
Tuesday in expectation of seeing him, and when we lost all 
hope of his coming, we wrote off a petition to the Clerk of the 
Court. Mr George Stephen…declined to receive it. We then 
sent it to their Honours…and the Chief Justice directed Mr 
George Stephen to read it…”Affidavit of Mr Gilbert 
Robertson, True Colonist 17 April 1835; 
AND 
“Mr Robertson prayed for more time as he had not received 




th  May this deponent was assaulted by the 
keeper of the prison and by him forcibly and violently 
dragged and pushed out of the prison wherein he had been 
confined under sentence of this honourable court, and without 
any writ of Habeus Corpus, was forcibly taken into court 
and…ordered to plead to the said Information, which the 
deponent refused to do because he had not received a copy of 
the Information or the Affidavits on which the Court had 
granted the rule,” Affidavit of Gilbert Robertson, True 
Colonist, 15 May 1835 
 
private undertakings -  is actionable as 
criminal libel. 
 
“The first alleged libel …imputed to Captain 
John Montagu that he had improperly 
possessed himself of a large quantity of 
building materials, the property of the 
Crown, and had employed them in the 
construction of his own private house,” per 
Solicitor General, Edward McDowall, in 
VDL Supreme Court 7 April 1835, 




Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of the indigent, imprisoned and unrepresented 
defendant to take appropriate defensive legal action: 
“Your petitioner being now confined in prison, cannot even 
swear an affidavit himself, much less procure the other 
affidavits necessary in this case”,  Affidavit of Gilbert 




 “ It is extremely hard that a man is to be charged with an 
offence, and put upon trial, and then made to pay for not   
knowing what he is charged with…” per Gilbert Robertson, in 
court to Montagu J., 7 May 1835  
Predominant values: 
 
Negative values of the potential for 
corruption in an incestuous colonial system 
of justice wherein power resides in the hands 
of a few: R v Robertson(No2)  Supreme 
Court of VDL, 7 April 1835, Pedder, CJ and 
Montagu, J – an alleged  criminal libel by 
Mr Robertson on Captain John Montagu, 
Acting Colonial Secretary, nephew of LG 
Arthur and brother of Judge Montagu, sitting 
on the Bench with CJ Pedder: 
 
“On account of the high official situation of 
Captain Montagu, and his near connection 
with the head of government, persons who 
could give evidence for your petitioner are 
afraid to make any voluntary affidavits in 
this case,”  per Affidavit of Gilbert 
Robertson, True Colonist 17 April 1835 
 
 
Principles identified in R v Robertson (No. 2) 
 
POWERLESSNESS  VALUE  POWER 
Powerlessness of an 
unrepresented defendant in 
prison  
 
The publication of defamatory 
material about a public officer 
in his private undertakings is 
actionable as criminal libel 
Power, residing in the dominion 
of a few intimates, has a high 
potential for corruption 
Denial of legal assistance renders     352 
a defendant powerless 
 
 R v Murray, 25 and 29 September 1835,
60 Chief Justice Pedder and Puisne Judge Montagu on the bench 
 
Samples of language in the report of  R v Murray 
 
Indices of powerlessness   Identification of values 
The Crown will not prosecute for criminal 
libel unless a malicious intent is apparent … 
“His Honour the Chief Justice considered the 
only  question in this case was whether the 
article complained of was published  with 
malicious intent or not” per   Tasmanian, 2 
October 1835 
 
The publication of content without a malicious intent is not 
criminal libel “… His Honour the Chief Justice considered 
the only question in this case was whether the article 
complained of was published  with malicious intent or not” 
per   Tasmanian, 2 October 1835 
 
To protect himself from prosecution for criminal libel the 
defendant can use the defence of publication without 
malicious intent and tender  independent evidence of 
showing the truth of the content was investigated prior to 
publication: “The judges only appreciated the motives of our 
whole conduct which induced this matter. Malice never yet, 
we hope and believe, formed a part of our constitution.” per 
Tasmanian 2 October 1835 
 
Predominant indices:  
 
Powerlessness of a plaintiff to gain the 
Crown’s assistance to protect his reputation 
from libelling by the press when the court 
applies the subjective criterion of malicious 
intent to the alleged libel: “… His Honour the 
Chief Justice considered the only question in 
this case was whether the article complained 
of was published  with malicious intent or 




A publisher is entitled to print matter which has been 
investigated for truth – apparently even if it is subsequently 
found not to have been truthful –  so long as it is not 
published with malicious intent:  
“…R.L. Murray had done nothing more than fulfil his duty 
as a public writer …taken great pains to ascertain what was 
the real truth before he published it…neither had the 
publication been made with any malicious intent,” per CJ 
Pedder Tasmanian, 2 October 1835 
 
 
Principles identified in R v Murray 
 
POWERLESSNESS  POWER  VALUES 
Party is powerless to obtain the 
assistance of the Crown to bring an 
action for libel when the court 
applies the subjective criterion of 
‘malicious intent’ to the publication  
Court will protect a publisher 
who shows a publication was 
not with malicious intent  
A publisher is entitled to publish 
material if it has been 
investigated for truth and is not 
published with malicious intent  
 
                                                 
60 Tasmanian, 2 October 1835 